Mandatory accounting compliance by Australian mineral resources firms: the affect of auditor independence and specialisation by Heniro, Joshua
School of Accounting 
 
 
 
 
 
Mandatory Accounting Compliance by Australian 
Mineral Resources Firms: The Affect of Auditor 
Independence and Specialisation 
 
 
 
 
 
Joshua Heniro 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis is presented for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy 
of 
Curtin University of Technology 
 
 
 
November 2010 
I 
 
Declaration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To the best of my knowledge and belief this thesis contains no 
material previously published by any other person except where 
due acknowledgment has been made. 
 
This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the 
award of any other degree or diploma in any university. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Signature: Joshua Heniro 
 
Date:  17 November 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II 
 
Acknowledgements 
First and foremost, I thank you ABBA heavenly father for the 
wisdom and perseverance that has been bestowed upon me 
thorough out this PhD journey and my life. 
 
There are many people that I want to thank for their assistance, 
guidance and support in this long journey of completing my thesis 
for the past years. I sincerely thank my supervisors Professor Greg 
Tower and Professor J-L.W. Mitchell Van der Zahn who have 
patiently guided me. I am grateful for the vision, advice, 
encouragement, feedback and immense knowledge that have been 
provided. The significant effort and valuable time they committed 
has made this extended journey much easier. 
 
I am truly thankful to School of Accounting and Curtin Business 
School for the scholarship. The financial support is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
 
I would like to express my gratitude to my parents, brothers, and 
sisters who deserve special thanks for their unconditional love, 
understanding, and encouragement. 
 
I also would like to thank Jo Boycott who is always helpful and 
supportive. Thank you, Patchareewan Boriboonsate for the 
continuous support, believing in me, and all the prayers. To my 
dear my friends Aileen Lim, Aripin Buman, John Jiang, Candes Siew 
and KokFai Thong, Khim Loo, Aunt CuiLan and Aunt Wenzi, I am 
thankful for your love, best wishes, support, and encouragement. 
Wee Khong, thank you for everything, all are appreciated. Finally, I 
am greatly indebted to Nensi Lim, without whom, all this would not 
have been accomplished. I thank you for the selfless love. I did it. 
 
III 
 
Abstract 
 
The two objectives of this thesis are to investigate the magnitude 
of compliance with AASB 6 Exploration for and Evaluation of 
Mineral Resources and AASB 136 Impairment of Assets; and to 
examine the influence of audit quality on the compliance levels 
utilising data from 305 Australian mineral resources public listed 
firms. Consistent with agency theory auditor independence and 
audit specialisation are considered pivotal determinants of the 
magnitude of a disclosure compliance index that comprises 62 
mandatory disclosure items.  
 
Findings reveal there is 76% compliance rate with both AASB 6 and 
AASB136 by Australian mineral resource listed firms. The average 
fees paid to the incumbent auditors for non-audit services is AUD 
$74,183. The ratio of non-audit fees to total fees earned by 
Australian accounting firms is 26% whilst 53% of the firms engage 
the services of a specialist auditor. 
 
OLS regression analysis reveals a statistically significant negative 
association between the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees and 
level of compliance. This suggests that in the Australian mineral 
resources sector context, large non-audit fees paid to the 
incumbent auditors seem to influence the auditor‘s independence. 
Yet, this thesis does not find any evidence that firms that employ 
services from a specialist auditor result in a higher level of 
compliance. Additional sensitivity analyses indicate that the results 
are generally robust across alternative measures.  
 
These findings have important implication for accounting bodies, 
regulators, investors and other interested parties. Based on the 
findings, regulators could either: (1) do nothing, and allow the 
market to assess the risk imposed of the non-disclosure made by 
firms and take necessary action to reflect on the firms‘ market 
share prices (though such a option is unlikely given tenets of 
regulation theory); (2) enforce and penalize any non-compliance 
with the mandatory disclosures via tougher regulations; or (3) 
indirectly improve the level of compliance by means of auditor 
independence. The results show auditor independence (i.e., non-
audit fees) is significantly associated with magnitude of 
compliance; regulators could regulate these non-audit services to 
boost the magnitude of compliance. 
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Overview of Research Study 
Globalisation of the world economy has led companies to seek 
international resources to finance expansion, modernisation and 
materials to compete in the world market. Similarly, investors are 
seeking potential investments and risk diversification across 
companies and nations. However, differences in accounting 
practices amongst countries are the biggest hindrance to global 
trading and expansion (Choi and Mueller, 1984; Alexander, Britton 
and Jorissen, 2007).  
 
Accounting standards have economic consequences such as 
increased volatility in the net income figure, changing financial 
ratios and possible violations of debt covenant agreements, which 
have direct impact on share prices (Tower, Hancock and Taplin, 
1999; Bailey, Karolyi and Salva, 2006). As a result, the 
need/demand for internationally comparable financial reports and, 
therefore, internationally comparable accounting standards, has 
never been greater to facilitate the international flow of capital and 
exchange of information (Taylor and Jones, 1999; Alexander, 
Britton and Jorissen, 2007). 
 
The Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) is the 
Australian body responsible for setting accounting standards for all 
reporting entities (Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission Act 2001, Section 227). The AASB has been 
developing accounting standards with a view to international 
harmonisation for a number of years. In July 2002 the Australian 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC), the statutory body responsible 
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for overseeing the setting of accounting standards, issued a FRC 
Bulletin (2002/4) recommending formal adoption of international 
accounting standards (now known as the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS)). This was formally adopted in March 
2003 and the AASB‘s harmonisation1 policy was fundamentally 
changed to a ‗convergence‘ approach. The AASB announced that 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) would be 
adopted as equivalent AASB Standards, with some minor 
exceptions (i.e., the exception of the accounting standards that 
relate to domestic issues and/or no equivalent IFRSs). The 
ratification was finalised on 15 July 2004. Subsequently, entities 
that comply with AASB standards (also known as IFRS-equivalents) 
are deemed to be simultaneously in compliance with those of 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). 
 
The AASB adopted a ‗big-bang‘ approach to transition; thus, 
Australian entities are required to comply with the applicable 
accounting standards (i.e., IFRS-equivalents) from 1 January 2005 
(Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, 2004). At the time of the decision to 
adopt international accounting standards the impact on mineral 
resource sector firms2 was considered to have far-reaching 
complications (Lowes, 2004). Various mineral resource insiders, 
commentators, accounting professionals and scholars alike (e.g., 
Lowes, 2004; Jubb, 2005) expressed concern regarding the 
adoption of international accounting standards verbatim would 
significantly increase earnings volatility, impact reported profits, 
alter balance sheet presentations and cause possible breaches of 
                                                     
1 Harmonisation is defined as ‗the process of increasing the consistency and comparability 
of accounts in order to remove the barriers to the international movement of capital and 
exchange of information by reducing the differences in accounting and company law‘ 
(Nobes, 1994, p.33). 
2 It is acknowledged the decision to adopt international accounting standards provided a 
major shake-up of the accounting practices of all Australian listed firms. This study, 
however, is limited to the mineral resources sector. Consequently, for brevity discussion 
is limited to the sector. 
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debt covenants. In particular, the accounting treatment for 
impaired assets is one issue identified as a specific driver of these 
concerns (Jubb, 2005) 3.  
 
In July and December 2004, AASB issued Accounting Standard 
AASB 6 – Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources 
(Australian equivalent to IFRS 6) and AASB 136 – Impairment of 
Assets (Australian equivalent to International Accounting Standard 
(IAS) 36), as part of Australia‘s convergence with IFRSs4. Both 
standards apply for reporting periods ending on or after 1 January 
2005. AASBs 6 and 136 are standards that have fundamental far-
reaching implications for assets revaluation5. Siy (2009, p. 378) 
provides further explanation of the importance of assets 
revaluation as follow: 
 Estimates of mineralization are crucial to the 
determination of mining companies‘ financial results. 
They underpin much of the value that investors place 
on the natural resource assets of extractive business. 
Financial reporting contends not only with the 
presentation of mineral MRR [mineral resources 
reserves] but how financial statements are impacted 
in terms of financial position and earnings. This is 
demonstrated by MRR‘s direct impact on key 
accounting policies. Shifts in mineral projections 
influence asset carrying values and returns through 
periodic charges against income as a result of 
depreciation, depletion or amortization. Accounting 
of mine stripping, exploration and evaluation costs is 
also significantly affected by these estimates. The 
aforementioned are critical areas of judgement which 
can alter a mining company‘s resource valuation, 
profitability and net worth. 
                                                     
3 Other industry-specific issues projected to have a pronounced impact include exploration 
expenditures, hedging foreign exchange and commodity risks, joint venture and 
production sharing arrangements (Jubb, 2004; Jubb, 2005). 
4 International Accounting Standards (IASs) were issued by the International Accounting 
Standards Committee (IASC) from 1973 to 2000. The IASB replaced the IASC in 2001. 
Since then, the IASB has amended some IASs, has proposed to amend other IASs, will 
replace some IASs with new IFRSs, and has adopted or proposed certain new IFRSs on 
topics for which there was no previous IAS. The terms ‗AASB(s)‘, ‗IFRS(s)‘ and ‗IAS(s)‘ 
will be used synonymously with ‗standard(s)‘ unless stated otherwise.  
5 See Chapter 2 for discussion. 
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Therefore, non-compliance with AASB 6 (Exploration for and 
Evaluation of Mineral Resources) and AASB 136 (Impairment of 
Assets) would definitely induce more uncertainty and volatility on 
earnings quality for the mineral resource sector. This in turn will 
have an impact on the cost of capital (Minton and Schrand, 1999; 
Francis, Nanda and Olsson, 2008). 
 
These standards (AASB 6 and AASB 136) are the key focus of the 
study, in particular the mandatory disclosure requirements. This 
study contributes to an understanding of the influence of audit 
quality features on the extent of a firm‘s accounting standards 
compliance. Auditor quality has been defined in numerous ways 
(see Gramling and Stone (2001) for a review). The majority of the 
most recent prevalent definitions generally define audit quality as a 
function of independence and specialisation (competency). This 
study addresses these two key dimensions by focusing on auditor 
independence and specialisation.  
 
Agency theory provides an appropriate conceptual framework for 
examining the extent of the compliance with AASBs 6 and 136. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) posit that the segregation of 
ownership (principals) and control (agents) present an opportunity 
for agents to act in the agents‘ interests instead of the principals‘. 
The presence of asymmetry information between agents and 
investors presents opportunities for agents to act in the agents‘ 
own best interest, such as to comply less with AASBs 6 and 136. 
Given that auditors‘ levels of audit quality are not the same; issues 
arise as to the auditors‘ capability of finding non-compliance and 
reporting it. This study seeks to investigate the influence of auditor 
quality on this level of compliance.  
 
 1 
1.2 Research Questions 
Recent research (e.g., Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo and 
Subramanyam, 1998; Francis, Mayhew and Sparks, 1999; Kim, 
Chung, Firth, and Kim, 2003; Hogan et al., 2008; Lin, Liu and 
Wang, 2009) shows that higher quality audit firms are more 
effective in monitoring corporate management, providing greater 
assurance of reported financial figures and increasing confidence in 
the financial reporting system‘s validity. It may further be 
postulated that higher quality audit firms are more likely to seek to 
ensure clients comply with accounting standards mandatory 
disclosure requirements.  
 
Recent audit research literature has paid particular attention to 
auditor independence (e.g., Gore, Pope and Singh, 2001; Antle, 
Narayanmoorthy and Zhou, 2002; Ashbaugh, LaFond and Mayhew, 
2003; Larcker and Richardson, 2004) and also in a smaller 
percentage of the literature examined auditor specialisation (e.g., 
Gramling and Stone, 2001; Ferguson and Stokes, 2002; Balsam, 
Krishnan and Yang, 2003). An audit firm‘s quality is likely to be a 
function of various attributes. Auditor independence and 
specialisation are the two key features that are of interest to this 
study. 
 
For auditor independence, it is commonly argued (e.g., Ramsay, 
2001; Firth, 2002; Warming-Rasmussen, 2005) that if the external 
auditor‘s independence is impaired then this will compromise their 
willingness to conduct an effective audit. Therefore, this 
impairment of independence gives corporate management great 
room to manipulate earnings or decline from complying with 
mandatory disclosure requirements.  
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With respect to auditor specialisation, an industry specialist is more 
likely to be familiar with how mandatory disclosures affect that 
specific industry than a non-industry specialist. This is likely to be 
particularly true in respect to AASB 6 which is attuned to a specific 
industry. Further, having indicated their position as an industry 
specialist the audit firm is more likely to enforce compliance with 
mandatory disclosures affecting that industry than a non-specialist 
so as to preserve their reputation capital (Healy and Palepu, 2001; 
Krishnan, 2003b). 
 
Based on the discussion in this chapter thus far, it is clear that the 
decision of the FRC and AASB to formally adopt international 
accounting standards is likely to have had profound implications for 
the accounting practices (AASB 6) of all Australian listed firms. 
Given the complexity surrounding asset impairment (AASB 136) 
and how it applies to mineral resource firms, effective 
communication with shareholders and the investment community is 
essential.  
 
AASB 6 Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources related 
disclosures such as key accounting policy on revaluation of 
extractive assets is a critical area which can influence a mineral 
resource firm‘s profitability and net worth (Siy, 2009). Such 
information is crucial to investors to place value on natural 
resource firm value. Disclosures required by AASB 136 Asset 
Impairment such as the assumptions applied in assessing and 
determining recoverable amounts are considered sensitive issues 
(KPMG, 2009). If asset impairment related information is indeed 
sensitive, mineral resource firms may be reluctant to comply with 
these mandatory disclosure requirements. It is important, 
therefore, for influential factors such as the external auditor to 
ensure mineral resource firms provide the required details. In 
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addition, audit quality factors such as independence and 
specialisation, may affect the monitoring effectiveness of the 
external auditor.  
 
This study seeks to investigate the issues related to compliance 
with mandatory disclosure requirements in AASBs 6 and 136 by 
Australian mineral resource firms; and the resulting influence of 
auditor independence and specialisation by addressing the three 
primary questions as follows:  
 
(1) What is the extent of compliance with AASBs 6 and 136 
mandatory disclosures for Australian mineral resources 
firms? 
(2) Does auditor independence influence the level of compliance 
with AASBs 6 and 136 mandatory disclosures for Australian 
mineral resources firms? 
(3) Does auditor specialisation influence the level of compliance 
with AASBs 6 and 136 mandatory disclosures for Australian 
mineral resources firms? 
 
1.3 Significance of the Study 
This study is significant for several key reasons. First, previous 
disclosure research (Raffournier, 1995; Chau and Gray, 2002; 
Makhija and Patton, 2004) primarily focuses on voluntary 
compliance with IAS and firms‘ level characteristics underlying 
voluntary compliance. This study differs by focusing on an external 
influential factor that may impact on compliance (i.e., the external 
auditor) and characteristics of that external force (i.e., auditor 
independence and specialisation) that may influence its effect.  
 
Second, previous compliance studies focus mainly on industrial and 
manufacturing firms (e.g., Naser, 1998; Owusu-Ansah, 2005). In 
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Australia‘s domestic setting, the mineral resource sector is 
considered to be a major sector6 in contribution to Australian GDP. 
Empirical evidence within this sector of compliance with accounting 
standards – in particular the new AASBs – is non-existent. This 
study aims to fill the void by providing evidence on compliance with 
IAS of mineral resources firms in the Australian context.  
 
Third, most compliance studies apply limited content analysis on 
IAS required disclosures and measurements/presentations as a 
means of managing the scale of research (such as Glaum and 
Street, 2003; Ali, Ahmed and Henry, 2004). Cairn (2002) notes 
that such practices are cause for a much greater concern as these 
practices restrict severely the value of the conclusions. It is true 
that the subjectively selected disclosure checklist focuses on IAS 
practices that past studies have identified as ‗problematic‘. 
However, Carins (2002) claims that there is scant evidence that 
these are the only ‗problematic‘ practices. This study enhances the 
methodological strengths by including all disclosures required by 
AASBs 6 and 136.  
 
Finally, this is the first analysis of the extent of compliance with all 
AASBs 6 and 1367 disclosure requirements since the convergence 
with IAS on 1 January 2005. This study is the first known study on 
the mandated compliance with IAS in an Australia context. Findings 
are expected to greatly enhance understanding of the role and 
contribution of auditor independence and specialisation to the 
degree of compliance. The findings will have important implications 
                                                     
6 This sector is important given the role it plays in Australia growing economy. In the year 
of 2002-03 mineral resources contributed about 5% and 28% to Australia GDP and 
exports respectively (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2003). 
7 It is important to have a basic understanding of key terms and fundamental concepts 
that are adopted in this study. This will confine the boundaries of this research and will in 
turn assist the readers in their interpretation of the research. See Appendix A for Key 
Terms and Concepts. 
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for standard setters, law enforcers, accounting organisations, 
international investors and international capital providers.  
 
1.4 Conceptual Schema 
The conceptual schema underlying the study is defined in Figure 
1.1. 
 
Figure 1.1: Conceptual Schema 
 
        
  Independent   Dependent   
  Variables   Variable   
   
H1(+) 
   
  Auditor 
Independence 
Disclosure 
Compliance 
Index 
  
  
 
  
                             
  
Audit 
Specialisation 
H2(+)   
  
 
 
 
   
            
 
This study investigates the relationship between the level of 
compliance with AASB 6 Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral 
Resources and AASB 136 Impairment of Assets with Audit Quality. 
Audit quality is segregated into auditor independence and audit 
specialisation. It is anticipated that auditor independence and audit 
specialisation are positively associated with the level of compliance 
(see Figure 1.1). The level of compliance is measured by a 
disclosure compliance index (DCI). 
 
1.5 Thesis Outline 
This thesis is organised into seven chapters. Chapter 1 provides an 
overview of the study, research questions, significance of this 
research and a conceptual schema. Chapter 2 presents the main 
two general conflicting regulation theories (Private and Public 
theories) and then narrows down to the more specific regulation in 
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governing auditor independence. This is augmented by a discussion 
on the Australian financial reporting framework and the main two 
key standards AASB 6 Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral 
Resources and AASB 136 Asset Impairment, with which companies 
should conform in promoting compliance and transparent 
communication. This chapter also identifies and reviews the 
literature relevant to compliance with mandatory disclosures. This 
is followed by a critical review on auditor independence and audit 
specialisation literature in Chapter 3. A theoretical framework using 
agency theory is then provided and a set of testable hypotheses 
are developed. Chapter 4 details the process of data collection. The 
chapter also describes the construction and application of the 
disclosure index as well as the definitions and proxies for 
independent and control variables. The main model of and the 
statistical method is constructed and discussed respectively. 
Descriptive statistics for dependent, independent and control 
variables are presented in Chapter 5. The statistical results for 
univariate and multivariate are performed and discussed in this 
chapter. Chapter 6 contains the results of a series of robustness 
checks. The results of sub-sample regression analysis based on 
firm size, firm performance, type of auditor, level of board 
independence and duality of management, are discussed. Finally, 
implications of the study, limitations, and suggestions for future 
research are set out in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 2 REGULATION AND 
COMPLIANCE 
 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents an overview of the relevant regulatory 
theories, regulatory framework and reviewing relevant literature in 
compliance with mandatory disclosure of accounting standards. 
Section 2.2 discusses theories of regulation. The Australian 
financial reporting framework is presented in Section 2.3. In 
Section 2.4 insights on audit independence regulation are explored. 
Section 2.5 outlines the current development of Australian mineral 
resource accounting regulations. The two key standards, AASB 6– 
Exploration and Evaluation of Mineral Resources and AASB 136 
Impairment of Assets, are reviewed. Finally, prior accounting 
compliance research studies are analysed in Section 2.6 and the 
chapter concludes with a summary in Section 2.7. 
 
2.2 Regulation Theories 
Most theories of regulatory origin and development can be seen as 
types of interest theory. The main two distinct and conflicting 
theories that have evolved over time in the attempt to explain both 
the origins and practice of regulation are: (i) public interest and (ii) 
private interest theories (Baldwin and Cave, 1999; Shinnick and 
McEnry, 2006; Singh, 2007). Public interest theory assumes 
regulation is for the ‗public good‘ by improving societal welfare 
(Leftwich, 1983; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Beaver, 1998; 
Bozeman, 2007). In contrast, private interest theorists argue that 
regulation gives rise to opportunities for wealth maximisation for 
the profession (Taplin, Tower and Hancock, 2002). Public interest 
theory is normative, that posits what should be, whilst private 
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theory seeks to describe and explain a more positive perspective 
(Tower, 1991).  
 
Under public interest theories regulation is established for the 
protection and benefit of the public at large or some large 
subclasses of the public largely in response to public-interest 
related objectives (Stigler, 1971; Mitnick, 1980; Hantke-Domas, 
2003). Public interest theorists view government regulation as a 
response to public demands for ―the rectification of palpable and 
remediable inefficiencies and inequities in the operation of the free 
market‖ (Posner, 1974, p. 336). This implies an assumption about 
public interest theory that activities do not always function in the 
public interest without supervision and control (Posner, 1974; 
Uche, 2001, Baldwin and Cave, 2001; Quick, Turley and Willekens, 
2008). Such a view draws on a historical antecedent that 
regulation in the past followed some forms of crisis or public 
dissent (Uche, 2001). For example, the establishment of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the USA is as a 
result of a crisis driven regulation8 (Reagan, 1987). Similarly the 
enactment of Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP) in 
Australia is yet another example of a response to significant 
corporate misconduct and failures.  
 
To achieve the aim of protecting the public at large, regulation in 
the public interest should strive to equip the public with all relevant 
information for decision making and protect the public from 
monopolies and industries that generate substantial external costs 
and benefits (Uche, 2001). However, this does not always take 
                                                     
8 After the 1929 great crash, equity and investment markets had been chaotic. Stocks 
were issued for worthless companies without true information being made to the public 
and investment firms were affiliated with commercial banks to manipulate market prices 
to their advantage. The legislation passed in 1933 and 1934 with regards to mandatory 
disclosures for new securities and regulation for securities market respectively that 
eventually lead to the establishment of SEC (Reagan, 1987). 
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place in practice as argued by Posner (1974) and Bozeman (2007). 
Mitnick (1980) provides views on deviations of the original public 
interest theories (as to why regulation ceases to serve the public 
welfare). First, regulators are or become venal or evil. This view 
holds that regulators are corrupted and mainly act to the best of 
personal gain due to conflict of interests. For instance, regulators 
accept bribes, embezzle or divert public funds to enhance personal 
benefits, and amend regulation of which they have business 
interest stake. Second, the regulators are or become incompetent. 
This incompetency in the agencies results from inadequacies in 
salary, status, and working conditions that fails to attract or retain 
competent human resources (Mitnick, 1980; Baldwin and Cave, 
2001). Another possible explanation for incompetence is the lack of 
specific industry knowledge of how to regulate effectively in rapid 
changing industries. In line with Mitnick (1980), Landis (1960, 
p.66) argues that ―the prime key to the improvement of the 
administrative process is the selection of qualified personnel. Good 
men can make poor laws workable; poor men can wreak havoc 
with good laws‖. Furthermore, public interest theory presumes that 
relevant information can be obtained by government at low cost, 
and politicians and other actors are motivated by altruism (Jordana 
and Levi-Faur, 2004). 
 
A contrasting view to public interest theory is contained in the 
private interest theory which is initiated by Stigler (1971) and 
expanded by Pelzman (1976) and Becker (1983). Private interest 
theorists perceive regulation as a mechanism designed to confer 
benefits on politically effective groups (Peirson and Ramsay, 1983; 
Gagnepain and Ivaldi, 2008). In other words, regulation is 
perceived to be ―the product of coalitions between regulated 
industry and related interest groups, the former obtaining some 
monopoly profits from regulation, the latter obtaining higher 
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prices‖ (Taplin, Tower and Hancock, 2002, p.175). Gagnepain and 
Ivaldi (2008) added that through the market and political 
regulatory processes, interest groups may pursue own private-
interest and hence establish the rules for private interest 
behaviour. Likewise, regulated companies may willingly choose to 
cooperate in their own regulation so as to create and/or protect 
their own self-interest. 
  
Private interest theory exhibits a more damaging motive by which 
―the special interests act specifically against the public interest in 
their own favour, either wielding covert influence, or abusing their 
monopoly power over asymmetric information‖ (Bartle and Vass, 
2008, p. 2). This is in line with the agency argument (bureaucratic 
theory) that typically alludes to regulators, nationalised industry 
boards, and company boards where, under conditions of 
incomplete information and uncertainty, the boards (agents) 
promote their bureaucratic self-interest over the interest of the 
governments or shareholders (principals) who delegated the boards 
to carry out a particular public function (Bartle and Vass, 2008).  
 
In the case of accounting standards  
―the regulatees could be accountants, represented by 
the professional accounting bodies, or alternatively, 
those entities that provide financial statements 
through the use of the standards. To some extent, 
these two groups‘ interests overlap. However, there 
can be tension if, for example, entities prefer 
standards allowing them to report favourably but not 
necessarily realistically, whereas the professional 
accounting bodies prefer standards that promote 
professionalism and high-quality reporting‖ (Godfrey 
and Langfield-Smith, 2005, p. 1983).  
 
The following section details and discusses the Australian financial 
reporting framework as the key focus of regulation in this study. 
 11 
2.3 Australian Financial Reporting Framework9  
The production of high-quality financial reports is considered to be 
a vitally important factor in capital markets as it promotes the 
efficient operation of those markets (Brown and Tarca, 2005). As a 
result, a well established framework of the financial reporting 
process plays a crucial role in achieving such efficiencies. As shown 
in Table 2.1 the Australian financial reporting framework is 
presented in three main categories: (1) rule-makers; (2) financial 
report preparers; and (3) rule-enforcers. Each group plays 
significant and distinct roles in the production of high-quality 
financial information. Those roles, however, materially changed in 
the period 2002 to 2004. The two key factors contributing to the 
change of roles of these three groups are as follows: (1) the 
decision made by FRC (Financial Reporting Council) to adopt IFRS 
(International Financial Reporting Standards) with effect from 1 
January 2005 (FRC, 2002); and (2) the enactment of the CLERP 910 
(Corporate Law Economic Reform Program) with effect from 1 July 
2004 (Blake Dawson Waldron, 2004) in response to significant 
corporate misconduct and failures (such as HIH, One.Tel, and 
Harris Scarfe, among others). 
                                                     
9 This section mainly overview the roles of rule-makers and rule-enforcers of the reporting 
framework. For details on financial report preparers, see Brown and Tarca (2005). The 
discussion in this section draws heavily on information from Brown and Tarca (2005). 
Discussion in relation to impact on audit independence will be presented in Section 2.4. 
Regulation in Audit Independence.  
10 CLERP 9 was the ninth series of reform. In March 1997, the Australian Treasurer 
announced a comprehensive program of corporate law reform, known as the Corporate 
Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP). It is to improve key areas of Australia‘s business 
and company regulation as part of the Commonwealth government‘s drive to promote 
business, economic development and employment (Leo et al., 2005). The Corporate Law 
Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 was passed 
on 25 June 2004. On June 30 June 2004, the enactment of the CLERP 9 Act includes a 
number of reforms to the Corporations Act 2001 and is based on the reform proposals 
contained in the CLERP 9 ‗Discussion Paper: Corporate Disclosure – Strengthening the 
Financial Reporting Framework‘ which was released by the federal government in 
September 2002 
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Table 2.1: Australian Financial Reporting Framework 
Rule-Makers Role(s) Changes 
Federal Government Legislate financial reporting requirements that 
promote capital market development and investor 
protection 
Additional requirements in relation to the production, auditing and oversight of financial reports 
(CLERP 9, operative 1 July 2004) 
Accounting standard-setter: Australian 
Accounting Standards Board (AASB) 
Provide high-quality accounting standards to be 
used in financial reporting by private and public 
sector and not-for-profit entities 
National accounting standards introduced based on IASB standards to be used by all reporting 
entities. Work as a liaison standard-setter with the IASB 
Auditing standard-setter: Australian 
Auditing Standards Board (AUSSDB) 
Provide high-quality auditing standards to be used 
in auditing financial statements 
Auditing standards to have the force of law from 1 July 2006 (CLERP 9) 
Standards interpretation body: Urgent 
Issues Group (UIG) 
Provide interpretations of Australian accounting 
standards 
Forward matters of interpretation relating to IASB standards to the International Financial 
Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC). The UIG was disbanded by the AASB at the end of 
June 2006. 
Stock exchange: Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX) 
Regulate financial reporting and disclosure to 
promote efficient and equitable financial markets 
Issued ―Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations‖ (2003) 
that may influence financial reporting practices 
Professional accounting bodies: 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
Australia (ICAA), CPA Australia 
(CPAA), National Institute of 
Accountants (NIA) 
Provide guidelines in relation to member behaviour 
that will influence financial reporting and auditing 
practice 
The ICAA and CPAA issued F1 Statement of Professional Independence in 2002 and amended it 
in 2004 to reflect CLERP 9 requirements for audit independence 
Financial statement 
preparers 
Role(s) 
Changes 
Directors Responsible for the preparation of the company‘s 
financial statements for presentation to 
shareholders, regulatory bodies (ASIC, APRA, and 
the taxation office) and other interested parties 
a) Additional and new reporting requirements from CLERP 9, other than (1): 
b) New accounting standards based on IFRS for financial years ending after 1 January 2005 
c) Civil liability for breach of ASX continuous disclosure requirements extended to individuals 
d) Additional operating and financial review information required in directors‘ report 
e) Disclosure of remuneration to auditors for non-audit services in the directors‘ report 
f) Statement in the directors‘ report that the provision of non-audit services is compatible with 
the Corporations Act requirements for auditors‘ independence 
g) Statement in the directors‘ report that audit independence has not been compromised 
h) Disclosure of remuneration for the opt five directors and executives 
Executives and employees Prepare financial statements on behalf of the 
directors 
A company‘s CEO and CFO are to provide a signed statement to directors that: 
a) The financial records have been properly maintained 
b) The financial statements comply with accounting standards; and 
c) The financial statements provide a true and fair view 
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Table 2.1: Australian Financial Reporting Framework (continued) 
Rule-enforcers Role(s) Changes 
Auditors Provide assurance to shareholders in relation to the 
information provided in the financial statements 
Changes to promote auditor independence (CLERP 9): 
a) Provide an independence declaration to the company 
b) Two-year period before engagement or review partner can become an officer of a company 
previously audited 
c) Limit of one former audit partner being a director of a company being audited 
d) Five-year rotation of lead and review audit partners (with limited ASIC discretion for seven-
year rotation) 
e) Additional disclosure by companies about the audit and the auditor, including disclosure of 
remuneration for non-audit services 
Professional accounting bodies (ICAA 
and CPAA) 
Require members to comply with standards relating 
to conduct competency and independence 
CLERP 9 extended the roles of the FRC and ASIC in relation to audit regulation and oversight. 
CPAA and ICAA can discipline members and refer matters to the Company Auditors and 
Liquidators Disciplinary Board (CALDB) 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC)  Oversight of the AASB and AUASB 
 ‗Monitor and assess‘ the independence of 
auditors 
 In addition to oversight of the AASB (from 2001) the FRC will oversee the AUASB (CLERP 9) 
 Oversight of auditors‘ power to gather information from accounting bodies and auditors 
(CLERP 9) 
Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission (ASIC) 
 Promote compliance with financial reporting 
requirements 
 
 Promote compliance with auditing standards 
and audit independence 
 
 Promote quality of audit 
 Increased financial reporting surveillance activities. Power to issue ―on-the-spot‖ 
infringement notices for non-compliance with ASX continuous disclosure rules. Fines to range 
from $33,000 to $100,000 depending on company market capitalisation (CLERP 9) 
 Auditors must report to ASIC all significant breaches of the Corporations Act and all attempts 
to ―unduly influence or interfere‖ with the audit (CLERP 9). ASIC may refer matters relating 
to auditors‘ conduct to the CALDB 
 Registration of auditors and determination competency standards. An annual statement to be 
provided by auditors (CLERP 9) 
Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority (APRA) 
Supervision of financial reporting of financial 
institutions and insurance companies 
Changes to APRA‘s organisation and practices following recommendation of the HIH royal 
commission. New standards for supervision of: 
a) Superannuation entities 
b) Banking groups in relation to capital adequacy 
c) Medical indemnity insurers  
Adoption of IFRS will require APRA to revise its prudential standards and statistical requirements  
Financial Reporting Panel (FRP) Review disputes between financial report 
preparers, auditors, and ASIC about compliance 
with financial reporting requirements 
Review panel to be set up to assist in dispute resolution without recourse to legal action (CLRP 
9). ASIC can refer matters to the FRP or consent to a company referring a matter to the FRP 
Adapted from Brown and Tarca (2005) 
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Rule-makers are the key parties who formulate the policies/rules 
that direct the form and content of financial reports. The federal 
government is the primary rule-maker that enacts laws to govern 
the process of financial reporting most notably via the Corporations 
Act. This Act is the primary legislation that regulates firms in 
Australia in matters of company formation, operation, officers‘ 
duties and takeovers, among others. Changes to the Act were 
implemented after the 2004 CLERP 9 reform to simplify the statute 
and introduce additional requirements in relation to the production, 
auditing and oversight of financial reports.  
 
The Federal Government has established two statutory bodies, the 
AASB and AUASB, whose main mission is to develop and maintain 
high-quality financial reporting standards and auditing standards 
respectively. The AASB and AUASB‘s roles and responsibilities were 
fundamentally changed due to Australia‘s decision to adopt IFRS. 
From 1 January 2005 Australia adopted the IFRSs and introduced 
the IFRSs into Australian law rather than rely on long-standing 
tradition of developing standards from an initial conception. With 
respect to auditing standards, prior to 1 July 2004 (before the 
inception of CLERP 9) the auditing standards were mandatory for 
members of professional bodies, such as ICAA and CPAA, but not 
legally binding. With the enactment of CLERP 9 Australian Auditing 
Standards have the force of law from 1 July 2006 (the Corporations 
Acts, section 336). The consequences are that any contravention of 
the auditing standards is a matter for the courts and may result in 
criminal penalties (Walker, Green, and McKinnon, 2008).  
 
Another key player in Australian rule-making is the ASX (Australian 
Stock Exchange). The ASX issues listing rules to promote efficient 
and equitable financial markets. Apart from the listing rules, 
corporate governance is also developed by the ASX Corporate 
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Governance Council (ASXCGC). With the intention of restoring 
investor confidence after many corporate scandals, in March 2003 
the Council released its first edition11 of Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations, which 
consists of 10 principles and 28 recommendations. Even though the 
Council‘s recommendations are not legally binding, listed 
companies in Australia are subject to three sources of mandatory 
disclosure: company law (The Corporation Act 2001), accounting 
standards (AASB) and listing rules (ASX) (Shailer, 2004). One 
important point to note is that the amendments to the Listing Rules 
4.10.3 on corporate governance disclosure in the annual report 
now require a company to disclose its corporate governance 
practices, and the extent of compliance with the recommendations. 
If the recommendations are not fully complied with, the company is 
obliged to provide reasons for the non-compliance.  
 
To ensure the high-quality of financial reports and the way audit 
functions are prepared and carried out in accordance with the 
rules, guidance, and principles, a number of parties are empowered 
to enforce compliance with financial reporting and audit 
requirements. One of the enforcement organisations is external 
auditors whose role is to ascertain that the financial statements are 
prepared in compliance with the current Australian accounting 
standards and presented in true and fair values of the firms 
(Corporation Act, Sections 292 – 295). The Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in Australia (ICAA) and Certified Practising 
Accountants of Australia (CPAA) are rule-making bodies that 
provide specific rules and guidelines, for example the Code of 
Professional Conduct, which are compulsory for members. One 
important component is the Code F1 Statement of Professional 
                                                     
11 In August 2007, the second edition Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations was released. The second edition guidelines apply to listed entities on 
and from the commencement of a listed entities financial year for 2008.  
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Independence that provides a list of threats to an auditor‘s 
independence. This in turn may influence the process of preparing 
financial reports and the conduct of audits.  
 
Other enforcement bodies include the statutory regulators such as 
ASIC (Australian Securities and Investment Commission), APRA12 
(Australian Prudential Regulation Authority) and ASX (Australian 
Stock Exchange). The ASX can enforce its listing rules through 
control over whether a firm is allowed to list and trade on the 
exchange. 
 
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) are 
Australia‘s corporate, markets and financial services regulator. 
ASIC is also an independent government body that enforces and 
administers the Corporations Law. The role of ASIC is to promote 
compliance with the financial reporting requirements of the 
Corporations Act and with accounting and auditing standards. 
ASIC‘s (2007) stated aim is to reduce fraud and unfair practices in 
financial markets and financial products so investors and financial 
consumers can invest confidently, and companies and markets 
perform effectively. To achieve that, ASIC administers the law, 
enforces, and gives effect to the law. With the passing of CLERP 9 
the authority of ASIC with respect to financial enforcement 
increased. A higher increment of government funding was received 
which better empowered ASIC to impose larger sanctions/penalties 
for breaches of the Corporations Act. If a disagreement occurs 
between ASIC and public companies in relation to the treatment of 
accounting standards the dispute is presented before the newly 
                                                     
12 APRA is the prudential regulator of the Australian financial services industry. It 
oversees banks, credit unions, building societies, general insurance and reinsurances 
companies, life insurance, friendly societies, and most members of the superannuation 
industry. APRA establish and enforce prudential standards and practices designed to 
ensure appropriate management and financial reporting practices are complied by 
financial sector entities (APRA, 2009). 
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created FRC (Financial Reporting Panel). CLERP 9 legislation 
introduced the FRC into the Australian financial reporting 
framework. The FRC is an independent third party mechanism 
which alleviates ASIC from initiating court proceedings whenever a 
dispute regarding the application of accounting standards arises 
between companies and ASIC. Such disputes are predominantly 
referred to FRC by ASIC. However with consent from the ASIC it 
also can be referred to it by the lodging entity (FRC, 2009). 
 
2.4 Regulation in Auditor Independence 
The previous section outlines the Australian accounting compliance 
system wherein the Corporations Act 2001 governs the audit of a 
company‘s annual financial reports and mandates that publicly 
listed firms must have annual financial reports audited by 
accounting firms (Gay and Simnett, 2005; Corporations Act, 
Sections 292-295 ). A number of high-profile Australian corporate 
failures13 have induced a great direct interest in the accounting and 
auditing profession with substantial scrutiny being directed upon 
auditor independence. The perceived audit failures have resulted in 
allegations in the financial press of the role played by the 
accounting and auditing professions in allowing these situations to 
evolve (Brandon, Crabtree and Maher, 2004). 
 
The need for an auditor‘s independence is formally recognised in 
some provisions of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 as shown 
in Appendix B. Section 307C requires auditors to provide a written 
declaration to the board of directors stating any (or none) of no 
violations of the auditor independence as required by the Act or 
                                                     
13 HIH Insurance Ltd was placed into provisional liquidation by the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales and One.Tel was placed into voluntary administration in March and May 2001 
respectively. In the same year, Harris Scarfe went into administration. 
 18 
any applicable code of professional conduct14. To promote audit 
independence Section 308 requires auditors to report directly to 
members of the company rather than to management. Further, the 
auditor is to be appointed by members as prescribed in Section 
327B. Under Section 324CA it is a violation of the general auditor 
independence requirements for the auditor to be aware of a conflict 
of interest situation and to not take reasonable steps to resolve it 
as soon as possible. In line with Section 324CA the accounting 
bodies‘ Code of Professional Conduct (CPC) F.115 requires auditors 
to identify and evaluate threats to independence and to apply 
safeguards to reduce the identified threats to an acceptable level if 
not eliminated. The complete sections of the Corporations Act 2001 
with respect to auditor independence are presented in Appendix B. 
 
 The Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and 
Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 was passed by both Houses of 
Parliament on 25 June 2004. The enactment of the CLERP 9 Act 
includes a number of reforms to the Corporations Act 2001 and is 
based on the reform proposals contained in the CLERP 9 
‗Discussion Paper: Corporate Disclosure – Strengthening the 
Financial Reporting Framework‘ released by the government in 
September 2002. The reforms give effect at restoring public 
confidence in corporate Australia after some significant corporate 
misconduct and failures. 
                                                     
14 On 6 September 2005 ASIC issue a Class Order ‗CO 05/910‘Auditor’s independence 
declaration – exemption. The exemption will excuse an auditor from making a declaration 
provided there are any violations under section 324CE(2), section 324CF(2) or section 
324CG(2) of the Act. This exemption will apply provided the auditor had reasonable 
grounds to believe that it had in place, at the time of the contravention, a quality control 
system that provided reasonable assurance that the auditor would comply with the 
auditor independence requirements. An auditor will still be required to make a written 
statement to its audit client disclosing any contraventions of the other auditor 
independence requirements. 
15 The CFC F.1 is based on the ethical rules set by the International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC), of which made up by 120 nations. Certified Practising Accountants 
(CPA) Australia and the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia (ICAA) adopted 
the CPC F.1 the professional independence standard in May 2002; and ratified on 31 
December 2003. 
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The reforms of CLERP 9 can be grouped into the following eight 
categories: 
1. remuneration of directors and executives; 
2. financial reporting; 
3. shareholder participation and information; 
4. continuous disclosures; 
5. audit reform; 
6. management of conflicts of interest by financial services 
licensees; 
7. disclosures rules; and 
8. enforcement (Blake Dawson Waldron, 2004). 
 
The fifth reform of the CLERP 9 titled ‗Audit Reform‘ arguably has 
had the greatest impact on auditors. The ‗Audit Reform‘ focused on 
the following main issues: 
 auditor appointment, independence and rotation; 
 auditors and annual general meetings; 
 submission of questions to the auditor; 
 expansion of auditor‘s duties; 
 retention of audit working papers; 
 qualified privilege for auditors; 
 oversights in audit; 
 audit regulation and oversight regime; 
 qualifications of auditors; and 
 registration of authorised audit companies. 
 
As detailed in the ‗Audit Reform‘ categories of CLERP 9 the auditor 
independence in the financial reporting process is a major area of 
concern. Some of the most significant changes made by the CLERP 
9 Act are increased regulation of additional disclosures in the 
directors‘ report on auditor and the audit process, auditor 
independence, restrictions and rotation. These changes are 
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embossed in the expanded Part 2M.4 of the Corporation Act. 
Overall, changes are classified into five categories (Blake Dawson 
Waldron, 2004; Rusmin, 2006): 
 
1. additional disclosures in the directors‘ report on the auditor 
and the audit; 
2. general auditor independence requirements; 
3. specific auditor independence requirements; 
4. restrictions on auditors being employed by an audit client; 
and 
5. auditor rotation for listed companies. 
 
These five changes affecting auditor independence, restrictions and 
rotation are exhibited in more depth in Appendix C.  
 
2.5 AASB 6 and 136: Australian Mineral Resource Sector 
Australia has traditionally had a national industry-specific 
statement pertaining to extractive industries, AASB 1022, that was 
superseded by Australian Accounting Standard (AAS) 7. When the 
decision to adopt international accounting standards was made no 
equivalent international accounting standard specific to extractive 
industries existed. The adoption of IFRS led to significant changes 
in some standards and minor changes in others. One area where 
significant changes occurred relates to the assets impairment test 
which had significant implications for assets revaluations with 
serious implications to the mineral resource firms. 
 
Following concerns raised by mineral resource industry constituents 
worldwide to the verbatim adoption of IFRSs, the IASB 
acknowledged a need to develop an extractive industry specific 
international accounting standard (Honey, 2004; Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu, 2005). This resulted in the issuance of an Issue Paper in 
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2000. Subsequent to this, however, minimal development had 
taken place. The extractive industry specific international 
accounting standard was removed from the active list of research 
topics in 2001 due to time constraints (IASB, 2003). The second 
setback came in 2002 when the IASB (2004) announced that it 
could not complete the project in time for the implementation of 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) in many territories. With 
its initial timeframe not met, the IASB came up with an interim 
measure. IFRS 6-Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral 
Resources was issued in the European Union and several other 
countries worldwide (Siy, 2009)16. 
 
AASB 6 allows mineral resource firms to use the option to continue 
to utilise existing practices in accounting for exploration and 
extraction costs (only area of interest is allowed in Australia under 
AASB 1022 / AAS 7). In particular, AASB 6: 
 requires Australian entities to use area of interest17 to 
account for exploration and evaluation expenditures 
(generally these expenditures are to be treated in the same 
manner as under AASB 1022 / ASS 7 Accounting for the 
Extractive Industries subject to any impairment testing 
requirements); 
 requires entities to perform an impairment test in accordance 
to IFRS 36 Impairment of Assets (or its AASB equivalent 
AASB 136) on recognised exploration and evaluation assets 
                                                     
16 This standard has been issued to facilitate the introduction of Australian equivalents to 
IFRSs in respect of the treatment of exploration and evaluation expenditures, pending the 
completion of a comprehensive project on accounting for extractive activities. The IASB 
has commissioned national standard-setters in Australia, Canada, Norway and South 
Africa to work jointly in providing a new definitive IFRS for extractive industries. The last 
update was in January 2006. 
17  A number of accounting practices are currently used throughout the world in 
accounting for costs of extraction and exploration. The following four other methods: 
costs written off, costs written off and reinstated, successful efforts, and full cost method, 
are not allowed to be used in Australia.  
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when facts and circumstances suggest that the carrying 
amount of an asset may exceed its recoverable amount; 
 requires an impairment test on exploration and evaluation 
assets to be assessed at a CGU (Cash Generating Unit) or 
group of CGUs level where the level is not to be larger than 
the lesser of an area of interest or segment (based on either 
the entity‘s primary or secondary reporting format under 
AASB 114 Segment Reporting); and  
 requires disclosures that identify and explain the amounts in 
the entity‘s financial report arising from the exploration for 
and evaluation of mineral resources, and help users of those 
financial reports to understand the amount, timing and 
certainty of future cash flow from any exploration and 
evaluation assets recognised. 
 
Under the area of interest approach costs are to be accumulated by 
the area of interest. According to AASB (2004, p. 20) Area of 
interest is defined as ―an individual geological area which is 
considered to constitute a favourable environment for the presence 
of a mineral deposit or an oil or natural gas field, or has been 
proved to contain such a deposit or field‖. Under this method, pre-
production costs, such as exploration and evaluation costs, each 
area of interest is to be either written off when incurred, or be 
partially or fully capitalised. The (partially or fully) capitalisation is 
to be accounted as an exploration and evaluation asset provided 
the rights to tenure of the area of interest are current and at least 
one of the following conditions is met: 
 exploration and evaluation expenditures are expected to be 
recouped through successful development and exploitation of 
the area of interest, or alternatively, by its sales; or 
 exploration and evaluation activities in the area of interest 
have not at the reporting date reached a stage which permits 
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a reasonable assessment of the existence or otherwise of 
economically recoverable reserve18, and active and significant 
operations in, or in relation to, the area of interest are 
continuing (AASB 6, para AUS7.2). 
 
Whilst AASB 6 provides a useful service in the interim (such as 
pressures on mineral resource firms to comply with requirements 
of AASB 136) it does present a sizeable juxtaposition. When a final 
extractive industry-specific international accounting standard is 
produced there is no guarantee it will closely align with AASB 619. 
 
With respect to AASB 136, the scope of assets subject to the 
impairment test is broader than in the past. For instance, deferred 
exploration and evaluation costs for areas in the development or 
production phases for mineral resource firms were now subject to 
the impairment test as defined in AASB 136 (KMPG, 2003).  
 
AASB 136 also requires that the carrying value of an asset should 
not exceed its recoverable amount. By definition the majority of 
mineral resource firms are unlikely to predict, with any certainty, 
how a given exploration will influence future revenue streams. 
Therefore, applying AASB 136 as written would then likely lead to a 
sizeable proportion of existing and future exploration and 
evaluation costs to be expensed immediately. Further, AASB 136 
requires that when the impairment test is applied, assets need to 
be aggregated to the smallest identifiable group of assets 
generating cash flows. This is commonly known as the CGU 
concept. The CGU concept contrasts with traditional practices of 
the Australian mineral resource firms where impairment is 
                                                     
18 Economically recoverable reserves can be defined as ―the estimated quantity of product 
in an area of interest that can be expected to be profitably extracted, processed and sold 
under current and foreseeable economic conditions‖ (AASB 6, 2004, p. 20). 
19 The last review of tentative agenda decisions for the scope of IFRS 6 was in 2006. The 
current IFRS 6 still serves as an interim standard.  
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assessed under a broader area of interest concept20. If the CGU 
concept is to be enforced rigorously this would require mineral 
resource firms to apply the impairment test to individual oil rigs, 
gas pumps and mines as opposed to a geological basin as a 
whole21. Consequently, this would force mineral resource firms to 
make impairment charges more frequently.   
 
In the absence of a definitive industry-specific standard, accounting 
treatments on key issues like asset impairment are open to 
interpretation for mineral resources firms. This open interpretation 
can result in wider variations across the industry. If variations 
increase this is likely to make comparisons between firms more 
difficult, which could ultimately affect investment and shareholder 
decisions within the industry. For example, the transition to IFRS 
goodwill accounting and reporting results in substantially increased 
complexity, technical expertise, and the nature of disclosure in 
relation to its impairment (Carlin and Finch, 2008). Consequently, 
such complexity increases the risk of inconsistent compliance and 
varying levels of mandatory disclosure quality by firms under the 
new and complex IFRS regime (Carlin and Finch, 2008). If this is 
so, then it raises a number of key questions relevant to auditing. 
For example, does the increased complexity in both technical 
expertises result in lower compliance? Does auditor competency 
(i.e., audit specialisation) have influences on the level of 
compliance? This thesis seeks to answer these questions by 
examining the level of compliance with the mandatory disclosures 
post adoption of IFRS (i.e., AASB 6 and AASB 136). Furthermore, 
                                                     
20 Under an ‗area of interest‘ concept asset impairment would assess oil production, gas 
and mineral assets at the geological basin level. In contrast, under the ―cash generating 
unit‖ concept oil production, gas and mineral extraction assets would be assessed at the 
individual oil and gas well, and mine site. 
21 For instance, if an oil and gas company has three proven fields supplying a single 
processing plant the ‗area of interest‘ concept as applied previously in Australia would see 
this combination as a single source of net cash inflows. According to the CGU concept 
specified in AASB 136 each field and processing plant may have to be considered 
separately. 
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this research seeks to investigate the influences, if any, of auditor 
independence and audit specialisation on the extent of compliance. 
The following section reviews the key past literature on compliance 
with mandatory disclosure studies.  
 
2.6 Studies on Mandatory Disclosure 
The benefits of corporate disclosure to market participants (this 
includes both users and preparers) are well documented in the 
literature (e.g., Botosan, 1997). Owusu-Ansah (1998, p. 608) 
defines disclosure as ―the communication of economic information, 
whether financial or non-financial, quantitative or otherwise 
concerning a company‘s financial position and performance‖. There 
is an extensive literature on disclosures of accounting information 
by management. It can be broadly grouped into two main 
categories; voluntary and mandatory. 
 
Though disclosure is recognised as having countless benefits, a 
major question is whether regulators should actively mandate and 
enforce the disclosure of financial accounting information. And 
further still, if regulators are to mandate and enforce disclosure 
then what disclosures should be mandatory and those left as 
voluntary (if at all)? Whilst firms acknowledge the importance of 
disclosure, management are reluctant to provide full disclosure. 
Furthermore, empirical research indicates the level of disclosure 
varies between firms, industries and nations. Consequently, this 
places investors and other direct and indirect market participants 
at a disadvantage. Given the value of disclosure to overcome 
asymmetrical information concerns between informed and 
uninformed investors to ensure an efficient market, there is ground 
and arguments for regulators to act to provide a level playing field 
though the creation and enforcement of mandatory disclosures. 
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This view is consistent with the tenets of public interest regulation 
theories.  
 
Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995, p. 555) define voluntary disclosure 
as ―disclosures in excess of requirements, represent free choices on 
the part of company managements to provide accounting and other 
information deemed relevant to the decision needs of users of their 
annual reports‖. It implies that voluntarily disclosed information is 
beyond mandated disclosures and it leaves gaps for open 
interpretation. Clarkson, Van Bueren and Walker (2006, p. 773) 
assert that ―high quality disclosures might only come about when 
mandated by detailed requirements that leave little opportunity for 
interpretative discretion‖. This thesis focuses on compliance with 
mandatory disclosure specifically to AASB 6 and AASB 136.  
 
In line with Owusu-Ansah‘s (1998) definition of mandatory 
disclosure, this study defines compliance as the minimum amount 
of accounting information that is required to be disclosed, insofar 
as applicable to companies under a disclosure regulatory regime 
(Owusu-Ansah, 1998). There is an implication that statutory 
requirements become the minimum standard of disclosure. Table 
2.2 summarises past studies on mandatory disclosure studies. This 
section reviews only compliance with mandatory disclosures. With 
regards to firm characteristics as determinants of the level of 
compliance, voluntary disclosures and aggregate (of both 
mandatory and voluntary) disclosures, these are also reviewed and 
documented in Appendix D. 
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Table 2.2: Summary of Studies on Mandatory Disclosure 
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Tai, Au-Yeung, 
Kwok & Lau (1990) 
Hong Kong 78% 1987 11   +  * *     
Ahmed & Nicholls 
(1994) 
Bangladesh 71% 1988 94 + * *   +     
Wallace, Naser, 
Mora (1994) 
Spain Na 1991 79  * + * * * -   - 
Wallace & Naser 
(1995) 
Hong Kong 73% 1991 142  * + -  - * *  * 
Patton & Zelenka 
(1997) 
Czech Republic Na 1993 Ns  * * + * +     
Owusu-Ansah 
(1998) 
Zimbabwe 75% 1994 214 +  + + * *  + + * 
Street, Grey & 
Bryant (1999) 
Multiple countries 70% 1998 63 *  * *  +     
Glaum & Street 
(2003) 
Germany 84% 2000 153 *  * *  + +  *  
Ali, Ahmed & Henry 
(2004) 
India, Pakistan & 
Bangladesh 
80% 1998 131 + * + +  *     
Owusu-Ansah & 
Yeoh (2005) 
New Zealand 93% 1992-
1993 & 
1996-
1997 
Ns   + + * -  * * * 
Legend: Na= study conducted on comprehensiveness of disclosure; Ns= Not specified; * = Insignificant; + = Significant positive relationship; - = Significant negative 
relationship 
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Clarkson, 
VanBueren & 
Walker (2006) 
 
Australia 
 
36% 
1998-
2004 
 
10 
  + + *      
Goodwin & Ahmed 
(2006) 
Australia 56% 2005 45  + + +       
Lim, Matolcsy and 
Chow (2007) 
Australia Na 2004 67     +      
Gallery, Cooper & 
Sweeting (2008) 
Australia 45% 2005 78   + + + +     
Kent & Stewart 
(2008) 
Australia Ns 2004 51   +        
Palmer (2008) Australia 36% 2005 53  + +   +     
Nelson, Gallery & 
Percy (2010) 
Australia Ns 2001 - 
2004 
35   +  + +     
Legend: Na= study conducted on comprehensiveness of disclosure; Ns= Not specified; * = Insignificant; + = Significant positive relationship; - = Significant negative 
relationship 
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Interestingly, none of the studies shown in Table 2.2 are industry-
specific. The number of firms of each study has varied from 49 
firms in Zimbabwe (Owusu-Ansah, 1998) to 566 firms in India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh (Ali, Ahmed and Henry, 2004). Most of 
the studies in Table 2.2 adopt some type of disclosure index as the 
dependent variable. The disclosure items that form the disclosure 
index have varied from a minimum of 11 (Tai et al., 1990) to a 
maximum of 214 items (Owusuh-Ansah, 1998). Some studies 
assign different weights to items (e.g., Belkaoui and Kahl, 1978; 
Firth, 1979; McNally, Lee and Hasseldine, 1982; Chow and Wong-
Boren, 1987; Malone et al., 1993) whilst many others apply equal 
weight to all items22. Based on the literature reviewed, past 
accounting compliance studies predominantly examine the levels of 
compliance with accounting standards in two major streams: (i) 
level of compliance of measurement, presentation and disclosure; 
and (ii) determinants of level of compliance.  
 
Building on Cairns‘ (1997) study, Grey and Bryant (1999) conduct 
an empirical study of the accounting policies and disclosures of 
firms claiming to have complied with IASs in 1996. The key 
research objective of Grey and Bryant‘s (1999) study is to 
investigate to what extent the firms really comply with IASs in 
practice. Grey and Bryant (1999) document evidence of significant 
non-compliance with IASs 2 (Inventory), 8 (Net profit or Loss for 
the Period), 9 (Research and Development Costs), 16 (Property, 
Plant and Equipment), 18 (Revenue), and 19 (Retirement Benefit 
Costs). In particular, the main areas of non-compliance include: 
use of inventory valuation not endorsed by the IAS; violation of the 
strict definition of extraordinary items; failure to capitalise certain 
development costs; failure to disclose information pertaining to 
revaluation on property, plant and equipment; and charging 
                                                     
22 Refer to Chapter 4 for methodology discussion. 
 30 
goodwill to reserves, or amortising goodwill over a period in excess 
of the 20 year limit. Grey and Bryant‘s (1999) findings reveal that 
41% (20 out of 49 companies) state full compliance with all IASs. 
However, the evidence shows that there is a significant extent of 
non-compliance with the individual IAS on measurement and 
disclosure, especially with the disclosure requirements.  
 
A research monograph23 by Street and Gray (2001) examines the 
extent of compliance of a worldwide sample of 1998/99 financial 
reports and footnotes of 27924 companies that were examined in 
respect to compliance with IAS-required disclosures and 
measurement/presentation practices. Street and Gray (2001) 
developed four compliance indices with two related to disclosures 
and two to measurement/presentation25. Street and Gray‘s (2001) 
results show that overall disclosure compliance indices of DC1 and 
DC2 are 72% and 74% level of compliance with IAS-required 
disclosures respectively. 
 
In a similar study, Glaum and Street (2003) assess the extent of 
compliance with mandatory disclosures by companies listed on 
Germany‘s New Market (Neuer Markt). Firm listed on the New 
Market are required to prepare financial statements in accordance 
with either IAS or US GAAP. The sample used in the study was 
drawn from 100 firms that applied IAS and US GAAP in the year-
                                                     
23 The research monograph was sponsored by the Association of Chartered Certified 
Accountants (ACCA). 
24 An initial sample of 831 companies obtained from the IASC‘s (1999) list of ‗Companies 
Referring to their Use of IAS‘. Companies in the sectors of finance, oil and gas, not for 
profit organisations, merged companies and annual reports that are not in English, are 
eliminated. The sample of annual reports obtained are as follows: 63(China), 62 
(Switzerland), 47 (Germany), 19 (France), 9 (each from Hong Kong and Zimbabwe), 7 ( 
each from Austria, Denmark and South Africa),  6 (each from Canada and Hungary), 5 
(Finland), 4 (Sweden), 3 (each from Italy, Luxembourg and Poland), 2 (each from 
Barbados, Czech Republic and Netherlands) and 1 (each from Australia, Bahrain, 
Botswana, Croatia, Grand Cayman Island, Guyana, Japan, Jordan, Malta, Mexico, Papua 
New Guinea, Russia and Turkey). 
25 Since this thesis focuses on disclosures, therefore measurement/presentation 
compliance is not discussed. Henceforth, the terms ―compliance‖ and ―compliance with 
IAS-required disclosures‖ are used interchangeably. 
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2000 financial reports (excluding Financial Services and Media & 
Entertainment industry). Glaum and Street‘s (2003) findings show 
the extent of compliance with mandatory disclosures of IAS varies 
from 41.6% to 100%, with an average of 83.7%; and of US GAAP 
ranges from 52.4% to 98.8%, with an average of 86.6%. This 
implies that compliance level is lower for firms that apply IAS for 
preparing financial statements. The results reveal that IAS firms 
are particularly problematic in regard to certain disclosure relation 
to pension, leasing, financial instruments, business combination 
and capitalisation of interest costs.  
 
Ali, Ahmed and Henry (2004) empirically examine the magnitude of 
compliance with the mandatory disclosure of the East Asia 
countries of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The final sample 
consists of 219, 229 and 118 firms from India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh respectively. Ali, Ahmed and Henry‘s (2004) findings 
show that on aggregate, the average compliance level is 80% for 
the whole sample, with 79% for Indian, 81% for Pakistani and 78% 
for Bangladeshi firms. The authors assert that the different levels 
of compliance might be due to institutional or regulatory 
differences. Ali, Ahmed and Henry (2004) note that the compliance 
level varies significantly across 14 standards examined. The results 
show that a higher disclosure level is observed for standards in 
relation to depreciation, inventories, and property, plant and 
equipment. Ali et al., (2004) argue that the higher extent of 
compliance is due to detailed disclosure requirements embedded in 
the Companies Act of each country. The lower magnitude of 
compliance is associated with accounting for leases and accounting 
for business combinations. 
 
Clarkson, Van Bueren, and Walker (2006) examine mandatory 
disclosures on chief executive officer (CEO) remuneration in 
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Australia from 1998 to 2004. Disclosures on remuneration paid to 
directors and executives have been made compulsory since the 
induction of the Company Law Review Act 1998 (CLRA98). 
However, Clarkson et al. (2006) show that firms generally did not 
comply until the formalisation of accounting standard Director and 
Executive disclosures by disclosing Entities (AASB 1046) became 
operative in 2004.  
 
Utilising on the sample of 124 Australian firms for the period of 7 
years (1998 to 2004), Clarkson et al. (2006) find a systematic 
increase in the level of disclosure in each successive year from 
1999 to 2003 which mainly due to the extent of public scrutiny. 
Clarkson et al. (2006, p. 772) conclude that ―allowing discretion in 
disclosure choices leads to poor quality disclosure, and that this is 
so despite ongoing media and regulatory interest in the disclosure. 
A far more effective regulatory strategy is to clearly stipulate 
precisely what is considered minimal disclosure at the outset, 
leaving as few issues as possible open to interpretation‖. 
 
On or post 1 January 2005 Australian firms are required to comply 
with AIFRS. To smooth the transition, a broadly defined standard 
AASB 1047 (Disclosing the Impacts of Adopting Australian 
Equivalents to International Financial Reporting Standards) 
mandated pre-adoption firms to disclose the AIFRS‘s (Australian 
Equivalents of International Financial Reporting Standards) 
impacts. AASB 1047 allows firms to exercise discretion in 
complying with the mandatory disclosures. Gallery, Cooper, and 
Sweeting (2008) investigate if such discretion influences the quality 
of pre-adoption AIFRS. In particular, Gallery et al. (2008) examine 
how the quality of pre-adoption AIFRS mandatory disclosures differ 
across Australian top 500 firms and what determinants affect the 
disclosure quality.  
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Gallery et al. (2008) find that a wide variation in the types and 
levels of disclosures on AIFRS information in firms‘ financial 
reports. Such variation can be attributed to AIFRS financial impact, 
size, industry, profitability factors and Big-4 accounting firms. One 
interesting finding by Gallery et al. (2008) is that firms seem to 
rely on their external auditor for guidance on how to meet the 
mandatory disclosures requirements rather than to exercise level of 
discretion as observed in other disclosures studies. This implies 
that accounting firms play significant role in firm AIFRS disclosures. 
 
Goodwin and Ahmed (2006) investigate the impact of AIFRS on the 
accounts of small, medium and large sized companies. Using a final 
sample of 135 Australian firms with 31 December reporting date, 
Goodwin and Ahmed (2006) find that the transition to AIFRS has 
not been onerous for small companies. Goodwin and Ahmed (2006) 
show that there is no impact of net income or equity from AIFRS on 
most of the studied small firms. However, a positive relation 
between increase in the number of adjustments to net income and 
equity, and firm size is documented. The findings also reveal small 
firms have higher earnings volatility than medium or large firms 
under AIFRS. 
 
Goodwin and Ahmed (2006) acknowledge one of the research 
limitation in its implications may be due to the sample is constraint 
to firms with 31 December financial year end and it is noted that 
not all AIFRS have to be complied with when firms restate their 
comparatives. 
 
In a similar study, Kent and Stewart (2008) conduct a study to 
examine the relationship between the level of disclosures on AASB 
1047 and corporate governance quality. Kent and Steward (2008) 
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proxy corporate governance quality as a composite of board 
independence (ratio of independent non-executive directors to total 
directors), CEO-Duality (value 1 assigned if the roles of the 
chairperson and CEO is segregated, otherwise 0), board size 
(number of directors on the board), board diligence (number of 
board meetings per year), existence of audit committee (takes 
value 1 if there is an audit committee else 0), audit committee 
independence (ration of non-executive and independent to total 
members), audit committee expertise (ratio of members with 
accounting and financial expertise), audit committee diligence 
(number of audit committee meeting held during the year) and 
audit committee size (number of directors in the committee). 
 
Utilising on a final sample of 965 Australian listed companies, Kent 
and Stewart (2008) provide evidence of an association between 
corporate governance quality and a greater level of disclosures, in 
particular, with regards to board and audit committee diligence. 
 
Utilising on agency theory framework, Lim, Matolcsy and Chow 
(2007) examines the relationship between board composition and 
voluntary disclosure of 67 items from 181 Australian firms‘ financial 
reports. Using a two-stage regression method, Lim et al. (2007) 
test the relation between total voluntary disclosure, voluntary 
disclosure of forward looking quantitative information, voluntary 
disclosure of strategic information, voluntary disclosure of historical 
financial information and board composition. Lim et al. (2007) 
provide evidence of a significant positive association between board 
composition and total voluntary disclosures. The evidence also 
shows that more forward looking quantitative and strategic 
information are disclosed by firms with boards that comprised of 
largely independent directors. However, there is no influence of 
board structure on non-financial and financial voluntary disclosure. 
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Nelson, Gallery and Percy (2010) examine the nature and level of 
compliance with ESO (Executive Stock Option) of Top 300 
constituent list as on 30 June 2004. The study period spans over 4 
years (2001-2004). Nelson‘s et al. (2010) study focuses on two 
main research questions. First, the nature and level of compliance 
with the ESO mandated disclosures. Second, the association of 
corporate governance determinants affect the level of compliance 
with the ESO required disclosures. 
 
The documented results show that generally firms did not fully 
comply with the mandated disclosures of ESO. The results also 
reveal that firms were significantly less likely to disclosure the 
more sensitive price and value-related information about ESO, in 
comparison to non-sensitive information. In terms of the 
determinants, Nelson et al. (2010) find higher compliance with ESO 
mandated disclosures in firms that with more independent and 
effective audit committees. The compliance level is found to be 
incremental from 2001 to 2004 which implies that additional media 
and regulatory attention on both the use of ESO disclosures by 
firms has a positive motivation impact. 
 
In a similar context, Palmer (2008) examines the extent and 
quality of 150 Australian listed firms‘ compliance with the 
mandated disclosures AASB 1047 (Disclosing the Impacts of 
Adopting Australian Equivalents to International Financial Reporting 
Standards). 
 
Palmer (2008) finds that firm size, leverage and auditor firm size 
affect the extent and quality of compliance with AASB 1047. Of the 
three variables, Palmer (2008) shows that auditor firm size makes 
the strongest contribution to the both extent and quality of the 
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mandatory disclosures. Palmer (2008, p. 867) suggests that ―many 
companies might have relied extensively, if not solely, on the 
example disclosures provided by their auditors as a means of 
meeting the requirements of AASB 1047‖. Palmer (2008, p. 868) 
concludes that if this is the case, ―then the disclosures might not 
provide an accurate reflection of the impact of adopting AIFRS on 
them, or their preparedness for adoption‖. 
 
This review of the past literature indicates that there is no known 
study on compliance with mandatory disclosure in the mineral 
resources sector. Therefore, the research methodology approach in 
this thesis is based on the broader mandatory disclosure studies. 
To explain variation in companies‘ compliance level, several past 
studies have addressed the association between compliance with 
IASs disclosures and firm‘s characteristics (see Appendix D). As 
discussed above the findings are mixed. This may well be due to 
the fact that each of the past studies has subjectively selected 
certain items covering a limited set of IASs when developing a 
checklist for the compliance analysis. To avoid similar 
shortcomings, this thesis utilises the complete disclosure items of 
AASB 6 and AASB 136. Furthermore, most past studies have 
included auditor quality (proxies by the Big-526 accounting firms) 
as one of the determinants of the extent of compliance, and the 
findings yield to mixed results. This thesis seeks to provide better 
insights by segregating auditor quality into audit independence and 
audit specialisation. Analysis is then conducted to determine the 
                                                     
26 In the 1970s, the then Big 8 were: Arthur Andersen, Arthur Young, Coopers & Lybrand, 
Deloitte Haskins and Sells, Ernst and Whinney, Peat Marwick Main, Price Waterhouse, and 
Touche Ross. In the 1990s the Big 6 were referring to Arthur Andersen, Ernst & Young, 
Coopers & Lybrand, Peat Marwick Main, Price Waterhouse, and Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu. 
In the late 1990s to early 2000s, the Big 5 were made up by Arthur Andersen, Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, KMPG, and PriceWaterhouse Coopers. From 2002 to 
present the Big 4 consists of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, KMPG, and 
PriceWaterhouse Coopers. To avoid confusion unless specify this study will use generic Big 
4 to refer to Big 8/6/5/4. 
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association of auditor independence and audit specialisation with 
mandatory disclosure as required by AASBs 6 and 136.  
 
2.7 Chapter Summary 
The two mainstream theories of regulation provide contrasting 
explanations. The public interest regulation theory seeks to explain 
regulation as a drive to strive towards public interest related 
objectives. In stark contrast, private interest theories are less 
altruistically-oriented. The private interest theorists more 
prosaically assume that regulation is driven by the pursuit of 
group, sector or individual interest, and is not necessarily for 
societal benefit.  
 
The roles of the current Australian financial reporting framework‘s 
three main groups, rule-makers, financial statement preparers and 
rule enforcers, are reviewed. With effect from 1 January 2005, 
IFRS was adapted into Australian law in the form of AASB. With the 
enactment of CLERP 9, the AASB have been made mandatory and 
have the force of law from 1 July 2006. Both these rule changes 
offer the potentially for fundamentally improved accounting 
regulation and related compliance rates. 
 
Table 2.2 presents a detailed review of the past literature on 
compliance with mandatory disclosure. In general results of past 
research reveal that on average the range of compliance level is 
usually 70% to 93%. The review shows that almost all past studies 
examined firms‘ characteristics, (such as leverage, size, 
profitability, type of auditing firms, among others) as determinants 
of the extent of compliance.  
 
In Chapter 3 the theoretical framework of this thesis is reviewed. 
Furthermore, empirical literature on audit quality, which is a 
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function of auditor independence and audit specialisation, is also 
discussed. Last but not least, utilising the tenets of agency theory, 
a set of testable hypotheses is then developed. 
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Chapter 3 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
Chapter 2 presents a review on the past literature of mandatory 
and aggregate disclosure studies. The review reveals that none of 
the studies, conducted in many different countries, show complete 
compliance with IASs and/or GAAP. Quite the contrary, significant 
levels of non-compliance are documented throughout the globe 
including both developed and developing countries.  
 
In this chapter, testable hypotheses based on the key research 
questions addressed in Chapter 1 are developed. Section 3.2 
reviews the theoretical framework of agency theory. In Section 3.3, 
various determinants of the level of mandatory disclosure 
compliance of prior research are deliberated. Section 3.4 discusses 
the importance of the key audit quality theme, leading to a formal 
statement of hypotheses. Section 3.5 concludes this chapter. 
 
3.2 Agency Theory 
Agency theory is used to study a relationship between owners of a 
firm and managers who are in charge of the firm (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983a). An agency relationship is defined as ―a contract 
under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another 
person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent‖ 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 308). The separation of ownership 
from management is one of the basic tenets of a free-market 
society because it allows specialisation (Copeland, Weston, and 
Shastri, 2005). The separation of the ownership and control of 
wealth gives rise to so-called agency problems. 
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In her review, Eisenhardt (1989) posits that agency theory is 
concerned with resolving the agency problems which arise 
predominantly because of goal conflicts and information 
asymmetry between the principal and the agent. In an agency 
relationship, the agent (the insider) has an information advantage; 
therefore, it is difficult and expensive for the principal to determine 
whether the agent is acting in the principal‘s best interest. 
 
Agency theorists assume that agent-principal interests are 
divergent and both agent and principal are utility maximisers. 
Consequently, given the opportunity the agent will rationally seek 
to maximise his/her own utility at the expense of the principal‘s 
(Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997). The principal‘s task is to 
elicit optimal behaviour from the agent given the principal‘s 
expectations about an uncertain future. The principal attempts to 
do this by monitoring the agent‘s activities (Underdown and Taylor, 
1987). Benston (1980), Watts and Zimmerman (1980), and Chow 
(1982) argue that the audit function is one method to constrain 
aberrant behaviour. 
 
The crux of agency theory is that the inevitable delegation of 
decision making authority to the agent gives rise to the potential 
misuse of such delegation by the agent. According to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), the principal can limit, if not minimise, the 
potential abuse of the delegation by aligning the interest of the 
agent to the principal‘s and/or establishing appropriate control 
mechanisms. The costs incurred to align the principal-agent 
interests are known as agency costs. The costs are born by the 
principals. 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define agency costs as the aggregate 
of: 
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 monitoring costs: incurred to curb the aberrant activities of 
the agent (e.g., external and internal audit); 
 bonding costs: incurred to ensure the agent will act on the 
interests of the principal (e.g., remuneration that includes 
stock options); and 
 residual costs/loss: incurred as not all activities of the agent 
are controllable. 
 
Using the tenets of agency theory, this study examines whether 
the level of compliance with mandatory disclosure of AASBs 6 
Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources and 136 
Impairment of Assets is associated with ‗audit quality‘. The next 
section presents a discussion on past literature of key determinants 
of both mandatory and voluntary disclosures. 
 
3.3 Determinants Compliance with Mandatory Disclosures 
A review of literature examining compliance with the mandatory 
disclosures (as presented in Chapter 2), indicates very little 
industry-based research has been conducted. To the knowledge of 
the author there is no known specific study in the mineral 
resources sector. This study aims to fill the void by providing an in-
depth analysis of the level of compliance with mandatory 
disclosures from within the Australian mineral resources sector.  
 
Past compliance studies predominantly investigate the relation 
between various firm characteristics (i.e., endogenous variables) 
and the extent of compliance level. Ahmed and Courtis (1999) 
noted the relationship between corporate attributes and disclosures 
in corporate financial reports was documented as early as 1961. 
The number of firm attributes investigated as possible 
determinants of the level of disclosure range from two (Stanga, 
1976) to thirteen (Naser, Al-Khatib and Karbhari, 2002).  
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Tables 3.1 and 3.2 present27 a summary of studies on mandatory 
disclosure and determinants of compliance28. As shown in Tables 
3.1 and 3.2, Firm Size is the most favoured firm attribute that has 
been studied in relation to mandatory disclosure compliance. This 
is followed by Leverage, Profitability and Size of the Audit Firm. 
Each of these potential determinants is discussed below. 
 
An overwhelming majority of prior studies in different countries 
across different time frames (1961 to 2005) find that firm size is 
significantly positively related with the extent of corporate 
disclosure, both mandatory and voluntary (see Cerf, 1961; Buzby, 
1975; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1989a, 1991; Naser 
and Al-Khatib, 2000; Owusu-Ansah and Yeo, 2005). This implies 
that larger firms make significantly more mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures. 
 
 
                                                     
27 Additional information is also documented in Table 2.3. 
28 A summary of voluntary disclosure studies is presented in Appendix D. 
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Table 3.1: Mandatory Disclosure Determinants Studies 
Study Age Firm Size Industry Leverage Liquidity 
Multi-
nationality 
Ownership 
Diffusion 
Profitability 
Size of 
Audit Firm 
Tai, Au-Yeung, Kwok & 
Lau (1990) 
 * X      X 
Ahmed & Nicholls (1994) 
 
 X  X  *   * 
Wallace, Naser, Mora 
(1994) 
 
 * X X *   X X 
Wallace & Naser (1995) 
 
 *  X X  X * * 
Patton & Zelenka (1997) 
 
 X X X    * * 
Owusu-Ansah (1998) 
 
* * X  X * * * X 
Glaum & Street (2003) 
 
X X    X  X * 
Ali, Ahmed & Henry 
(2004) 
 
 *  X  *  * X 
Owusu-Ansah & Yeoh 
(2005) 
 
X * X  X  X * * 
Legend: * = significant; and X = insignificant
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Table 3.1: Mandatory Disclosure Determinants Studies29 (continued) 
Study Age Firm Size Industry Leverage Liquidity 
Multi-
nationality 
Ownership 
Diffusion 
Profitability 
Size of 
Audit Firm 
Cerf (1961)  *      *  
Singhvi (1968)  *      * X 
Singhvi & Desai (1971)  X     X X X 
Buzby (1975)  *        
Belkaoui & Kahl (1978)  * * * *   *  
Malone, Fries & Jones 
(1993) 
 X X *  X * X X 
Solas (1994)  X      X  
Zarzeski (1996)   * *   *    
Ahmed (1996)  X  X  *   X 
Al-Bastaki (1997)  *  X    X  
Inchausti (1997)  * X X  *  X * 
Naser (1998)  * * * X  X * X 
Craig and Diga (1998)  *  X  *    
Naser, Al-Khatib & 
Karbhari (2002) 
 * X * *  X X * 
Al-Shayeb (2003) X * *   X  X  
Legend: * = significant; and X = insignificant 
 
                                                     
29 Aggregate disclosure consists of both mandatory and voluntary disclosures. Adapted from: Al-Shammari (2005) 
 45 
Most studies, if not all, predict firm size is positively related with 
level of corporate disclosure (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2). In line with 
Buzby (1975), majority past studies argue that it is more costly in 
terms of affordability for smaller firms, which have limited 
resources to collect and present an array of information in a 
financial statement, than it is for larger firms that have greater 
resources. Furthermore, management of smaller firms may believe 
that disclosure in greater detail would put the firms at a 
competitive disadvantage to larger counterparts in the industry 
(Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Mautz and May, 1978; Nalikka, 2008). 
Such perception suggests that smaller firms are exposed to higher 
opportunity costs than larger firms. In addition, it has been well 
established that cost of capital (cost of equity and cost of debt) 
reduces with increased disclosure (Elliot and Jacobson, 1994; 
Botosan, 1997; Sengupta, 1998; Karamanou and Nishiotis, 2009). 
This motivates larger firms to disclose in more details than smaller 
firms due to larger firms greater reliance on external finance from 
the securities market (Salomon and Dhaliwal, 1980).  
 
Empirical evidence supports the postulation that firm size is 
positively associated with compliance levels. For example, Owusu-
Ansah‘s (1998) findings reveal that firm size has a significantly 
positive impact on mandatory disclosure practices. This is 
subsequently supported by Ali et al., (2004), among others, who 
reveal that the size of a firm is statistically significantly associated 
with mandatory disclosure compliance at the 1% level. This implies 
that larger firms more strongly comply with accounting standard 
disclosure requirements than the smaller ones (Ali et al., 2004; 
Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, 2005).  
 
Another firm attribute commonly examined as a determinant of 
compliance levels is firm leverage. Ali et al., (2004) argue that 
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external finance increases a firm‘s financial risk, and agency costs 
between shareholders and creditors. Dumontier and Raffournier 
(1998) postulate that increased disclosure by way of complying 
with mandatory disclosure improves the monitoring role of financial 
statements which in turn reduces agency costs and information 
asymmetry. In line with the arguments by Dumontier and 
Raffournier (1998) and Ali et al., (2004), most of the past studies 
reviewed propose that the higher the leverage, the more likely the 
higher levels of disclosure, as a means to signal firms‘ ability to 
fulfil its obligation (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990).  
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that there is a negative 
association between a firm‘s leverage and the extent of disclosure. 
However, the empirical evidence on the direction of such 
association is mixed. Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 show 31% of the 
studies (four out of thirteen) document a significant relationship 
between leverage and level of disclosure compliance. These are 
Belkaoui and Kahl (1978), and Malone, Fries and Jones (1993) who 
note a negative relation in contrast to Naser (1998) and Naser et 
al., (2002) who find a positive association. The remaining in Table 
3.1 and Table 3.2 observe insignificant results.  
 
The empirical findings shown in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 indicate 
the association between the leverage and the extent of disclosure 
yields mixed results. Craig and Diga (1998) conclude that the 
degree of leverage has an effect on the level of compliance with 
mandatory disclosure and the impact is country-specific (for 
instance, Belkaoui and Kahl (1978) for Canada, Zarzeski (1996) for 
France, Germany, and Japan, Naser (1998) and Naser et al., 
(2002), both for Jordan, Wallace et al., (1994) for Spain, Wallace 
and Naser (1995) for Hong Kong, Raffournier (1995) for 
Switzerland, Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh (2005) for New Zealand).  
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Profitability is another firm characteristic that is examined as a 
potential determinant of disclosure compliance studies. The 
influence of profitability on corporate disclosure levels, including 
mandatory disclosure, has been well established (Wallace et al., 
1994; Raffournier, 1995; Inchausti, 1997, Owusu-Ansah, 1998; 
and Street et al., 1999; cited in Ali et al., 2004). Using different 
theories, arguments have been put forward to support a positive 
relation between profitability and level of disclosure.  
 
Applying agency theory Wallace and Naser (1995) posit that 
managers of very profitable companies will seek to use information 
for personal advantage. For example, management of very 
profitable firms will disclose greater information to support 
continued employment and increased compensation. Utilising 
signalling theory, Inchausti (1997) proposes that firms with good 
news tend to disclose greater information than those with bad news 
so as to avoid undervaluation of the firm‘s shares value. Based on 
political process theory, Inchausti (1997) argues that very 
profitable firms also tend to disclose more information to justify 
profit level.  
 
Empirical evidence supports the positive relationship between 
profitability and the level of mandatory disclosure compliance, such 
as Patton and Zelenka (1997) for Czech Republic, Owusu-Ansah 
(1998) for Zimbabwe, Ali et al., (2004) for India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh, and Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh (2005) for New Zealand. 
These studies reveal that more profitable firms disclose more 
required information in annual reports than those of less profitable 
firms. In contrast, using Hong Kong data Wallace and Naser (1995) 
report profitability is negatively associated with the level of 
mandatory disclosure. This implies that Hong Kong firms with low 
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profit margins tend to disclose greater information in corporate 
annual reports; hence, more compliance. Wallace and Naser‘s 
(1995, p. 347) explanation for the contrasting finding is that it is 
due to ―the cultural reluctance of the Chinese to attribute glory to 
themselves and their eagerness to provide explanation for failures 
but not for success‖ (Bond 1991, p. 42). Another reason provided, 
may be that many firms are closely held by a few wealthy Chinese 
families in Hong Kong (Phenix, 1994, p. 160) whose demand for 
information might be different from those of U.S. investors. 
 
The fourth main common/popular variable is auditing firm size. 
Past mandatory disclosure compliance studies as presented in 
Table 3.1 show that audit firm size has been included in all studies 
as one of the potential key determinants of compliance level. 
Building on DeAngelo‘s (1981b) audit quality theory framework, 
most studies reviewed in Table 3.1 postulate that the level of 
mandatory disclosure compliance is positively associated with audit 
firm size. Past studies, such as Wallace and Naser (1995), Owusu-
Ansah (1998), and Ali et al., (2004) argue that large audit firms 
are less likely to depend on (or financially bond with) a particular 
client; therefore, larger firms are able to and have greater 
incentives to maintain independence from clients. Consequently, 
larger audit firms are more likely to exert more influence over 
disclosure compliance of clients than smaller audit firms. 
Furthermore, large audit firms are more likely to report any breach 
or non-compliance in order to maintain reputation capital and audit 
quality. Depending on when the study was conducted, the size of 
audit firm is generally surrogated by the Big 4 as a proxy of audit 
quality. 
 
The empirical findings of association between audit firm size and 
level of compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements are not 
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consistent. Research such as Patton and Zelenka (1997), Owusu-
Ansah (1998), and Ali et al., (2004) find that firms audited by the 
Big 4 tend to have higher compliance levels with mandatory 
disclosure requirements (i.e., a positive relation). On the other 
hand, Firth (1979), Wallace et al., (1994), and Glaum and Street 
(2003) find no relationship between audit firm size and the level of 
mandatory disclosure. Interestingly, a negative association is 
observed by Wallace and Naser (1995) and Owusu-Ansah and Yeo 
(2005).  
 
The mixed results regarding the association between audit firm size 
and compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements may be 
due to using a crude measure such as audit firm size which 
generally takes a dichotomous form30. This study argues that 
should the Big 4 auditing firms‘ status represent higher audit 
quality, then this implies that the quality of an audit is dependent 
on the name of the auditor (Firth, 1997a). Consequently, the Big 4 
are all assumed to be the ‗experts‘ across all industries in the 
market. Should this be the case, then what was rationality behind 
the complete and rapid demise of Arthur Andersen? In line with 
Firth (1997a), it is argued that stakeholders may look beyond the 
name of an auditor when assessing the audit quality. Indeed, 
stakeholders may also be concerned with economic bonding 
between the auditor and the client. This implies alternative 
measures are needed to better understand the audit quality and 
mandatory disclosure compliance link.  
  
In consolidating the mixed results of the extant literature, this 
thesis contributes to the literature by investigating the relationship 
between levels of compliance with mandatory disclosure and the 
                                                     
30 The crude measure of audit quality employed by past literature may be due to data 
availability/constraints. 
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external institutional factors (i.e., the external auditor) and values 
of that external force (i.e., audit quality) that may influence its 
effect.  
 
Arguably, the past research on compliance with mandatory 
disclosure only examines its association with endogenous variables 
(i.e., firms‘ attributes) and employs a crude measure of audit firm 
size for audit quality. There is virtually no study that takes one step 
further by directly examining the affect of auditor independence 
and audit specialisation on mandatory disclosure compliance. This 
thesis aims to fill the void. In the following sections, crucial roles 
played by external auditors are discussed. The definition and 
attributes of audit quality are defined and explored respectively. 
Subsequently formal statements of hypotheses are developed. 
 
3.4 Audit Quality 
Berle and Means (1932) were one of the first to raise concerns 
about generation of agency costs and information asymmetry 
problems due to the separation of control and ownership. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) argue that enforcement of the contract 
between principal and agent requires monitoring the agent‘s 
activities. Key authors such as Watts (1977), Benston (1980), 
Watts and Zimmerman (1980), and Chow (1982) assert the audit 
is one type of monitoring activity that increases the value of firm. 
This gives rise to the demand for auditing services as to be ―a need 
to facilitate dealings between the parties involved in business 
relationships – shareholders, creditors, public authorities, 
employees and customers, etc. Exchanges between such parties 
are usually costly since informational asymmetries give rise to 
uncertainty concerning the performance of the contractual 
obligations‖ (Arrunada, 2000, p. 205). 
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Agency theory suggests that it is in the interest of management to 
engage an external audit to express an independent opinion on the 
company‘s financial statement as well as to provide monitoring and 
verification on management‘s actions (Firth, 1997a). Engagement 
of the external auditor reduces agency costs. Firth (1997, p.7), for 
example, argues the lack of a credible external ―audit will likely to 
increase the cost of capital, restrict access to capital, and impose 
severe restrictions on management‘s actions‖. This implies the 
external auditing processes add value to the quality of financial 
statements.  
 
Furthermore, an external auditor derives value from its role in 
reducing agency costs and information asymmetries between 
corporate management and owners. The agency cost is reduced, if 
not eliminated, by providing external verification of the reliability of 
the firm‘s financial statements (Leftwich, 1980; Ferguson, Francis 
and Stokes, 2003) and the effectiveness of the external monitory 
by the audit firm. DeAngelo (1981a, 1981b) argues that the 
effectiveness of such external monitoring depends on audit quality 
of the auditing firm.  
 
External auditors play a major role in disclosure policies and 
practices (Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Apostolou and Nanopoulos, 2009) 
and in enhancing the credibility of financial statements (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001; Almer, Gramling and Kaplan, 2008). The important 
role held by auditors is well-recognised even before the U.S. 
Securities Acts mandated external auditing. For example, DeFond 
(2002) concludes that the research of Watts and Zimmerman 
(1983) shows 84% of NYSE firms voluntarily engaged external 
auditor in 1926 many years before it was made compulsory by the 
U.S. Securities Acts. However, ―what investors and creditors do 
observe all too often lately are instances where it appears the 
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auditor and/or the audit committees were not effective. These are 
the cases of fraud, material errors or misstatements, material 
omissions [non-compliance with mandatory disclosure]‖ (Imhoff, 
2003, p.122). Examples include big icons such as AOL Time 
Warner, WorldCom, Boeing, Computer Associates, Xerox, Enron, 
Tyco, IBM and HIH. Imhoff (2003) asserts that the dissolving of 
one of the largest accounting firms (Arthur Andersen) in the world 
was due to audit failures.  
 
In line with Jensen and Meckling (1976), Al-Shammari (2005) 
notes the quality of financial reporting is not only determined by 
the quality of the accounting standards (such IASs) but also by the 
effectiveness of the enforcement of these accounting standards 
(Ball, Robin and Wu, 2003; Francis, Jhurana and Pereira, 2003; 
Saudagaran, 2004). One mechanism designed to enforce 
compliance with IASs (including mandatory disclosure) is the 
external audit (Glaum and Street, 2003). 
 
Audit quality has been one of the most important issues affecting 
the auditing profession (Vanstraelen, 2000). Further, it is also a 
service and attribute highly valued by equity market participants 
(Moreland, 1995; Franz, Crawford and Johnson, 1998). It is 
perceived that a high audit quality reduces the uncertainty 
associated with financial statements in the eyes of other 
contracting parties not involved in the preparation of such 
statements (Wallace, 1980). In addition contractual costs will also 
fall as auditing quality increases (Vanstraelen, 2000). 
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The most commonly utilised definition of audit quality is by 
DeAngelo31 (1981b, p. 186) who stated ―the market-assessed joint 
probability that a given auditor will both: (a) discover a breach in 
the client's accounting system, and (b) report the breach‖. This 
implies a perceived audit quality definition, as the author defines 
audit quality as ‗the market-assessed‘. The definition implies that 
DeAngelo (1981b) views audit quality as a function of the ability of 
the auditor to perform a thorough examination of the financial 
accounts and detect possible errors or anomalies (technical 
competence) and the willingness to report any breach if discovered 
(independence) (Arrunada, 2000; Vanstraelen, 2000). Therefore, 
for an audit to be of value to the consumer of audit services, the 
auditor must be perceived as being both technically competent and 
independent (Watts and Zimmerman, 1980; Citron and Taffler, 
1992; Srinidhi and Gul, 2007). Hypotheses for these two primary 
audit quality features (auditor independence and audit 
specialisation) are developed and discussed in the following two 
subsections. 
 
3.4.1  Auditor Independence 
Agency theory suggests that external auditors are in demand to 
monitor and verify the actions of management. A deficiency of a 
credible independent audit will likely increase agency costs (Firth, 
1997a). An audit will only be a success ―in changing expectations 
and hence reducing the opportunistic behaviour costs (agency 
costs) borne by the manager only if it is expected that the auditor 
will report some discovered breaches of contract‖ (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1983, p. 615). ―The probability that the auditor will 
report a discovered breach is effectively the auditing profession‘s 
definition of independence‖ (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983, p. 615).  
                                                     
31 DeAngelo‘s definition of audit quality has been widely used. See Ahmed and Nicholls 
(1994), Wallace and Naser (1995), Owusu-Ansah (1998), and Ali et al., (2004) for 
examples. 
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Auditor independence has been regarded as a vital attribute of a 
statutory audit (Firth, 1997a) and has been labelled as the 
cornerstone (Mautz and Sharaf, 1961), essence (Stamp and 
Moonitz, 1979), and foundation (Whittington and Pany, 1995) of 
auditing. Past literature has segregated independence into 
independence in fact and independence in appearance (Ramsay, 
2001). Auditor independence, both in fact and appearance, has 
long been recognised as an important aspect of audit quality 
(DeAngelo, 1981a). Firth (2002) contends that independence in 
fact (i.e., actual independence) is generally unobservable; 
therefore, independence in appearance assumes prime importance 
(Beattie and Fearnley, 2002). Frequently, independence in 
appearance is perceived as representative of actual independence 
(Olazabal and Almer, 2001).  
 
If financial statement users perceive there is an impairment to 
auditor independence (i.e., appearance), then users are likely to 
impose a cost-of-capital premium for information risk associated 
with the inability to rely on the audit (Firth 1997a; Johnstone et al., 
2001). This suggests that if the auditor is not perceived to be 
acting independently of management, the audit loses its values to 
market participants (Beattie and Fearnely, 2002). Such a 
perception of an impairment of auditor independence in 
appearance, may be as damaging to the audit firm as if an actual 
independence violation occurs (Olazabal and Almer, 2001). 
Correspondingly, this study effectively examines auditor 
independence from the perspective of appearance. 
 
An independent audit is a vital component of the capital markets 
disclosure mechanism in protecting the interests of the investing 
public (Campbell and Parker, 1992). In an efficient capital market 
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rational agents forecast that an auditor‘s independence is impaired 
when the auditor forms an economic bond with clients (i.e., have 
increased incentives for misrepresentation) (DeAngelo, 1981a; 
Salehi, 2009). 
 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, 2000) posits that 
accounting firms that provide significant non-audit services to audit 
clients may increase economic bonding between the audit firm and 
the client. If economic bonding increases it is argued this will 
reduce investor confidence in auditor independence leading to a 
decline in confidence in public capital markets (Kinney, Palmrose 
and Scholz, 2004). Regulators also express concern that some 
audit fees are too low because auditors may lowball audit fees to 
secure lucrative non-audit services such as consulting contracts 
(SEC, 2001; McMeeking, Peasnell and Pope, 2007).  
 
The provision of non-audit services (NAS) by incumbent auditors 
has long been considered by regulators in Australia and overseas 
as a threat to auditor independence (Craswell, 1999). There has 
been a strong growth in the provision of NAS32 to clients by 
accounting firms. For instance, Abbott, Parker, Peters and Rama, 
(2003) show that the SEC estimated that 25% of (USA) public 
firms purchase non-audit services from incumbent auditors (this 
estimate was for the time period prior to non-audit fee data being 
made a compulsory disclosure). More recently in 2000, SEC-
required disclosures show that 96% of public companies purchased 
non-audit services. Significantly 51% of firms were paying more for 
non-audit services than audit services. Time series evidence from 
                                                     
32 The scope of services offered by large audit firms to both public and private firms may 
include, among others: systems and information technology (IT); training; services for 
SME such as payroll; risk management advice; taxation, including tax compliance and tax 
planning and advice; corporate recovery and insolvency; legal, forensic and litigation 
support; mergers and acquisitions; transaction support and follow up including due 
diligence and initial public offerings (IPO); recruitment and human resources; and 
portfolio monitoring (Beattie and Fearnley, 2002). 
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Australia is broadly consistent with US trends. That is, evidence 
reveals that much of the growth of a public accounting firm‘s total 
revenues from 1982 to 1989 (a cumulative average annual 
increase of 30%) is due to the provision of non-audit services 
(Wines, 1994). 
As the scope of NAS provided by audit firms has broadened 
(particularly with respect to management advisory services 
(hereafter MAS)) the worry is that the relationship between auditor 
and management becomes more proximate (Ramsay, 2001). 
Furthermore, Ramsay (2001, p. 118) argues that the existence of 
―an inherent scepticism about how close the relationship between 
the auditor and the management of the audit client can be without 
creating, in fact or in perception, a mutuality of interest that could 
impair the auditor‘s independence‖.  
 
Beattie and Fearnley (2002, p. 20) postulate that a real or 
perceived threat to independence in the case of an audit client may 
arise if some of these NAS are jointly provided, the main threats 
are:  
 self interest: the increase of economic dependence; 
 self review: taking management decisions and auditing one‘s 
own work; 
 advocacy: acting for the client‘s management in adversarial 
circumstances; and  
 familiarity: becoming too close to the client‘s management 
through the range of services provided. 
 
Research shows that NAS have been perceived by corporate 
stakeholders to be an impairment of auditor independence. For 
example, a survey conducted by Quick and Warming-Rasmussen 
(2005) find that shareholders, bank loan officers and journalists 
feel that auditor independence may be at risk when NAS are 
 57 
provided. Additionally, Firth (1997a) using data observations from 
500 firms, documents evidence that firms with higher agency costs 
are negatively associated with the size of NAS purchased from the 
external auditor.  
 
Many empirical studies (e.g., Frankel et al., 2002; Reynolds, Deis 
and Francis, 2004; Kinney et al., 2004) have investigated the issue 
whether the provision of NAS would impair auditor independence; 
thereby, leading to reduced quality of audit and/or financial 
reporting. Earnings management, a major topic of interest in the 
past decade, has been examined in relation to the provision of 
NAS. For instance, Frankel, Johnson and Nelson (2002) assess the 
impact of NAS on auditor independence by examining the 
association between non-audit fees and earnings management 
(surrogated by discretionary accruals). They (Frankel et al., 2002) 
present evidence that firms with higher NAS levels supplied by the 
incumbent auditors are more likely to just meet or beat earnings 
forecasts. Frankel et al., (2002) also find evidence of a positive 
relation between non-audit fees and small earnings surprises and 
the extent of discretionary accruals. They (Frankel et al., 2002) 
conclude that the provision of NAS can threaten auditor 
independence as higher-fee-ratio clients receive preferential 
treatment from the incumbent auditor.  
 
Challenging the findings of Frankel et al., (2002), Ashbaugh, 
LaFond and Mayhew (2003) report no association between earnings 
management and the provision of NAS when discretionary current 
accruals for firm performance are adjusted. Ashbaugh et al., 
(2003) argue that the results of Frankel et al., (2002) are due to 
sensitivity to research design choices. They (Ashbaugh et al., 
2003) conclude that no systematic evidence sustaining the claim of 
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purchasing more NAS would result in impairment of auditor 
independence. 
 
Using a similar approach, Reynolds et al., (2004) use the base 
model to replicate the results of Frankel et al., (2002). The initial 
results documented by Reynolds et al., (2004) support the findings 
of Frankel et al., (2002); that are a significant positive relation 
between the level of non-audit fees and discretionary accruals. 
However, the significant positive association is found to disappear 
when additional controls for high-growth clients are included in an 
expanded model. Reynolds et al., (2004) deduce that the findings 
of Frankel et al., (2002) may be partially a result of a weakness in 
the research design for failing to adequately control for factors 
unrelated to auditor objectivity such as firm growth. 
 
Raghunandan, Read and Whisenant (2003a) assess whether the 
provision of NAS has an impact on auditor independence in terms 
of restated financial statements33. They (Raghunandan et al., 
2003a) sampled 110 companies that restated financial statements 
filed with the SEC during 2000 and 2001. Raghunandan et al., 
(2003a) find the level of non-audit fees do not result in an 
inappropriate influence from incumbent auditors on the audit that 
lead to restatements. Similarly, Kinney et al., (2004) partition NAS 
into financial information system design and implementation 
(FISDI), internal audit, tax, and unspecified NAS34. Insignificant 
results are documented for the relation between non-audit fees and 
FISDI, and non-audit fees and internal audit. However, their 
(Raghunandan et al., 2003a) evidence shows that unspecified non-
audit fees are positively associated with restatement. 
                                                     
33 Restatement refers to firms that have to restate their financial statement to bring it to 
conformity with the existing GAAP. 
34 Unspecified NAS may include some Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) banned services 
such as expert services unrelated to the audit. 
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Another perspective of auditor‘s objectivity that has been 
associated with NAS provision is the type of audit opinions issued. 
The controversy is whether the non-audit fees influence (an) a 
(un)qualified audit opinion issued by auditors. Barkess and Simnett 
(1994), Craswell (1999), and Craswell, Stokes and Laughton 
(2002) all document evidence that the extent of non-audit fees do 
not affect the propensity to issue unqualified audit opinions. 
However, Wines (1994) and Firth (2002) conclude otherwise. They 
(Wines, 1994; Firth, 2002) find that when higher levels of non-
audit fees are obtained the less likely auditors are to issue a 
qualified audit opinion. Hence, they (Wines, 1994; Firth, 2002) 
both draw the conclusion that the auditor independence may have 
been impaired as a result of higher level of non-audit fees. 
 
There is no clear and unequivocal empirical evidence showing NAS 
negatively affects audit independence in fact (DeFond, 
Raghunandan and Subramanyam, 2002; Francis and Ke, 2002; 
Frankel et al., 2002; Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Chung and Kallapur, 
2003; Reynolds, Deis and Francis, 2004). However, recent research 
suggests that NAS may impair an investor‘s perception of the 
auditor based on appearance of independence (e.g., Glezen and 
Millar, 1985; Frankel et al., 2002; Francis and Ke, 2003; 
Hackenbrack, 2004; Joshi, Bremser, Hemalatha and Al-Mudhaki, 
2007). This is further supported by the fact that some countries 
(e.g., Japan (Nakase, 1985), France (Schilder, 1994), Belgium 
(Moizer, 1997) and Italy (CAJIC, 1996; Kinney, 1999) (quoted in 
Firth, 2002)) have taken the extreme step of prohibiting the joint 
provision of audit and NAS. 
 
In summary, empirical results reported in the extant literature are 
mixed results. DeFond et al., (2002) argue that because of market-
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based institutional incentives an auditor will act independently For 
example, Benston (1975) and Duh, Lee and Hua (2009) maintain 
that loss of reputation and litigation costs are likely to create 
strong incentives for auditors to maintain independence. DeFond et 
al., (2002, p. 1251) contend that ―although there are market-
based incentives for an auditor to maintain independence, there 
are also forces that potentially threaten auditor independence‖.  
 
Kinney et al., (2004) claim that income generated from non-audit 
services may result in an auditing firm being economically 
dependent on an audit client. A long held assertion in the auditing 
literature is that such dependence could lead to the perception of 
impaired auditor independence (Arrunada, 1999) and reduce 
auditor independence (DeAngelo, 1981b; Beck, Frecka and 
Salamon, 1988; Magee and Tseng, 1990). This in turn, reduces the 
auditor‘s willingness to challenge possible non-compliance of a 
client‘s financial statements, such as non-disclosure of mandatory 
information (Simunic, 1984; Arrunada, 1999). For example, the 
auditor‘s lack of independence could result in an unqualified audit 
opinion on financial statements even though they do not fully 
comply with accounting standards.  
 
Tai et al., (1990) show that in spite of the assurance function 
provided by auditors, non-disclosure of mandatory information still 
is in existence (see Chapter 2). In line with Ramsay (2001, p. 105), 
it is argued in this study that ―given the close working relationship 
between auditors and clients and the fact that auditors are paid by 
their clients, it is psychologically impossible for an auditor to be 
free from bias‖. Therefore, it is expected that the higher the level 
of auditor independence the more likely the greater compliance 
with accounting standards by firms (i.e., AASBs 6 Exploration for 
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and Evaluation of Mineral Resources and 136 Impairment of 
Assets). 
 
 
 
Based on the above arguments and prior literature, the following 
hypothesis is proposed: 
H1: There is a positive association between the level of 
auditor independence and the firm’s level of 
compliance with mandatory disclosures of AASB 6 
and AASB 136. 
 
3.4.2  Audit Specialisation  
Audit quality, as mentioned above, is a function of auditor 
independence and technical competence. Maines (2001) claims that 
auditor‘s competence is linked to task-specific knowledge and 
auditor‘s expertise. Whilst most research has focused brand name 
(audit firm size Big 4) (e.g., Becker et al., 1998; Francis, Mayhew 
and Sparks, 1999; Reynolds and Francis, 2001) others suggest an 
auditor‘s industry specialisation (e.g., Craswell et al., 1995, 
Solomon et al., 1999; Zhou and Elder, 2002; Balsam et al., 2003; 
and Krishnan, 2003b) is a relevant proxy of an auditor‘s technical 
competence.  
 
Solomon, Shields and Whittington (1999, p. 191) define industry 
specialists as ―auditors who are so designated by their firms and 
whose training and practice experience largely are in a particular 
industry‖. Solomon et al., (1999) infer that a preferred way for 
auditors to gain industry specialisation is through specialised 
indirect experience (training) combined with focused direct 
experience (working exclusively in a particular industry). 
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Casterella et al., (2004) note that in the early 1990s big accounting 
firms began changing the organisational structure and marketing 
expertise around industry specialisations35 (De Belde, 1997; Hogan 
and Jeter, 1999; Solomon et al., 1999). Furthermore, Mayhew and 
Wilkins (2003) indicate that audit firms make costly investment to 
become industry specialist. This gives rise to the question as to 
why accounting firms develop industry expertise in the market for 
audit services since it has been argued to be costly36. Craswell et 
al., (1995, p. 299) provide an explanation as follow: 
Agency theory can be extended to explain … industry 
specialisation as a function of increasing agency costs. 
There is an interplay of firm-specific factors (such as 
financing an ownership structure) as well as more 
general industry-wide factors (such as industry-
specific transactions and contracts) which determine a 
company‘s agency cost structure and corresponding 
monitoring needs….Thus, the combination of firm-
specific and industry-wide factors results in cross-
sectional variation in the demand for monitoring and, 
consequently, for different levels of audit quality. 
Differential demand for auditing allows multiple types 
of audit quality to co-exist in the same industry and 
leads to … product differentiation through industry 
specialisation. 
 
Al-Basteki (2000) points out that the effectiveness of the audit 
function depends on the competency of the auditor. In the same 
view, Healy and Palepu (2001) assert that differences in the 
auditor‘s qualifications and professional training have an impact on 
the credibility of audit reports. Therefore, it could be argued that it 
is more likely for a better trained auditor (or a specialist) to detect 
and question non-compliance with IASs than that of a non-
specialist. This is further supported by Abbott and Parker (2000) 
                                                     
35 For example, merging of Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand resulted from 
complementary strengths/synergy in industry markets; where Coopers & Lybrand‘s 
specialisation was in telecommunications as complementary to Price Waterhouse‘s 
specialisation in entertainment and media (Hogan and Jeter, 1999). 
36 See Gramling and Stone (2001) for a detailed discussion on objectives of audit firms to 
develop an industry specialisation. 
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and Krishnan (2003b) who argues that given specialised auditors 
have the expertise, resources and incentives to separate the 
information component from noise. Therefore, the higher the 
competency of auditors, the more likely the auditors to deter and 
detect irregularities, financial misstatement and questionable 
accounting practices, whether by error or fraud than are non-
specialist auditors. 
 
Some studies have investigated the association between audit 
specialisation and the quality of financial reporting such as those 
related to earnings management. Zhou and Elder (2002), for 
example investigate whether industry specialist auditors provide 
higher quality audits in the IPO process in terms of lower earnings 
management (measured by discretionary accruals). Zhou and Elder 
(2002) use 1,048 IPO observations from 1996 to 1998 spread over 
17 industries. They (Zhou and Elder, 2002) find that IPOs audited 
by industry specialists exhibit less underpricing and smaller 
discretionary accruals.  
 
Similarly, Krishnan (2003a; 2003b) utilises a much bigger sample 
size and finds that discretionary accruals reported by clients 
audited by specialist auditors was on average 1.2% lower than 
those audited by the non-specialist auditors. The result is 
consistent with the view that specialist auditors better alleviate 
accruals-based earnings management than non-specialist auditors, 
which implies a higher market valuation of earnings suggesting 
greater earnings quality (Francis et al., 2005). This conclusion is 
fully supported by Chen, Lin, and Zhou (2005) whose findings are 
consistent with firms audited by audit specialists which exhibit 
smaller abnormal accruals (i.e., earnings management). 
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Extending the literature on audit specialisation and earnings 
management, Balsam et al., (2003) compare the absolute level of 
discretionary accruals and earnings response coefficients of firms 
audited by audit specialists with those of firms audited by non-
specialists. Balsam et al., (2003) show that firms audited by 
industry specialist auditors have lower discretionary accruals and 
higher earnings response coefficients than clients of non-specialist 
auditors. Again, this is consistent with the notion that industry 
specialists improve a client‘s earnings quality than that of non-
specialists.  
 
The association between industry specialist auditors and fraudulent 
financial reporting has also attracted research. Utilising a logit 
regression model based on a matched sample of 1990 and 2001 
Carcello and Nagy (2004) reveal a negative relationship between 
audit specialisation and fraudulent financial reporting. Carcello and 
Nagy (2004) conclude that financial fraud reporting is lower for 
firms audited by industry specialist than by non-industry specialist. 
 
Another stream of research has looked to explain the relationship 
between audit specialisation and disclosure quality. Dunn and 
Mayhew (2004) provide evidence of the effect of hiring an industry 
specialist auditor on client disclosure quality. The disclosure quality 
is measured by analysts disclosure quality evaluations reported in 
the annual Association for Investment Management and Research 
(AIMR) Corporate Information Committee Reports. Using rank 
regression methods, Dunn and Mayhew (2004) show that an 
analyst‘s ranking of disclosure quality in unregulated industries is 
higher for firms audited by industry specialist auditors than that 
those audited by non-specialist auditors. Likewise, O‘Keefe, King 
and Gaver (1994) document evidence of audit (industry) 
specialisation being associated with fewer violations of Generally 
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Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) reporting standards. Hence, it 
can be argued that firms audited by an industry specialist results in 
higher level of compliance and; therefore, better quality (in this 
case with fewer violations of GAAS reporting standards). 
 
The evidence in support of industry audit specialisation is 
somewhat consistent. In line with Beatty (1989) and Krishnan 
(2003b), this study argues that specialist auditors are more likely 
to deter and detect questionable accounting practices and report 
material errors and irregularities than non-specialist auditors. First, 
specialist auditors are likely to invest more in staff recruitment, 
training, information technology, and state-of-the art audit 
technologies than non-specialists (Dopuch and Simunic, 1982; Chin 
and Chi, 2009). Second, specialist auditors have the expertise, 
resources, and incentives which motivate the specialist accounting 
firms seeking to protect their reputation capital. Third, auditor 
industry specialisation is reported to be positively related to a 
firm‘s compliance with GAAS, and non-compliance might be due to 
some audit firms lack of industry-specific knowledge (O‘Keefe et 
al., 1994).  
 
In line with agency theory, past literature, and prior empirical 
findings, it is expected that financial statements audited by a 
specialist auditor will result in higher levels of compliance with 
accounting standards; and that an industry specialist auditor will be 
more likely to be pro-active in challenging corporate management 
(Balsam et al., 2003; Krishnan, 2003b).  
 
The mineral resources industry, the central focus of this study, has 
‗specialised‘ accounting rules, reporting, measurement and 
disclosure requirements such as the valuation of mineral/oil 
reserves, income determination, and complex forward sales and 
 66 
hedging contracts (Craswell et al., 1995). Therefore, this study 
argues that auditor specialists in this industry will lead to a higher 
level of audit assurance relative to audits performed by non-
specialist auditors. Hence, it is hypothesised that: 
 
H2: There is a positive association between auditor 
specialisation and the firm’s level of compliance with 
mandatory disclosures of AASB 6 and AASB 136. 
 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
Theoretical framework of agency theory is reviewed. Using the 
tenets of agency theory, this chapter discusses theoretical and 
empirical literature on audit quality which is a function of auditor 
independence and auditor specialisation (technical competence). 
Agency theory suggests that external auditors are one of the 
crucial factors in demand to monitor and verify the actions of 
agents (management). Consequently, impairment of auditor 
independence, whether in fact or in appearance, is deemed to 
increase the agency cost. Furthermore, the higher the level of 
auditor independence the more likely results in the greater 
compliance with accounting standards (i.e., AASB 6 and AASB 
136). Specialist auditors are likely to deter and detect irregularities 
in accounting practices and non-compliance with accounting 
standards than non-specialists auditors. This is due to specialist 
auditors put more resources in investment in staff recruitment, 
training, information technology and state-of-the art audit 
technologies than non-specialists. Therefore, it is expected financial 
reports audited by a specialist auditor will result in a higher level of 
compliance with accounting standards (AASB 6 and AASB 136). 
 
This thesis hypothesises that the level of compliance with 
mandatory disclosure of AASB 6 Exploration for and Evaluation of 
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Mineral Resources and AASB 136 Impairment of Assets is positively 
related with both auditor independence and audit specialisation. 
 
The following chapter deliberates on how these hypotheses are to 
be tested, sample selection criteria, and measurement on both 
dependent and independent variables. The construction of a 
disclosure compliance index for AASBs 6 and 136 mandatory 
disclosure, and details on statistical methodology employed in this 
research are presented and discussed. 
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Chapter 4 DATA AND METHOD 
 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
Chapter 3 reviews various determinants of the extent of both 
mandatory disclosure compliance and the level of aggregate 
(mandatory and voluntary) disclosures noted in past studies. 
Chapter 3 also defines audit quality as a function of the ability of 
the auditor to perform a thorough examination of the financial 
accounts and detect possible errors or anomalies (technical 
competence) and the willingness to report if any breach is 
discovered (independence). The review shows that audit firm size 
has been predominantly used to proxy for audit quality. Using the 
tenets of agency theory, two hypotheses for the two features of 
auditor quality (i.e., auditor independence and audit competency) 
are then developed. 
 
This chapter documents the data collection process, research 
design and methods. Sample selection, data source, and data 
collection procedures are detailed in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 
presents the construction and measurement of the dependent 
variable, referred to as the Compliance Disclosures Index (CDI). 
The measurements for independent variables (auditor 
independence and audit specialisation) and various control 
variables are discussed in Section 4.4 and 4.5 respectively. Section 
4.6 describes the statistical methodology used to test the 
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hypotheses developed. Finally, Section 4.7 presents a brief 
summary of this chapter. 
 
4.2 Data Sources and Sample Selection 
Public listed firms in ASX under the Australian mineral resources 
sector are the target population of this study. This thesis covers a 
1-year period of 2005/06 financial year (i.e., 1 July 2005 to 30 
June 2006). This is a crucially important time period to study as 
this is the first year after AASB 6 Exploration for and Evaluation of 
Mineral Resources and AASB 136 Impairment of Assets were 
adopted and thus became compulsory for compliance. The listed 
companies‘ consolidated financial statements are the main source 
of data for the investigation of the extent of compliance with AASB 
6 and AASB 136, and for firms‘ attributes. These financial reports 
are collected from Aspect Huntley DatAnalysis database. Other 
information (such as market capitalisation) not available in Aspect 
Huntley DatAnalysis is obtained from DataStream and Connect 4 
databases. 
 
Table 4.1 summarises the number of companies in the final sample 
in relation to the population. The entire population of mineral 
resource firms listed on the ASX totalled 320 public firms as at 30 
June 2006. Four exclusions were made due to being delisted or 
suspended from the ASX, two that changed financial year end from 
30 June to 31 December, and nine firms that had incomplete data. 
Table 4.1 Panel A shows final sample of 289 firms that are 
applicable to compliance with AASB 6 after additional exclusion of 
16 non-applicable firms to AASB 6.  
 
Table 4.1 Panel B shows that additional of 9 non-applicable firms 
are excluded due to non-applicable to compliance with AASB 136. 
In Table 4.1 Panel C reveals an additional of 97 firms that are 
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excluded due to being non-applicable to compliance with both 
AASB 6 and AASB 136. Therefore, the final sample consists of 208 
firms which are applicable to both AASB 6 and AASB 136. The 
distribution of final sample firms as shown in Table 4.1 Panel C37 
consists of 65% of the whole population. With such an extensive 
representation, it is argued that the results can then be generalised 
to mineral resources firms listed in Australia.  
 
Table 4.1: Final Sample 
Description 
No. Firms 
% to Total 
Population 
PANEL A: DCI AASB 6   
Sample of listed firms 320 100 
Less: Delisted / Suspended 4 1.25 
Less: Change Financial Year to 31-
December 
2 0.63 
Less: Incomplete Data 9 2.81 
Less: N/A to the DCI 16 5.00 
No. of firms in the final sample 289 90.31 
   
PANEL B: DCI AASB 136   
Sample of listed firms 320 100 
Less: Delisted / Suspended 4 1.25 
Less: Change Financial Year to 31-
December 
2 0.63 
Less: Incomplete Data 9 2.81 
Less: N/A to the DCI 81 25.31 
No. of firms in the final sample 224 70.00 
   
PANEL C: DCI AASB 6 and AASB 136   
Sample of listed firms 320 100 
Less: Delisted / Suspended 4 1.25 
Less: Change Financial Year to 31-
December 
2 0.63 
Less: Incomplete Data 9 2.81 
Less: N/A to the DCI AASB 6 AND AASB 
136 
97 30.31 
No. of firms in the final sample 208 65.00 
   
AASB 6 is for Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources and AASB 136 
is for Impairment of Assets. Those ‗N/A to the DCI‘ mainly are firms that do not 
fall into the scope of AASB 6 and/or AASB 136. See Appendix E for a complete 
listing of the sample companies. 
 
4.3 Dependent Variable 
                                                     
37 The main sample used to test for the developed hypotheses are based on the sample 
shown in Table 4.1 Panel C which consists of 208 firms that are applicable to compliance 
with both AASB 6 and AASB 136. 
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Chapter 1 discusses the significant role of mineral resources38 in 
the Australia economy. As at 30 June 2006 the total assets in the 
Sector Energy and Material firms listed on ASX show a value of 
more than AUD $337.8 billion. Nearly 75% (AUD $ 252.2 billion) of 
the AUD 337.8 billion are categorised as non-current assets. This 
indicates that Australian resource companies have an enormous 
investment in their non-current assets. Therefore, it is posited that 
non-compliance with AASB 136 (Impairment of Assets) would 
definitely induce great uncertainty and volatility in earnings quality 
for the Australia resources firms. Such uncertainty and volatility 
has a major impact on the cost of capital (Minton and Schrand, 
1999; Francis, Nanda and Olsson, 2008). 
 
Most previous studies of mandatory and/or voluntary disclosure 
compliance have subjectively applied limited content analysis on 
IFIR required disclosures and measurements/presentation, as a 
means of managing the scale of research (e.g., Wallace et al., 
1994; Street and Bryant, 2000; Street and Gray, 2001; Glaum and 
Street, 2003; Ali et al., 2004). Cairns (2002) notes that such 
practise is cause for much concern, and as such it is a limit that 
severely restricts the value of conclusions. This study enhances the 
methodological strengths of including all disclosures required by 
AASBs 6 Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources and 
AASB 136 Impairment of Assets in comparison to previous research 
which selectively choose certain disclosure items from selective 
accounting standards, 
 
The dependent variable in this thesis is the level of compliance with 
AASB 6 and AASB 136. In order to measure the level of mandatory 
disclosure compliance with these standards a Disclosure 
                                                     
38 Mineral Resource firms are mainly made up by Energy and Materials sector in 
accordance to the ASX industry classification, which based on Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS).  
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Compliance Index (DCI) is constructed. This approach is consistent 
with previous studies (Tower et al., 1999, Street and Bryant, 2000; 
Ali et al., 2004). Marston and Shrives (1991) also argue that a 
well-constructed compliance index is considered to be a reliable 
measurement of corporate compliance. The DCI checklist consists 
of all key items that are required to be disclosed under AASB 6 and 
AASB 136. The DCI checklist comprises 62 mandatory disclosure 
items and is set out in Table 4.2.  
 
In constructing the compliance index there are three main 
methodological issues to consider. First, how should each item be 
weighted? Second, what scale should be used for each item? Third, 
what is the best way to deal with the non-applicable/non-disclosed 
dilemma?  
 
The first issue is to decide whether an individual item of the 
compliance list is to be allocated different weights in accordance 
with its importance. Weighting disclosure items is one of the crucial 
issues in measuring the level of compliance. Some studies assign 
different weight to items (e.g., Belkaoui and Kahl, 1978; Firth, 
1979; McNally, Lee and Hasseldine, 1982; Chow and Wong-Boren, 
1987; Malone et al., 1993) whilst others apply equal weight to all 
items (e.g., Tower et al., 1999; Street and Bryant, 2000; Street 
and Gray, 2001; Glaum and Street, 2003). 
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Table 4.2: AASB 6 and AASB 136 Compliance Checklist 
Mandatory Disclosures Source 
Disclose information that identifies the amount of the exploration for and evaluation of mineral resources 
 
AASB 6 para 23 
Disclose information that explains the amount of the exploration for and evaluation of mineral resources 
 
AASB 6 para 23 
Disclose accounting policy for exploration and evaluation expenditures 
 
AASB 6 para 24 (a) 
Acknowledge the recognition of exploration and evaluation assets 
 
AASB 6 para 24 (a) 
Disclose the amounts of assets, liabilities, income and expense and operating and investing cash flows 
arising from the exploration for and evaluation of mineral resources 
AASB 6 para 24 (b) 
 
Provide an explanation that recoverability of the carrying amount of the exploration and evaluation assets is 
dependent on successful development and commercial exploitation, or alternatively, sale of the respective 
areas of interest 
AASB 6 para Aus24.1 
 
Disclose if it is impracticable to apply a comparative information that relates to annual reporting periods 
beginning before 1 January 2005 
AASB 6 para 27 
Disclose if applying the Standard, being the Australian equivalent to IFRS 6 
 
AASB 6 para Aus27.1 
Disclose the amount of impairment losses recognised in profit and loss  
 
AASB 136 para 126 (a) 
Disclose the line item of the income statement in which those impairment losses are included 
 
AASB 136 para 126 (a) 
Disclose the amount of reversals of impairment losses recognised in profit or loss 
 
AASB 136 para 126 (b) 
Disclose the line item of the income statement in which those impairment losses are reversed 
 
AASB 136 para 126 (b) 
Disclose the amount of impairment losses on revalued assets recognised directly in equity  
 
AASB 136 para 126 (c) 
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Table 4.2: AASB 6 and AASB 136 Compliance Checklist (continued) 
Mandatory Disclosures Source 
Disclose the amount of reversals of impairment losses on revalued assets recognised directly in equity 
 
AASB 136 para 126 (d) 
Disclose the amount of impairment losses recognised in profit or loss for each reportable segment in 
accordance with AASB 114 
AASB 136 para 129 (a) 
Disclose the amount of impairment losses recognised directly in equity 
 
AASB 136 para 129 (a) 
Disclose the amount of reversals of impairment losses recognised in profit or loss 
 
AASB 136 para 129 (b) 
Disclose the amount of reversals of impairment losses recognised directly in equity 
 
AASB 136 para 129 (b) 
Disclose the events and circumstances that led to the recognition of the impairment loss for an individual 
asset (including goodwill, cash-generating unit) 
AASB 136 para 130 (a) 
Disclose the events and circumstances that led to the recognition of the reversal of impairment loss for an 
individual asset (including goodwill, cash-generating unit) 
AASB 136 para 130 (a) 
Disclose the amount of the impairment loss recognised for an individual asset (including goodwill, cash-
generating unit) 
AASB 136 para 130 (b) 
Disclose the amount of the reversal of impairment loss recognised for an individual asset (including goodwill, 
cash-generating unit) 
AASB 136 para 130 (b) 
For an individual asset, disclose the nature of the asset 
 
AASB 136 para 130 (c) 
(i) 
For an individual asset, disclose the segment information in accordance with AASB 114 to which the asset 
belongs, based on the entity‘s primary reporting format 
AASB 136 para 130 (c) 
(ii) 
For each CGU, describe the CGU (such as whether it is a product line, a plant, a business operation, a 
geographical area, or a reportable segment as defined in AASB 114 
AASB 136 para 130 (d) 
(i) 
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Table 4.2: AASB 6 and AASB 136 Compliance Checklist (continued) 
Mandatory Disclosures Source 
For each CGU, disclose the amount of the impairment loss recognised by class of asset, 
 
AASB 136 para 130 (d) 
(ii) 
For each CGU, disclose the amount of the reversal of the impairment loss recognised by class of asset 
 
AASB 136 para 130 (d) 
(ii) 
For each CGU, disclose if the aggregation of assets for identifying the CGU has changed since previous 
estimate of the CGU‘s recoverable amount 
AASB 136 para 130 (d) 
(iii) 
For each CGU, describe the current and former way of aggregating assets if the aggregation of assets for 
identifying the CGU has changed since the previous estimate of the CGU‘s recoverable amount 
AASB 136 para 130 (d) 
(iii) 
For each CGU, disclose the reasons for the changing the way the CGU is identified 
 
AASB 136 para 130 (d) 
(iii) 
Disclose whether the recoverable amount of the asset (CGU) is its fair value less costs to sell or its value in 
use 
AASB 136 para 130 (e) 
If recoverable amount is fair value less costs to sell, disclose the basis used to determine fair value less costs 
to sell (such as whether fair value was determined by reference to an active market) 
AASB 136 para 130 (f) 
If recoverable amount is value in use, disclose the discount rate(s) used in the current estimate and previous 
estimate (if any) of value in use 
AASB 136 para 130 (g) 
Disclose the main classes of assets affected by impairment losses in aggregate for which no information is 
disclosed in accordance with para 130 
AASB 136 para 131 (a) 
Disclose the main classes of assets affected by reversal of impairment losses in aggregate for which no 
information is disclosed in accordance with para 130 
AASB 136 para 131 (a) 
Disclose the main events and circumstances that led to the recognition of these impairment losses in para 
131 (a) 
AASB 136 para 131 (b) 
Disclose the main events and circumstances that led to the recognition of these reversal of impairment 
losses in para 131 (a) 
AASB 136 para 131 (b) 
Any portion of the goodwill acquired in a business combination that has not been allocated to a CGU (group 
of units), the amount of the unallocated goodwill shall be disclosed 
AASB 136 para 133 
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Table 4.2: AASB 6 and AASB 136 Compliance Checklist (continued) 
Mandatory Disclosures Source 
Disclose the reasons why that amount (para 133) remains unallocated 
 
AASB 136 para 133 
For each CGU (group of units) for which the carrying amount of goodwill or intangible assets with indefinite 
useful lives allocated to that unit (group of units) is significant in comparison with the entity‘s total carrying 
amount of goodwill or intangible assets with indefinite useful lives, shall disclose the carrying amount of 
goodwill allocated to the unit (group of units) 
AASB 136 para 134 
(a) 
For each CGU (group of units) for which the carrying amount of goodwill or intangible assets with indefinite 
useful lives allocated to that unit (group of units) is significant in comparison with the entity‘s total carrying 
amount of goodwill or intangible assets with indefinite useful lives, shall disclose the carrying amount of 
intangible assets with indefinite useful lives allocated to the unit (group of units) 
AASB 136 para 134 
(b) 
For each CGU (group of units) for which the carrying amount of goodwill or intangible assets with indefinite 
useful lives allocated to that unit (group of units) is significant in comparison with the entity‘s total carrying 
amount of goodwill or intangible assets with indefinite useful lives, shall disclose the basis on which the unit‘s 
(group of units‘) recoverable amount has been determined (value in use or fair value less costs to sell) 
AASB 136 para 134 
(c) 
If the unit‘s (group of units‘) recoverable amount of para 134 (c) is based on value in use; disclose each key 
assumption on which management has based its cash flow projections for the period covered by the most 
recent budgets/forecasts 
AASB 136 para 134 
(d) (i) 
If the unit‘s (group of units‘) recoverable amount of para 134 (c) is based on value in use; disclose 
management‘s approach to determining the value assigned to each key assumption (reflect past experience or 
why they differ from past experience or external sources) 
AASB 136 para 134 
(d) (ii) 
If the unit‘s (group of units‘) recoverable amount of para 134 (c) is based on value in use; disclose the period 
over which management has projected cash flow based on financial budgets/forecasts, if the period > 5 years, 
explain why that longer period is justified 
AASB 136 para 134 
(d) (iii) 
If the unit‘s (group of units‘) recoverable amount of para 134 (c) is based on value in use; disclose the growth 
rate used to extrapolate cash flow projection, and justification for using growth rate exceeds the long-term 
average growth rate for the products, industries, or country in which the entity operates 
AASB 136 para 134 
(d) (iv) 
If the unit‘s (group of units‘) recoverable amount of para 134 (c) is based on value in use; disclose the 
discount rate(s) applied to the cash flow projections 
AASB 136 para 134 
(d) (v) 
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Table 4.2: AASB 6 and AASB 136 Compliance Checklist (continued) 
Mandatory Disclosures Source 
If the unit‘s (group of units‘) recoverable amount of para 134 (c) is based on fair value less costs to sell; if the 
methodology used is based on an observable market price, disclose a description of each key assumption on 
the determination fair value less costs to sell is formed 
AASB 136 para 134 
(e) (i) 
If the unit‘s (group of units‘) recoverable amount of para 134 (c) is based on fair value less costs to sell; if the 
methodology used is based on an observable market price, disclose a description of management‘s approach 
in determining the value assigned to each key assumption, whether based on past experience, if not, explain 
why they differ from past experience or external sources of information 
AASB 136 para 134 
(e) (ii) 
If a change in a key assumption results in CGU carrying amount to exceed its recoverable amount; disclose 
the amount by which the CGU recoverable amount exceeds its carrying amount 
AASB 136 para 134 (f) 
(i) 
If a change in a key assumption results in CGU carrying amount to exceed its recoverable amount; disclose 
the value assigned to the key assumption 
AASB 136 para 134 (f) 
(ii) 
If a change in a key assumption results in CGU carrying amount to exceed its recoverable amount; disclose 
the amount by which the value assigned to the key assumption must change, in order for the CGU recoverable 
amount to be equal to its carrying amount 
AASB 136 para 134 (f) 
(iii) 
Disclose the fact if the some or all carrying amount of goodwill or intangible assets with indefinite useful lives 
is allocated across multiple CGU is not significant in comparison with the entity‘s total carrying amount 
AASB 136 para 135 
Disclose the aggregate carrying amount of goodwill or intangible assets with indefinite useful lives allocated to 
the CGU 
AASB 136 para 135 
Disclose the fact if the recoverable amounts of any of those CGUs are based on the same key assumptions and 
the aggregate carrying amount of goodwill or intangible assets with indefinite useful lives allocated to them is 
significant in comparison with the entity‘s total carrying amount of good will or intangible assets with indefinite 
useful lives, together with the following: 
AASB 136 para 135 
Disclose the aggregate carrying amount of goodwill allocated to those CGU (or group of CGUs) 
 
AASB 136 para 135 
(a) 
Disclose the aggregate carrying amount of intangible assets with indefinite useful lives allocated to those CGU 
(CGUs) 
AASB 136 para 135 
(b) 
 
 78 
Table 4.2: AASB 6 and AASB 136 Compliance Checklist (continued) 
Disclose a description of the key assumption(s) 
 
AASB 136 para 135 
(c) 
Disclose a description of management‘s approach to determining value assigned to the key assumption, 
whether those values reflect past experience or, if appropriate, are consistent with external sources of 
information, and if not, how and why they differ from past experience or external sources of information 
AASB 136 para 135 
(d) 
If a reasonable possible change in the key assumption would cause the aggregate of the CGU (a group of 
CGUs) carrying amount to exceed the aggregate of their recoverable amount, disclose the following: 
 the amount by which the aggregate of the CGU (a group of CGUs) recoverable amounts exceeds the 
aggregate of their carrying amounts 
 the value assigned to the key assumption 
 the amount by which the value assigned to the key assumption must change, after incorporating any 
consequential effects of the change on the other variables used to measure recoverable amount in order 
for the aggregate of the CGU recoverable amounts to be equal to the aggregate of their carrying amount 
 
 
AASB 136 para 135 
(e) (i) 
 
AASB 136 para 135 
(e) (ii) 
AASB 136 para 135 
(e) (iii) 
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In this study, each required disclosure of AASBs 6 and 136 is 
equally weighted, for the following reasons: 
 This study examines the extent of compliance with mandated 
disclosures. As the AASB 101 Presentation of Financial 
Statements, paragraph 14, states ―an entity whose financial 
statements and notes comply with IFRSs shall make an 
explicit and unreserved statement of such compliance in the 
notes. The financial statements and notes shall not be 
described as complying with IFRSs unless they comply with 
all the requirements of IFRSs‖. With this view in mind, it is 
implicitly assumed by the AASB that each disclosure item is 
of equal valuable.  
 Equal weighting circumvents the use of subjective judgement 
in appraising the importance of different disclosure items 
(Wallace and Naser, 1995; Owusu-Ansah, 2000). 
 There is no general consensus on the relative importance of 
each disclosure item amid different user groups (Singhvi and 
Desai, 1971; Dhaliwal, 1980; Owusu-Ansah, 1998). 
 Dhaliwal (1980) and Owusu-Ansah (1998) argued that ―the 
relative importance of disclosure items is dynamic and not 
static as they depend on prevailing economic conditions‖ (as 
quoted in Owusu-Ansah, 2000, p. 294). 
 Since this study is not tailored for, and does not focus on, a 
particular user group, but rather for and on all users of 
financial reports, an unweighted scheme is adopted to enable 
a neutral assessment of the disclosure level devoid of 
perceptual influences of any particular user group (Wallace 
and Naser, 1995; Camfferman and Cooke, 2002).  
 Past research shows that equal weighting methods tend to 
produce analogous results as of different weighting methods, 
for example Choi (1973), Robins and Austin (1986), Chow 
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and Wong-Boren (1987), Zarzeski (1996) and Prencipe 
(2004). 
 
The second methodological issue in constructing a disclosure index 
is to determine what scale to measure each item. This is, should 
the scale be dichotomous (i.e., one if present and zero if not) or 
broader (e.g., zero to five, with five being complete disclosure, 
three for partial disclosure and zero for no disclosure)? The 
approach chosen in this thesis for scoring is dichotomous, in which 
a disclosure item on the checklist is assigned a value of one if 
disclosed. On the other hand if a checklist item that is deemed to 
be applicable, but is not disclosed and no information pertaining to 
non-disclosure are adequately provided, then a value of zero is 
assigned. The use of a dichotomous scoring scale has been widely 
adopted by other studies, such as Cooke (1989b; 1991; 1992; 
1998), Ahmed and Nicholls (1994), Inchausti (1997), Tower et al., 
(1999), Camfferman and Cooke (2002), Ali et al., (2004), Owusu-
Ansah and Yeoh (2005). 
 
The third issue regarding scoring is to determine if an undisclosed 
information item should be judged as non-applicable or non-
compliance. There is a possibility that a firm might be penalised as 
non-compliance (score of zero) when a mandated disclosure item is 
in fact not applicable. Whilst the scoring approach introduces a 
judgemental element, steps are taken to mitigate the 
problem/uncertainty by reading the entire annual report 
thoroughly, to comprehend the nature and complexity of each 
firm‘s operation prior to determining undisclosed information item 
as non-applicable or non-compliance. This approach has been 
widely applied by prior studies (Cooke, 1989b; Ahmed and Nicholls, 
1994; Glaum and Street, 2003; Ali et al., 2004; Owusu-Ansah and 
Yeoh, 2005). Ahmed and Nicholls (1994) argue that such a 
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procedure will greatly reduce the risk of penalising a firm for not 
disclosing an information item which is not applicable.  
 
In summary, the DCI for each company is calculated as a ratio of 
deemed compliance over total applicable mandated disclosure 
items as defined in the following formula:  
  mj 
 ∑ dij 
  i=1 
DCI = _______ 
   nj 
 ∑ dij 
  =1 
 
where dij is mandatory information item i applicable to company j 
coded as 1 if disclosed or 0 if not; mj is the number of mandatory 
disclosure items applicable to company j and are actually disclosed 
in its annual report; and njt is the total number of mandatory 
disclosure items that are applicable to, and are expected to be 
disclosed by company j in its annual report. This measurement 
applies a stricter interpretation, whereby, a company‘s non-
disclosure violates an AASB rule and is treated as non-compliance.  
 
4.4 Independent Variables 
The key predictor variables that are of interest to this study are 
auditor independence and audit specialisation. Chapter 3 presents 
the main key variables definition, arguments that leading to 
development of the two main hypotheses. The following sub-
sections (i.e., 4.4.1 and 4.4.2) discuss measurements that have 
been widely employed to proxy for auditor independence and audit 
specialisation respectively, and present measurements that are 
used for this study. 
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4.4.1  Auditor Independence 
Previous studies acknowledge that it is the strength of the 
economic bond between the audit firm and a client that may impair 
auditor independence (DeAngelo, 1981a; Beck et al., 1988; Magee 
and Tseng, 1990; Salehi, 2009). However, there is lack of 
agreement in measuring the economic bond.  
 
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) asserts that 
an accounting firm that provides both audit and non-audit services 
to a client may increase the economic bond. This may impair 
investor confidence in auditor independence resulting in declining 
confidence in public capital markets (Kinney, Palmrose and Scholz, 
2004). For example, in a speech at the New York University for Law 
and Business, the then-SEC Chairman Levitt, stated that, ―the audit 
function is simply being used as a springboard to more lucrative 
consulting services‖ (Levitt, 2000 cited in Hay, Knechel, and Li 
(2006)). Regulators also express concern that some audit fees are 
too low because auditors may lowball audit fees to secure lucrative 
NAS such as consulting contracts (SEC, 2001). The provision of 
NAS39 by incumbent auditors has long been considered by 
regulators in Australia and overseas as a threat to auditor 
independence (Craswell, 1999).  
 
Table 4.3 Measures of Auditor Independence shows that almost all 
past research has employed Ratio of Non-Audit Fees to Total Fees 
(Non-Audit + Audit Fees) to proxy for auditor independence. This is 
particularly true of research in Australia. This measurement of 
auditor independence is also supported by the SEC, where in its 
                                                     
39 In line with Beattie and Fearnley (2002), this research defines non-audit services as 
services offered by audit firms to both public and private firms which may include, among 
others: systems and information technology (IT); training; services for SME such as 
payroll; risk management advice; taxation, including tax compliance and tax planning and 
advice; corporate recovery and insolvency; legal; forensic and litigation support; mergers 
and acquisitions; transaction support and follow up including due diligence and initial 
public offerings (IPO); recruitment and human resources; and portfolio monitoring. 
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final rule on auditor independence (SEC, 2000), maintains that 
―non-audit services create economic incentives that may 
inappropriately influence the audit‖ and when non-audit fees 
―become large relative to audit fees, auditor independence may be 
at risk‖. 
 
This study employs the Ratio of Non-Audit Fees to Total Fees (Non-
Audit + Audit), henceforth NonAudit, as the main proxy for auditor 
independence. This is consistent with both SEC‘s stand that non-
audit fees is of use to investors in evaluating auditor independence 
(SEC 2000, Section III.c.5), and with most previous research (e.g., 
Wines, 1994; Craswell, 1999; Gore et al., 2001, Sharma and 
Sidhu, 2001; Frankel et al., 2002; Reynolds et al., 2004, among 
others). The higher the ratio the more problematic auditor 
independence is considered. 
 
Asbaugh et al., (2003, p.614) contend the non-audit ratio only 
―capture[s] the relative monetary value of the audit versus non-
audit services provided by the audit firm to a client‖. They 
(Asbaugh et al., 2003, p. 614) further state that the non-audit ratio 
measure ―does not necessarily capture the economic importance of 
the client to the audit firm when the total client fees are immaterial 
to the audit firm‖. In response to the concern raised by Asbaugh et 
al., (2003), recent research has introduced other measurements 
designed to capture the client financial importance to the auditor. 
For example, DeFond et al., (2002), Asbaugh et al., (2003) and 
Brandon et al., (2004) use the natural log of audit fees, non-audit 
fees, and total fees. Meanwhile, Frankel et al., (2002) and 
Reynolds et al., (2004) utilise the percentile rank by Auditor of a 
Client‘s Audit Fees, Non-Audit Fees, and Total Fees, to capture the 
explicit economic bond between the audit firm and its client. 
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Table 4.3: Measures of Auditor Independence 
Study Country Measures of Auditor Independence 
Wines (1994) Australia  Ratio of Non-Audit Fees to Total Fees 
Firth (1997a) U.K.  Non-Audit Fees (in amount) 
Craswell (1999) Australia  Ratio of Non-Audit Fees to Total Fees 
Gore, Pope and Singh 
(2001) 
U.K. & 
U.S. 
 Ratio of Non-Audit Fees to Total Fees 
Sharma and Sidhu 
(2001) 
Australia 
 Ratio of Non-Audit Fees to Total Fees 
Antle, Narayanamoorthy 
and Zhou (2002) 
U.K. & 
U.S. 
 Natural Log of Non-Audit Fees 
 Natural Log of Audit Fees 
Barkess, Simnett and 
Urquhart (2002) 
Australia 
 Ratio of a Client‘s Total Fees to the Audit 
Firm‘s Total Revenue 
DeFond, Raghunandan 
and Subramanyam 
(2002) 
U.S. 
 Ratio of Non-Audit Fees to Total Fees 
 Natural Log of Audit Fees 
 Natural Log of Non-Audit Fees 
 Natural Log of Total Fees 
Frankel, Johnson and 
Nelson (2002) 
U.S. 
 Ratio of Non-Audit Fees to Total Fees 
 Percentile Rank by Auditor of a Client‘s 
Non-Audit and Audit Fees 
 Percentile Rank by Auditor of a Client‘s 
total Fees 
Asbaugh, LaFond and 
Mayhew (2003) 
U.S. 
 Ratio of Non-Audit Fees to Total Fees 
 Natural Log of Audit Fees 
 Natural Log of Non-Audit Fees 
 Natural Log of Total Fees 
Chung and Kallapur 
(2003) 
U.S. 
 Ratio of a client‘s Total Fees to Audit 
Firm‘s Total Revenue 
 Ratio of a Client‘s Non-Audit Fees to 
Audit Firm‘s Total Revenue 
Geiger and Rama (2003) U.S. 
 Natural Log of Audit Fees 
 Natural Log of Total Fees 
Ragnunandan, Read and 
Whisenant (2003a) 
U.S. 
 Ratio of Non-Audit Fees to Total Fees 
 Natural Log of Total Fees 
Brandon, Crabtree and 
Maher (2004) 
U.S. 
 Ratio of Non-Audit Fees to Total Fees 
 Natural Log of Audit Fees 
 Natural Log of Non-Audit Fees 
 Natural Log of Total Fees 
Reynolds, Deis and 
Francis (2004) 
U.S. 
 Ratio of Non-Audit Fees to Total Fees 
 Natural Log of Total Fees 
 Percentile Rank by Auditor of a Client‘s 
Audit Fees 
 Percentile Rank by Auditor of a Client‘s 
Non-Audit Fees 
 Percentile Rank by Auditor of a Client‘s 
Total Fees 
Ruddock, Taylor and 
Taylor (2005) 
Australia 
 Ratio of Non-Audit Fees to Total Fees 
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Another stream of research has looked to better capture the 
client‘s importance to the audit firm by examining the fee 
dependence at both the national audit firm level (Firm-wide) and 
the local office level. The Firm-wide perspective ―considers an 
accounting firm‘s practice in aggregate, typically at the country-
level of analysis; the firm is the focal point and no differentiation is 
presumed to exist across the individual practice offices of the firm‖ 
(Ferguson et al., 2003, p. 430). In contrast the office-level 
perspective ―views each individual practice office in the then the 
BIG 5 network as a unique and relevant unit of analysis in its own 
right because audit contracting is conducted through local offices, 
audit engagements are administered by an audit team typically 
located in an office in the same city as the client‘s headquarters, 
and audit reports are issued on office-specific letterhead of BIG 5 
engagement office administering the audit‖ (Ferguson et al., 2003, 
p. 430). 
 
For robustness, proxies that have been widely introduced to 
capture client importance for auditor independence, such as using 
the total audit fees and examining the fees at both local and 
national level, will be used in sensitivity tests reported in Chapter 6 
Robustness Tests. 
 
4.4.2  Audit Specialisation 
Audit specialisation40 has generated significant interest among 
auditing researchers. In view of the fact that an auditor‘s specialist 
status is not directly observable, prior studies have used different 
proxies to capture such specialisation. A review of past studies 
presented in Table 4.4 indicates a lack of consensus on the most 
appropriate measurement of auditor specialisation. 
                                                     
40 This study uses the terms auditor industry specialisation, audit specialist, auditor 
industry expertise, industry expertise, audit competency and audit specialisation 
interchangeably. 
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The summary in Table 4.4 indicates different measures have been 
employed to capture audit specialisation across different time 
frames and countries. Whilst there is no general consensus, Table 
4.4 reveals that there are two measures, auditor‘s industry market 
share (Market Share) and auditor‘s industry portfolio share 
(Portfolio Share), that have emerged to be the main proxies used 
to measure for industry expertise. Of the two the former approach 
dominates. 
 
The industry market share approach regards an accounting firm as 
an audit expert within an industry when the firm ―has differentiated 
itself from its competitors in terms of market share within a 
particular industry‖ (Neal and Riley, 2004, p.170). Neal and Riley 
(2004) claim that this within-industry (Market Share) approach 
assumes that an audit specialisation can be inferred from observing 
the relative market share of an audit firm servicing a particular 
industry. The firm with the largest market share is deemed to have 
developed the largest knowledge base in that industry and, 
therefore, reflecting ―significant investments by audit firms in 
developing industry-specific audit technologies with the expected 
benefits being increased economies of scale and improved audit 
quality‖ (Neal and Riley, 2004, p.170). Consistent with Neal and 
Riley (2004), Balsam et al., (2003) maintain that audit 
specialisation is established through repetition in similar settings, 
and hence a large volume of audit within a particular industry 
deduces expertise. 
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Table 4.4: Measures of Auditor Specialisation 
Study Country Measures 
Cut-
off 
Base and Condition 
Zeff and 
Fossum (1967) 
U.S. Industry Market 
Share 
Top 1  Number of Clients  
 Client Revenues  
 Client Assets  
 Client Income 
 
Difference between Top 1 & 
Top 2 must be at least of 
10% 
 
Palmrose 
(1986) 
U.S. Industry Market 
Share 
Top 3  Client Sales 
Craswell and 
Taylor (1991) 
Australia Industry Market 
Share 
10%  Number of Clients 
 Audit Fees 
 Total Fees (Audit + 
Others)  
At least 30 Clients within 
an industry 
Craswell, 
Francis and 
Taylor (1995) 
Australia Industry Market 
Share 
10% 
20% 
 Either Number of Clients 
or Audit Fees 
 
At least 30 Clients within 
an industry 
Hogan and 
Jeter (1999) 
U.S. Industry Market 
Share 
Top 2 
Top 3 
 Client Assets 
DeFond, 
Francis and 
Wong (2000) 
Hong 
Kong 
Industry Market 
Share 
Top 1  
Top 3 
 Client Assets 
Top 1 limited to Big-6 only 
Krishnan 
(2001) 
U.S. Industry Market 
Share 
 
 
 
Industry Portfolio 
Share 
Top 3 
10% 
 
 
1/Nind 
 Client Assets 
 Client Sales 
 Number of Clients 
 
 Client Assets 
 Client Sales 
 Number of Clients 
Ferguson and 
Stokes (2002) 
Australia Industry Market 
Share 
 
 
 
 
  10% Base: number of 
clients 
 10% Base: Audit Fees 
 10% Base: Both Number 
of Clients and Audit Fees 
 20% Base: Both Number 
of Client and Audit Fees 
 10% Base: Either 
Number of Client or 
Audit Fees 
 15% Base: Either 
Number of Clients or 
Audit Fees 
 20% Base: Either 
Number of Clients or 
Audit Fees 
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Table 4.4: Measures of Auditor Specialisation (continued) 
Zhou and Elder 
(2002) 
 
U.S. Industry Market 
Share 
15%  Client Sales 
Balsam, 
Krishnan and 
Yang (2003) 
U.S. Industry Market 
Share 
 
 
 
 
Other 
 
 
 
Continuous 
Market Share 
 
Top 3 
Top 1 
 
 
 
Top 1 
 
 
 
N/A 
N/A 
 Client Sales 
 Client Sales (difference 
btw Top 1 & 2 must be 
at least of 10%) 
 
 Firm with the greatest 
number of clients in the 
industry 
 
 Client Sales 
 Number of Clients 
Ferguson, 
Francis and 
Stokes (2003) 
Australia Industry Market 
Share 
Top 1 
 
Top1 
 Audit Fees 
 
 Audit Fees, at least 5 
observations per 
industry 
Krishnan 
(2003b) 
U.S. Industry Market 
Share 
 
Industry Market 
Share 
 
Industry Portfolio 
Share 
15% 
 
15% 
 
Top 3 
 Client Sales 
 
 Client Assets 
 
 Client Sales 
Mayhew and 
Wilkins (2003) 
U.S. Industry Market 
Share 
20%  Number of Clients 
 Client Assets 
Carcello and 
Nagy (2004) 
U.S. Industry Market 
Share 
 
Continuous 
Market Share 
Top 1 
20% 
N/A 
 Client Sales 
 Client Assets 
 
Casterella, 
Francis, Lewis 
and Walker 
(2004) 
U.S. Industry Market 
Share 
20% 
25% 
30% 
35% 
 Client Sales 
Dunn and 
Mayhew (2004) 
U.S. Industry Market 
Share 
 
Continuous 
Market Share 
20% 
 
N/A 
 Client Sales 
 
 Percentage of sales the 
client‘s audit firm audits 
in the client‘s industry 
Neal and Riley 
(2004) 
U.S. Industry Market 
Share 
 
 
Industry Portfolio 
Share 
 
Weighted Market 
Share 
20% 
25% 
 
1/Nind 
 
* 
 Client Assets 
 
 
 Client Assets 
 
 Client Assets 
* Cut off = Market Share 
Cut-off x Portfolio Share 
Cut-off 
Francis, 
Reichelt and 
Wang (2005) 
U.S.  Industry Market 
Share 
Top 1  Audit Fees 
 Client Sales 
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Neal and Rile (2004, p.170) posit that the portfolio share approach 
regards ―the relative distribution of audit services and related fees 
across the various industries for each audit firm considered 
individually‖. Such view assumes that an industry expertise is 
designated when an audit firm generates the most revenue and 
presumably has invested significant resources into development of 
industry expertise. Therefore, under the portfolio approach, an 
audit firm may be designated as an industry expert even if the 
audit firm does not lead the market share in proportion to that 
particular industry. 
 
Table 4.4 shows that almost all prior research on audit 
specialisation has relied on the market share approach to measure 
industry expertise. However, an additional complication in 
identifying industry expertise is the decision to use one of two 
methods (market share or portfolio share) to determine the 
measurement base and the cut-off point. These issues are further 
elaborated below.  
 
Firstly, different bases have been utilised to measure market share. 
Apart from audit fees the number of clients, client sales and total 
assets are the most favoured proxies. In the absence of statutory 
requirement to disclose audit and non-audit fees, past studies have 
been forced to use surrogates such as client sales to substitute 
audit fees in order to measure market share. However, Moizer and 
Turley (1987) argue that using client‘s sales as a surrogate is likely 
to generate biased tests, hence generate spurious results. Some 
researchers (e.g., Craswell, Francis and Taylor, 1995; Krishnan, 
2001; Ferguson and Stokes, 2002; Mayhew and Wilkins, 2003) use 
the number of clients as a proxy to capture industry expertise so as 
to avoid the bias toward large clients in an industry. Balsam et al., 
(2003) contend that small audit firms that have a number of small 
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clients and have developed an industry knowledge base may be 
captured by the measurement base of number of clients, and not 
by client sales base measure. 
 
Secondly, once the measurement base is selected and results are 
generated, a cut-off point at which an auditor is to be designated 
as a specialist is required. Table 4.4 reveals that the cut-off point 
that has been widely and differently employed has ranged from Top 
10%41 to 35% and Top 1 to Top 3 audit firms within the 
industry/portfolio. There is a lack of consensus on the most 
appropriate cut off point for an industry expert designation. 
 
Consistent with the argument of DeAngelo (1981b) and Dunn and 
Mayhew (2004) that audit quality correlates with audit firm size, 
this study assumes that audit firms with large market share, and 
hence audit fees, have strong incentives to deliver high quality 
audits. In line with the arguments discussed above and Craswell et 
al., (1995, p.300), this research maintains that ―demand for 
industry specialisation drives audit firm investments in 
specialisation and leads to industry-based clienteles (which is the 
rationale for using market share data to infer specialisation)‖.  
 
Thus, this study employs Industry Market Share (IMS) as the main 
measure for audit specialisation as expressed below: 
 
Jik 
∑      AFeesijk 
j=1 
IMS = _________________ 
Ik Jik  AFeesijk 
∑ ∑ 
i=1 j=1 
 
                                                     
41 It was first introduced by Craswell and Taylor (1991) that auditors are deemed to be an 
industry specialist if they gain an arbitrary 10% market share within a particular industry. 
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where, AFees is audit fees, and the numerator is the sum of audit 
fees of all Jik clients of audit firm i in industry k. The denominator is 
the audit fees of Jik clients in industry k summed over all Ik audit 
firms in the sample with clients (Jik) in industry k.  
 
Australian statutory law requires companies to disclose audit and 
non-audit fees. The 10% cut-off rate of market share rule utilised 
by Craswell and Taylor (1991) is deemed to be arbitrary (Craswell 
et al., 1995), and this may result in a misclassification of some 
auditors as specialists (Craswell et al., 1995, p. 318). Thus this 
study applies a more commonly used definition in previous 
research (e.g., Mayhew and Willins, 2003; Dunn and Mayhew, 
2004; Neal and Riley, 2004) and more restrictive/tighter 
measurement of audit specialisation by utilising a much larger cut-
off point of 20% market shares. For robustness, other 
measurement (i.e., portfolio share), different measurement base, 
and other cut-off points on audit specialist classification are 
reported in Chapter 6 Robustness Tests. 
 
4.5 Control Variables 
In order to better investigate the affect of auditor independence 
and audit specialisation on the degree of mandatory disclosure, this 
study controls for other factors that may impact on the extent of 
compliance. A number of variables that have been documented by 
prior research (see Chapter 3), that may have an impact on the 
level of disclosure, is utilised to ‗better explain‘ the behaviour of 
both independent and dependent variables. These variables are 
company size (FIRMSIZE), leverage (LEVERAGE), profitability 
(PROFIT), auditor status (BIG4), age (AGE), liquidity (LIQUID), 
board independence (BRDIND), CEO-duality (DUALITY), and 
ownership concentration (OWNCON). 
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Table 4.5 summarises the measurement of both independent and 
control variables used in this study. All these variables have been 
utilised in numerous past mainstream studies. These variables are 
applied in the main regression analysis, other models, and 
sensitivity analysis. Table 4.5 shows the definition of both 
independent and control variables. 
 
Salomon and Dhaliwal (1980) assert that larger firms have largely 
relied on external financing from security markets than smaller 
firms. It has been well established that the cost of capital (cost of 
equity and cost of debt) is reduced with increased disclosure 
(Sengupta, 1998). As detailed in Chapter 3 most studies have 
found a positive association between company size and level of 
corporate disclosure. A variety of methods (such as market 
capitalisation, total sales, total assets) have been utilised in 
measuring size of company. For the purpose of this study, 
company size is measured by the natural log of book value of total 
assets. This measure has been utilised by a great deal of prior 
research on mandatory disclosure (e.g., Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; 
Patton and Zelenka, 1997; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Owusu-Ansah 
and Yeoh, 2005). 
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Table 4.5: Definitions of Variables Used42 
Variable 
Denoted 
by 
Description 
Predicted 
sign 
Independent Variables: 
Auditor Independence 
Audit Specialisation 
 
 
NonAudit 
IMS 
 
Ratio of non-audit fees to total fees (non-audit + audit fees) 
Percentage of audit fees earned by an accounting firm in a 
particular industry relative to total audit fees earned by all 
accounting firms in that particular industry 
 
+ 
+ 
Control Variables: 
Firm Attributes: 
Company Size 
Leverage 
Profitability 
Type of auditor 
 
Age 
Liquidity 
Corporate Governance: 
Board Independence 
CEO Duality 
 
Ownership Concentration 
 
 
FirmSize 
Leverage 
Profit 
Big4 
 
Age 
Liquid 
 
BrdInd 
Duality 
 
OwnCon 
 
 
Natural log of book value of total assets 
Ratio of book value of long term debt to book value of equity 
Ratio of earnings before tax to book value of equity 
Dummy variable, coded 1 if a firm is audited by a local audit firm 
with an international affiliation (Big4) and 0 otherwise 
Number of years passed since its listing 
Ratio of current assets to current liabilities 
 
Ratio of independent/outside directors to board size 
Dummy variable, coded 1 if board of directors is chaired by the 
firm CEO and 0 otherwise 
Proportion of shares owned by top 20 shareholders 
 
 
+ 
+/- 
+ 
+ 
 
+/- 
+/- 
 
+ 
- 
 
+/- 
    
                                                     
42
 The list of control variables presented in Table 4.5 does not represent and exhaustive list of factors that may influence the level of compliance. As with any positivist 
empirical study, omitted variables from the multivariate analysis may well explain variations in the dependent variable. Pragmatically, however, it is near on impossible to 
include every conceivable factor. The control variables noted in Table 4.5, are included as these are perceived, based on an extensive review of the literature, to have the 
strongest likelihood of presenting cross-sectional differences that could influence the association between the dependent and independent variables. 
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Ali et al., (2004) argue external finance (i.e., debt-market) 
increases a firm‘s financial risk and agency costs between 
shareholders and creditors. Dumontier and Raffournier (1998) 
claim that such external financing induces increased corporate 
disclosure by way of complying with mandatory disclosure, to 
improve the monitoring role of financial statements, which in turn, 
reduces agency costs and information asymmetry. Past studies 
measure such financial risks in terms of leverage. Yet, these past 
empirical findings on association between leverage and level of 
compliance are mixed. Consistent with prior studies (Wallace, 
Naser and Mora, 1994; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Hossain, Perera 
and Rahman, 1995; Ferguson, Lam and Lee; 2002), leverage is 
measured by ratio of book value of long term debt to book value of 
equity. 
 
Utilising political process theory Inchausti (1997) argues that very 
profitable firms tend to disclose more information to justify the 
level of profits. Applying agency theory Wallace and Naser (1995) 
contend that management of very profitable firms seek to use 
information for manager advantage. Hence, managers of very 
profitable companies tend to disclose greater information in order 
to support the continuance of the manager‘s position and thus 
increase the compensation. Chapter 3 shows that prior research 
predominantly documents a positive relation between profitability 
and level of disclosure. Return on capital (earnings before tax / 
book value of equity) is employed in this study to measure 
profitability. This proxy has also been utilised in previous studies 
(Wallace and Naser, 1995; Makhija and Patton, 2004; Owusu-
Ansah and Yeoh, 2005). 
 
The size of the auditor firm has been included in many disclosure 
studies. Size is often used as a proxy for brand name. Building on 
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DeAngelo‘s (1981b) audit quality theory framework, past research 
such as Owusu-Ansah (1998) and Ali et al., (2004), argue large 
audit firms (normally proxies by Big4/5/6/8) are less likely to 
depend on a particular client. Larger audit firms, therefore have 
greater incentive to maintain independence from clients. However, 
past empirical findings reveal inconsistent results. This study 
contends that the mixed results may be due to using a simple/basic 
measure to proxy for audit quality as discussed in Section 4.4. In 
line with past research and in order to shed light on the 
relationship between the size of the audit firm and the level of 
disclosure, a dummy variable is utilised and coded 1 if a firm is 
audited by a local audit firm with an international affiliation (Big4) 
and zero otherwise. 
 
Owusu-Ansah (1998) argues that the extent of compliance with 
mandatory disclosure may be influenced by a company‘s age 
(stage of development and growth). That is older (well-established) 
firms are more likely to disclosure a higher degree of information 
than that of younger firms. Owusu-Ansah (1998) justifies this 
proposition saying younger firms might be reluctant to disclose any 
information that may give rise to competitive disadvantage. Also, 
Owusu-Ansah (1998) argues it is considered more costly for 
younger firms to gather, process, and disseminate mandated 
information than older firms. The findings of past research (e.g., 
Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Glaum and Street, 2003; Owusu-Ansah and 
Yeoh, 2005) are not consistent. For the purpose of this study, a 
firm‘s age is measured by the number of years passed since its 
listing. This measure has been employed in prior research (Owusu-
Ansah, 1998; Glaum and Street, 2003; Owusu-Ansah, 2005). 
 
Wallace and Naser (1995) assert that investors, lenders and 
regulatory authorities are concerned with the going concern of a 
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firm. This implies that a firm that is able to meet short-term 
financial obligations without resorting to liquidate long-term assets 
may have the motivation to provide such information through 
disclosures (e.g., Belkaoui and Kahl, 1978). These empirical results 
documented in prior studies related to this issue are mixed. In line 
with past studies (Belkaoui and Kahl, 1978; Wallace and Naser, 
1995; Naser et al., 2002) liquidity is measured by current ratio 
(proportion of current assets to current liabilities). 
 
One of the key elements of corporate governance is the monitoring 
of management by the board of directors. Fama (1980) and Fama 
and Jensen (1983a) assert that the board of directors monitoring 
role reduces agency conflicts. John and Senbet (1998, p. 380) 
claim that ―the degree of board independence is closely related to 
its composition‖. Beasley and Petroni (2001) conclude that the 
quality of monitoring improves as the percentage of 
independent/outside directors on the board is increased. This view 
is subsequently supported by Black (2001) who shows that 
independent directors are considered as one of the ‗useful 
institution‘ that can assist stockholders in identifying disclosure 
problems. Empirical results of past research reveal an association 
between firms with a higher proportion of independent/outside 
directors and a greater extent of disclosure (Cheng and Courtenay, 
2005; Cheung, Connelly, Limpaphayom, and Zhou, 2006). For this 
study board independence is measured by percentage of 
independent/outside directors to board size.  
 
A board of directors is led by a chairperson. Petra (2005) claims 
that many firms have a CEO-duality in the board structure (i.e., the 
same individual jointly occupies the role of CEO and chairperson). 
It is alleged the CEO-duality designation puts the CEO in a very 
influential position in setting the board agenda, conduct of board 
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meeting, control of information flow, control of the process of 
hiring, retrenchment, and top management compensation 
(including the CEO) (Abdulla, 2004; Petra, 2005). Cheng and 
Courtenay (2005) argue that a board of directors chaired by the 
CEO generally indicates weaker monitoring capabilities. Also the 
board intensity to monitor the top management is greatly reduced 
as a result of lack of independence, and a conflict of interest 
(Millstein, 1992). In the context of disclosure, Forker (1992) and 
Gul and Leung (2004) document evidence CEO-duality is negatively 
related to the level of disclosure. For this study CEO-duality is 
coded 1 when the board of directors is chaired by the firm CEO and 
0 otherwise. 
 
Agency theory suggests that in a modern corporation the 
separation of ownership and management gives rise to agency 
conflicts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The potential of conflicts 
between the agent and principal is largely increased in a diffused 
ownership structure (Fama and Jensen, 1983a). Ownership 
concentration is proposed as an important variable in explaining 
variability of disclosure (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Zeckhauser and 
Pound (1990) argue that a diffused ownership structure insinuates 
a lack of monitoring capacity due to the low stake of individual 
shareholders. Empirical results of past studies concerning the 
association between ownership concentration and disclosure are 
mixed. Craswell and Taylor (1992), for example, document no 
association between ownership structure and voluntary corporate 
disclosure. In contrast, McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) and 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) reveal a significant positive relationship. 
Interestingly, Hossain, Tan, and Adams (1994) note a negative 
association. Consistent with past studies (Craswell and Taylor, 
1992; McKinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993; Baroko, Hancock, and 
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Izan, 2006) ownership concentration is measured by the proportion 
of shares owned by the top 20 shareholders. 
 
4.6 Statistical Methods 
In order to determine the influences of auditor independence and 
audit specialisation on mandatory disclosure compliance, 
correlation and multivariate ordinary least square (OLS) regression 
techniques are employed to examine the data collected.  
 
In the case of the regression analysis, as the dependent variable 
(DCI) is expressed in a ratio with values confined between zero and 
one, standard OLS regression can be unreliable. Consequently, the 
underlying assumption of the standard OLS is an unconstrained 
(unbounded) dependent variable (Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994). 
Given a bounded dependent variable, the OLS regression does not 
ensure that the estimates of the dependent variable will lie 
between zero and one, and may give predictions of the DCI outside 
the valid range (zero to one) (Hanushek and Jackson, 1997; 
Greene, 2003). 
 
In order to include the zero-one bound into the regression, a 
dependent variable transformation is necessary. This is achieved by 
taking the logarithm of the odds ratio (Hanushek and Jackson, 
1997; Greene, 2003). The transformation creates a new 
endogenous variable. Therefore, if the extent of compliance with 
mandatory disclosure of a firm is captured by DCI, given by P, the 
logarithm of the odds ratio, Y, is given by: 
 
                     P 
Y = log   -------- 
                              1 – P  
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Where Y is the transformed of DCI; and P is the computed 
disclosure index for each company (DCI). This transformation 
method43 has also been utilised by past studies such as Ahmed and 
Nicholls (1994, Inchausti (1997), and Makhija and Patton (2004). 
The new transformed endogenous DCI variable (DCI) is then 
regressed on the discussed independent and control variables 
based on the following formula: 
 
TDCI = β0 + β1 NonAudit + β2 IMS + β3 FirmSize + β4 Leverage + 
β5 Profit + β6 Big4 + β7 Age + β8 Liquid + β9 Board-Ind + 
β10 Duality + β11 Own-Con + ε 
Where: 
 NonAudit  = ratio of non-audit fees to total fees 
IMS  = proportion of audit fees earned by an accounting 
firm in an industry to total audit fees earned by all 
accounting firms in that particular industry 
Leverage  = ratio of book value of long term debt to book value  
     of equity 
Profit   = ratio of earnings before tax to book value of equity 
Big4   = a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for firm 
   audited by a local audit firm with an international  
   affiliation (Big4) and 0 otherwise 
Age  = number of years passed since firm listing 
Liquid  = ratio of current assets to current liabilities 
BrdInd  = ratio of independent/outside directors to board size 
Duality  = a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for board  
     of directors that is chaired by the firm CEO and 0  
     otherwise 
OwnCon  = proportion of shares owned by top 20 shareholders. 
 
 
                                                     
43 Past compliance studies research such as Tower et al., (1999), Street and Bryant 
(2000), Street and Gray (2001), and Glaum and Street (2003) have used the raw 
compliance index as a dependent variable. For robustness, the raw DCI (prior 
transformation DCI) will be used for sensitivity analysis purposes. 
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4.7 Chapter Summary 
Chapter 4 describes the sample selection, data collection process, 
statistical method, and measurements for the dependent, 
independent, and control variables. The entire population of 
Australian mineral resource sector firms listed on the ASX as at 30 
June 2006 consists of 320 firms. Of these, the final sample consists 
of 208 companies after filtering out those with incomplete data, 
delisted/suspended, or not applicable to both AASB 6 and AASB 
136 disclosures requirements. 
 
The dependent variable is captured by the constructed Disclosure 
Compliance Index (DCI) with the mandatory disclosure 
requirements of AASBs 6 and 136. The DCI checklist comprises a 
comprehensive list of 62 mandatory disclosure items. The two 
independent variables, auditor independence and audit 
specialisation, are measured by NonAudit Ratio and Industry 
Market Share respectively. Nine control variables (company size, 
leverage, profitability, type of auditor, age, liquidity, board 
independence, CEO duality, and ownership concentration) are 
included in the statistical analysis. 
 
In Chapter 5 the descriptive statistics for all variables are 
presented and the two key hypotheses are tested. Results of 
univariate and multivariate analysis are performed and discussed. 
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Chapter 5 RESULTS 
 
5.1 Chapter Overview 
Chapter 4 describes the procedures of data collection, sample 
selection, and data sources. In addition to discussing the analysis 
of the measures of dependent, independent and control variables, 
Chapter 4 also presents the research design, and defines the 
multivariate analysis model.  
 
Chapter 5 focuses on the primary results of the tests of the two 
key hypotheses developed in Chapter 3. In Section 5.2 is a 
discussion of the descriptive statistics of the dependent (Disclosure 
Compliance Index), independent (auditor independence and audit 
specialisation) and control variables (company size, leverage, 
profitability, type of auditor, age, liquidity, board independence, 
CEO duality, and ownership concentration).  
 
The results related to independent t-Tests of the independent and 
selected control variables are explored in Section 5.3. Next, 
bivariate relationships among independent variables are reported in 
Section 5.4 with multivariate tests for the pooled sample shown in 
Section 5.5. Tests reported in Section 5.5 utilise on Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) with White‘s adjustment to control the 
heteroscedastic residual. Finally, the chapter summary is reported 
in Section 5.6. 
 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
This section is structured as follows. Section 5.2.1 reports the 
descriptive statistics for the dependent variable DCI. It follows with 
analysis of the independent variables. Section 5.2.2 focuses on 
audit fees, non-audit fees, and total fees received by accounting 
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firms and the ratio of non-audit to total audit fees as the proxy for 
auditor independence. The focal point of Section 5.2.3 is the 
analysis of the percentage of audit fees earned by an accounting 
firm in mineral resources sector, relative to the total audit fees 
earned by all accounting firms in that particular sector. This 
measure represents the audit specialisation construct. Finally, 
descriptive statistics for all control variables are presented in 
Section 5.2.4. 
 
5.2.1  Dependent Variable: Disclosure Compliance Index 
The focus of this study is the level of mandatory disclosure 
compliance with AASB 6 Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral 
Resources and AASB 136 Impairment of Assets of Australian 
mineral resources firms. To test the research hypotheses, data was 
collected from various secondary sources. Table 5.1 shows the 
descriptive statistics of the dependent variable (DCI) segregated 
into three sections; (i) DCI AASB 6 (DCI-6); (ii) DCI AASB 136 
(DCI-136); and (iii) the aggregate DCI AASB 6 and AASB 136 
(DCI). 
 
The DCI AASB 6 (DCI-6) mean is 85% with a wide range of 0% to 
100% of compliance. In comparison, for DCI AASB 136 (DCI-136) 
and DCI AASB 6 and 136 (DCI-6-136) the mean are 70% with a 
range between 11% and 100% and 76% with a range between 
31% and 95% respectively. As shown in Table 5.1 the mean of 
DCI-6 is 15% higher than that of DCI-136. This might be due to 
AASB 6 having a lower number of items44. Moreover, the items 
may be easier to comply with relative to AASB 136 requirements as 
elaborated in Chapter 2. DCI-6 consists of only nine items in 
comparison to fifty three items for DCI-136. 
  
                                                     
44 See Table 4.2 for a complete list of compliance items of DCI-6 and DCI-136. 
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics Disclosure Compliance Index 
 Mean Std.Dev. Med Min Max 
DCI (AASB 6) 
N = 289 
85% 8% 86% 0% 100% 
      
DCI (AASB 136) 
N = 224 
70% 15% 70% 11% 100% 
      
DCI (AASB 6 and 136) 
N = 208 
76% 9% 77% 31% 95% 
DCI (Disclosure Compliance Index) is the overall compliance index excluding 
not-applicable (N/A). The index ranges between 0 (total non-compliance) and 1 
(total compliance). N = number of firms for each dependent variable variant. 
 
This difference is mainly due to the fact that AASB 6 mainly 
requires disclosure of certain accounting policies. In contrast, AASB 
136 requires disclosures that are arguably much more complicated 
in nature, such as the broader scope than previously defined of 
assets that are subjected to the impairment test (Ernst and Young, 
2002; KMPG, 2003). For instance, deferred exploration and 
evaluation costs for areas in the development or production phases 
for mineral resource firms are now subject to the impairment test 
as defined in AASB 136. Furthermore, in many instances, there are 
some mandatory disclosures of AASB 136 that involve disclosing 
potentially sensitive information. Such disclosures may induce 
greater proprietary costs and, therefore, is deemed to be costly if it 
gives competitors the opportunity to gain an advantage 
(Hakansson, 1977; Wang, 2007). One of the mandatory disclosures 
of AASB 136 that is sensitive in nature is the requirement of the 
firm to reveal how management determines the values assigned to 
each key assumption for deriving fair value, and the costs in selling 
mineral assets. As such disclosures might create a competitive 
disadvantage for the discloser; this may lead to lower compliance 
with mandated disclosures. 
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The overall DCI AASB 6 and 136 (DCI-6-136) non-compliance rate 
among the full sample of 208 firms is 24%. As shown in Table 5.1, 
no company totally fails nor fully complies with the two standards. 
At the heart of this study, the compliance level of DCI is 76% (with 
a range of 31% to 95% of compliance). The average DCI-6-136 
value (based on Australian mineral resources sector) is lower than 
voluntary disclosure studies by Tower45 et al., (1999). They (Tower 
et al., 1999) document the compliance level of a broad sample of 
Australia focus to be 94%. Also, DCI-6-136 is lower than Germany 
(87%) (Glaum and Street, 2003). The compliance level in this 
study is also lower than some developing countries such as 
‗Thailand‘ (93%); ‗Singapore‘ (90%); ‗Malaysia‘ (90%); ‗Hong 
Kong‘ (89%); ‗Philippines‘ (88%). The DCI-6-136 average in this 
study is, however, slightly higher than that reported for a sample 
of Hong Kong firms (73%) (Wallace and Naser, 1995).  
 
An important caveat to note regarding any direct comparisons of 
compliance levels from prior studies to this study is that differences 
in research methodology will lead to misconstrued conclusions. 
Methodology differences include differences on the number of 
standards examined, number of items measured in each standard, 
time frame of studies, potential country and industry biases, and 
varying sample sizes. The niche of this research is that it is entirely 
based on Australian listed mineral resource firms and focuses on 
two accounting standards exclusively pertaining to/and having a 
big impact on the mineral resource firms. 
 
                                                     
45 It is noted that Tower et al., (1999) examine different standards, with a broader scope 
of industries, and in much earlier time frame.  
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Table 5.246 provides a summary (by 10 percentile intervals) of the 
frequency distribution of DCI scores by each and combined 
standard. As indicated in the Table 5.2 Panel A, almost all sample 
firms (286 out of 289) have a compliance level above 50% in the 
case of DCI-6. This implies that most firms comply with the 
majority items of AASB 6. Of those, 96% (277 out of 289) have a 
compliance level of at least 80%, with 16 firms fully complying with 
the mandatory disclosures of AASB 6. Only six firms (2%) have a 
compliance level below 70%.  
 
A similar analysis is given for DCI-136. The result documented in 
Table 5.2 Panel B reveals that 93% (209 of 224) of sample firms 
have a compliance level above 50%. It is observed that there are 
21 firms (9%) that have a compliance level above 90%; of these 
six firms (3%) have complete compliance with AASB 136. On a 
more negative note, 15 firms (7%) score a level of compliance of 
50% or below.  
 
With respect to the aggregate DCI-6-136 (both AASB6 and 
AASB136), no firm achieves 100% compliance with the mandatory 
disclosure requirements. However, firms generally comply with 
most items of the checklist. That is, nearly 85% (176 out of 204) 
achieve a compliance level of at least 70% with 3% (six firms) 
above 90%. It is noted that there are only two firms (1%) with 
DCI-6-136 scores below 50%.  
                                                     
46 Table 4.1 summarises the number of companies in the final sample in relation to the 
population. The entire population of mineral resource firms listed on the ASX totalled 320 
public firms as at 30 June 2006. Exclusions included four that were delisted/suspended 
from/by ASX, two changed financial year end from 30 June to 31 December, and nine 
firms have incomplete data are excluded.  
The final sample consists of (i) 289 firms applicable to compliance with AASB 6 (ii) 224 
firms applicable to compliance with AASB 136 (iii) 208 firms applicable to compliance with 
both AASB 6 and AASB 136. 
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Table 5.2: Frequency Distribution of DCI by AASB Standard 
Level of 
Compliance (%) 
PANEL A: AASB 6 PANEL B: AASB 136 PANEL C: AASB 6 and 136 
DCI % DCI % DCI % 
00.00 – 09.99 1 0.35 0 0 0 0 
10.00 – 19.99 0 0 4 1.79 0 0 
20.00 – 29.99 0 0 1 0.45 0 0 
30.00 – 39.99 0 0 4 1.79 1 0.48 
40.00 – 49.99 2 0.69 6 2.68 1 0.48 
50.00 – 59.99 2 0.69 21 9.38 11 5.29 
60.00 – 69.99 1 0.35 63 28.13 19 9.14 
70.00 – 79.99 6 2.08 69 30.80 83 39.30 
80.00 – 89.99 261 90.31 35 15.63 87 41.83 
90.00 – 99.99 0 0 15 6.70 6 2.89 
100 16 5.54 6 2.68 0 0 
Total 289 100 224 100 208 100 
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5.2.2  Independent Variable: Auditor Independence 
The objective of this study is to investigate whether auditor 
independence and audit specialisation impact on the level of 
compliance with AASB 6 and 136 of mineral resources companies 
listed in Australia. In this sub-section, a review of descriptive 
statistics of auditor independence and audit specialisation is 
provided. A set of summary statistics of audit, non-audit, and total 
fees are presented in Table 5.3 which is further segregated into 
sub-samples based on Big4 versus Non-Big4 accounting firms.  
 
Table 5.3 indicates that average total fees, audit fees and non-
audit fees paid by Australian mineral resources firms during 2006 
are AUD $154,980, $115,091 and $74,183 respectively. These 
averages are less than averages (AUD $260,566, $136,406, 
$124,161 respectively) reported by Ruddock and Taylor47 (2005). 
Similarly, Rusmin48 (2006) reports based on a sample of 325 
Australian firms average of total fees, audit fees and non-audit fees 
earned by Australian accounting firms are AUD $261,722, 
$160,896 and $ 100,825 respectively. The differences in those fees 
may be that Ruddock and Taylor‘s (2005) study covers eight years 
of data and Rusmin‘s (2006) study includes selective firms of all 
sectors in comparison to this study that covers all firms in one 
sector and of one year of time frame. 
 
In contrast to studies of firm listed on international capital markets 
(such as US and UK) audit and non-audit fees averages reported in 
this study are far lower (frequently between ten to eighteen tiers 
level).  
                                                     
47 Ruddock and Taylor‘s (2005) studies utilised on Australian data that spans over eight 
financial years of (1993 to 2000) across 10 GISC sectors. 
48 Rusmin‘s (2006) studies 405 (out of 1,563) Australian firms listed across sixteen ASX 
industry sectors for the financial year of 2004. 
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For example, Ashbaugh et al., (2003)49 document the average 
audit and non-audit fees earned by US accounting firms are AUD 
$2,155,148 and AUD $928,883 respectively. Likewise, Ferguson et 
al., (2004) report the average for UK firms is AUD $1,189,582 and 
AUD $1,287,792 for audit and non-audit fees respectively. 
 
Table 5.3 shows this study‘s spread of the average of the non-audit 
fees to total fees is 25.83%. This is relatively lower than the 
reported 48% by Ruddock and Taylor (2005), 37% by Rusmin 
(2006), 69% by Whisenant et al., (2003b), and 52% by Ferguson 
et al., (2004). The difference may be due to different sample sizes, 
different time frame, different numbers of years and different 
sectors. 
 
Ratio of non-audit fees to total fees as a proxy for auditor 
independence is tabulated in Table 5.3. PWC has the largest ratio 
of non-audit to total audit fees (33.15%). In contrast, Deloitte has 
the lowest ratio (16.24%) among the Big-4 auditing firms. On 
average, the Big-4 firms have a higher share of non audit fees 
(thus implying a lack of auditor independence) of 26.69% 
compared to Non-Big4 auditing firms with an average of 20.49%. 
 
                                                     
49 Ashbaugh et al., (2003) and Ferguson et al., (2004) utilise US and UK data of financial 
year ends 31 December 2000 and 31 December 1998 respectively. The local currencies 
(i.e. USD & GBP) have been converted to AUD consistently using RBA exchange rate in 
accordance to the financial year end. 
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Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics: Auditor Independence 
Type 
of 
Fees 
 Deloitte E&Y KPMG PWC All 
Auditors 
Total Big-
4 
Non-
Big4 
Audit 
Fees 
Mean 79,710 147,444 504,462 186,567 115,091 259,786 29,932 
 Med 80,236 45,500 43,882 62,250 28,055 51,000 20,000 
 Min 17,404 15,700 19,000 20,840 5,700 15,700 5,700 
 Max 213,000 1,731,036 14,829,813 1,125,635 14,829,813 14,829,813 727,406 
 SD 50,464 314,920 2,430,197 323,656 862,276 1,406,943 54,582 
 Total 
Audit 
Fees 
1,434,777 5,897,755 18,665,105 3358,210 35,102,859 29,355,847 5,747,011 
 % 
Total 
Fees 
83.76% 67.10% 76.14% 66.85% 74.26% 73.31% 79.51% 
 N 18 40 37 18 305 113 192 
Non-
Audit 
Fees 
Mean 27,815 115,669 307,896 118,931 74,183 157,131 15,427 
 Med 22,630 52,638 36,052 37,925 14,840 42,413 7,331 
 Min 900 7,947 3,450 7,100 650 900 650 
 Max 69,471 806,111 4,957,621 707,676 4,957,621 4,957,621 107,261 
 SD 24,879 183,617 1,126,877 186,332 396,483 608,226 20,053 
 Total 
Non-
Audit 
Fees 
278,149 2,891,728 5,850,024 1,665,035 12,165,952 10,684,936 1,481,016 
 %Total 
Fees 
16.24% 32.90% 23.86% 33.15% 25.74% 26.69% 20.49% 
 N 10 25 19 14 164 68 96 
Total 
Fees 
Mean 95,163 219,737 662,571 279,069 154,980 354,343 37,646 
 Med 85,130 69,464 60,257 94,898 33,000 76,150 23,533 
 Min 17,404 15,700 19,000 27,940 5,700 15,700 5,700 
 Max 245,800 2,298,036 19,787,434 1,695,099 19,787,434 19,787,434 727,406 
 SD 62,836 454,419 3,239,352 473,043 1,151,411 1,878,540 58,542 
 Total 
Fees 
1,712,926 8,789,483 24,515,129 5,023,245 47,268,811 40,040,784 7,228,027 
 N 18 40 37 18 305 113 192 
Currency is denoted in Australian dollar; reported currencies other than Australian dollar are 
converted to Australian dollar using RBA (Reserve Bank Australia) exchange rate as at 30-June-2006 
coinciding with the period of the study. 
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It is noted that on average KMPG earned the biggest share, among 
Big-450 audit firms, in respect to audit (AUD $504,462), non-audit 
(AUD $307,896) and total fees (AUD $662,571) from mineral 
resource sector firms listed on the Australian capital market. Audit, 
non-audit and total fees earned by KPMG are approximately four 
fold greater than the average of the mineral resources sector. 
Conversely, Deloitte acquired the least fees among the Big-4 firms 
in terms of audit and non-audit services rendered to the mineral 
resources sector. On average, Deloitte secured AUD $79,710, AUD 
$27,815, and AUD $95,163 of audit, non-audit, and total fees 
respectively.  
 
Overall, total audit fees earned by Big-4 and Non-Big4 in the 
mineral resources sector are AUD 259,786 (84%) and AUD 29,932 
(16%) respectively; total non-audit fees earned are AUD 157,131 
(88%) and AUD 15,427 (12%) respectively; and total fees earned 
are AUD 354,343 (85%) and AUD 37,646 (15%) respectively. 
 
5.2.3  Independent Variable: Audit Specialisation 
Table 5.4 reveals the Australian accounting firms‘ industry market 
share of mineral resources sector. It shows that audit fees earned 
by Big-4 firms are unevenly distributed. KPMG has the highest 
industry market share of 53.17% followed by E&Y and PWC who 
generate 16.80% and 9.57% respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
50 Align with market consensus, Big-4 are made up by Deloitte & Touche, E&Y (Ernst & 
Young), KPMG (KPMG Peat Marwick), PWC (PriceWaterhouse Coopers). Non-Big-4 are the 
remainder of the accounting firms. 
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Table 5.4: Descriptive Statistics: Auditor Specialist 
Audit Firms N Audit Fees 
Non-Audit 
Fees 
Total Fees 
Audit 
Industry 
Market 
Share 
Big-4 113 29,355,847 10,684,936 40,040,783 83.63 
   Deloitte 18 1,434,777 278,149 1,712,926 4.09% 
   E&Y 40 5,897,755 2,891,728 8,789,483 16.80% 
   KPMG 37 18,665,105 5,850,024 24,515,129 53.17% 
   PWC 18 3,358,210 1,665,035 5,023,245 9.57% 
      
Non-Big-4 192 5,747,011 1,481,016 7,228,027 16.37% 
      
Total 305 35,102,858 12,165,952 47,268,811 100% 
Currency is denoted in Australian dollar; reported currencies other than Australian dollar are 
converted to Australian dollar using RBA (Reserve Bank Australia) exchange rate as at 30-June-2006 
coinciding with the period of the study. Align with market consensus, Big-4 are made up by Deloitte 
& Touche, E&Y (Ernst & Young), KPMG (KPMG Peat Marwick), PWC (PriceWaterhouse Coopers). Non-
Big-4 are the remainder of the accounting firms. Please refer to Appendix F for a list of Non-Big-4 
firms. 
 
In contrast to findings reported in this study, Rusmin (2006) finds 
PWC had the biggest industry market share of Australian mineral 
resources sector with a market share of 35.91%. Meanwhile KPMG 
had a market share of 24.36%. The different results may be due to 
differences in the sample size. The study of Rusmin (2006) only 
included 27% (85 out of 320 firms) with the mineral resources 
sector population as at end of 2003, whereas, this thesis utilises all 
firms of the whole population51. Consistent with the findings of 
Rusmin (2006), this study shows Deloitte had the smallest industry 
market share among the Big-4 firms 4.09%.  
 
Table 5.4 documents that Big-4 auditing firms have by far the 
biggest industry market share (in regards to total audit fees earned 
in mineral resources sector) amounting to 83.63%. In contrast, the 
                                                     
51 After excluding four delisted/suspended firms, two firms changed financial year ends 
from 30 June to 31 December, and nine firms have incomplete data. The final sample 
consists of 305 firms.  
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Non-Big4 firms have a far lower share of 16.37%. The findings 
related to market share is interesting when compared to the 
number of firms audited. Specifically, Table 5.4 shows that the Big-
4 firms audited 37% (113 out of 305) firms in the sector, whereas, 
the majority 63% (192 out of 305 firms) are audited by the Non-
Big-4 firms. This implies that most of the big firms in mineral 
resources sector engaged the Big-4 audit firm services. 
 
Other Australian studies, such as Ruddock and Taylor (2005) find 
that in the years from 1993 to 2000 Big-4 firms, on average, audit 
61.13% of Australian listed firms. Ferguson and Stokes (2002) 
report that in the years of 1990 to 1998, about 65% of the sample 
firms are audited by the Big-4 auditing firms. The Australian 
mineral resources sector clearly has a lesser percentage in terms of 
engaging the services of Big-4 audit firms. However, those 
engaged Big-4 services were among the biggest in the mineral 
resources sector. 
 
Of 45 auditing firms52 that provide auditing services to the whole 
population in mineral resources sector, only one audit firm (i.e., 
KPMG) satisfies the criteria53 to be categorised as a specialist 
auditor in the sector. There are 113 firms who engage audit 
services from Big-4 audit firm, and of those there are 37 firms 
(33%) that engage specialist auditor services.  
 
5.2.4  Control Variables  
Table 5.5 shows summary statistics of control variables relating to 
firm attributes (i.e., company size, leverage, profitability, type of 
                                                     
52 There are 41 auditing firms under Non-Big4. Of 41 firms, the three auditing firms that 
secure the highest industry market share are BDO, Grant Thornton, and PKF with the 
industry market share of merely 3.86%, 2.23%, and 2.10% respectively. 
53 Using industry market share as defined in Chapter 4, with the cut-off rate of 20%.  
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auditor, age, liquidity) and corporate governance attributes (board 
independence, CEO duality, ownership concentration). 
  
As shown in Table 5.5, the descriptive statistics for company size 
(FirmSize) varies greatly ranging from a low of AUD $172,000 to a 
high of AUD $65,311 million. Average company size (measured by 
total assets) of Australian mineral resource sector firms is AUD 
$325 million. Table 5.5 documents the company size distribution is 
positively skewed. In order to alleviate skewness, company size is 
transformed by applying the natural logarithm of total assets. This 
technique is in line with past research that adopts a similar 
approach (e.g., Glaum and Street, 2003).  
 
Table 5.5 reports that leverage (measured by ratio of book value of 
long term debt to book value of equity) ranges widely from 1% to 
64% with a mean of 17%. This implies that at one extreme, firms 
with 1% leverage effectively have no liabilities. On average, firms 
almost have 17% of debt to equity (in book value).  
 
As presented in Table 5.5, profitability (Profit) for the sample 
ranges from -152% to 22%. Average profitability of Australian 
mineral resource firms based on this study is -27%. This implies 
that for the financial year ended at 30 June 2006, Australian 
mineral resource firms, on average made a financial loss. This is 
evidenced by approximately 83% (253 out of 305 firms) of the 
sample firms reporting a loss. The high number of firms reporting a 
loss might be due to the introduction of AASB 136 Asset 
Impairment that requires entities to perform an impairment test in 
accordance with AASB 136 on recognised exploration and 
evaluation assets when facts and circumstances suggest that the 
carrying amount of an asset may exceed its recoverable amount. 
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As evidenced in Table 5.5, a small proportion (approximately 37% 
on 113 out of 305 firms) of Australian mineral resource firms 
engage audit services from Big-4 accounting firms. The Big-4 firms 
Deloitte, E&Y, KPMG, and PWC audit 18, 40, 37, 18 mineral 
resources firms respectively. The remaining 63% (192 out of 305 
firms) of the sample employed NonBig-4 firms. 
 
Company age (Age) is represented by years passed since the firm‘s 
listing. Distribution of the variable Age ranges from 1.25 to 27.43 
years with an average of 10.83 years. On average, Australian 
mineral resources firms has been listed for at least 10 years as of 
the financial year ended at 30 June 2006. This implies that the 
mineral resources sector is a matured market. 
 
Liquidity is measured as the current ratio derived from the 
proportion of current assets to current liabilities. Firms included in 
the sample appear to be highly liquid. This is evidenced by 
average, liquidity being 9.16 with a ranging from 0.49 to 33.29. 
Overall, Australian mineral resource firms appear to have the 
capacity to meet short term financial obligations. 
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Table 5.5: Descriptive Statistics: Control Variables 
Control Variables Mean 
25 
percentile 
Median 
75 
percentile 
Min Max Std. Dev. 
Firm size (Total Assets $ ‘000) 325,571 5,684 11,394 33,651 172 65,311,449 3,776,722 
FirmSize (logged) 16.50 15.55 16.25 17.33 14.62 19.40 1.33 
Leverage 17.30% 3.78% 8.15% 22.36% 1.43% 63.71% 19.15% 
Profit -26.69% -40.23% -13.57% -4.21% -151.77% 22.49% 40.64% 
Big4 (% of sample) 37.00       
Age 10.83 2.65 9.15 18.93 1.25 27.43 8.40 
Liquidity 9.16 1.80 5.40 13.63 0.49 33.29 9.29 
BrdInd % 61.44 50.00 66.67 75.00 0.00 100 18.12 
Duality (% of sample) 18.00       
OwnCon % 57.77 43.71 57.99 69.79 20.72 99.85 17.27 
FirmSize is measured by natural log of book value of total assets; Leverage is the proportion of book value of long term debt to book value of equity; 
Profit (Profitability) is the ratio of earnings before tax to book value of equity; Age is the number of years passed since its listing; Liquid (Liquidity) is the 
ratio of current assets to current liabilities; BrdIp (Board Independence) is the percentage of independent/outside directors to total directors; OwnCon 
(Ownership Concentration) is the proportion of shares owned by top 20 shareholders. 
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Board size is a crucial factor that influences the effectiveness of the 
decision making body (Yermack, 1996, 1998; Vafeas, 2000). This 
study documented evidence shows board size varies widely, 
ranging from 3 to 14. For the majority, however, 98% board sizes 
range from 3 to 7. The number of independent directors (BrdInd) 
on mineral resource firms range from 0 to 10. The vast majority 
(97%) have between 1 and 5 independent directors with 1% of 
firms having no independent directors. Board independence is 
measured by the percentage of independent directors to the total 
number of directors on board. From Table 5.5 it is evident that 
board independence varies across the spectrum (i.e., 0% to 
100%). With an average of 61.44% it is clear, however, that most 
of the sample firms have a significant numbers of independent 
directors on the board. 
 
A firm is classified as a CEO duality (Duality) when its chairman of 
the board of directors also serves as the firm‘s CEO. Presently, 
there is no legislation in place that explicitly forbids CEOs of 
Australian firms serving concurrently as the chairman of board of 
directors. As presented in Table 5.5, 18% of the sample firms have 
voluntarily segregated the two roles. Such segregation is made in a 
move to project a positive image in improving corporate 
governance practices.  
 
Table 5.5 documents the ownership concentration (OwnCon) of 
mineral resources firms listed in Australia. The top twenty 
shareholder concentration ranges from 20.72% to 99.85% shares 
with an average of 57.77%. Only 2.5% of the sample firms are 
found to have an ownership concentration lower than 25%. In 
contrast 25% of the sample firms have 75% or higher ownership 
concentration.  
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5.3 Independent t-Test 
Al-Basteki (2000) points out that the effectiveness of the audit 
function depends on the competency of the auditor. Healy and 
Palepu (2001) assert that differences in the auditor‘s qualifications 
and professional training have an impact on the credibility of audit 
reports. These arguments imply that it is more likely for a better 
trained auditor (i.e., a specialist) to detect and question non-
compliance with IASs than that of a non-specialist. This is further 
supported by Krishnan (2003b) and Abbott and Parker (2000) who 
claim that as specialised auditors have the expertise, resources and 
incentives to separate the information component from noise, 
hence the higher the competency of auditors, the more likely the 
auditors are to deter and detect irregularities, financial 
misstatement and questionable accounting practices, whether by 
error or fraud, than are non-specialist auditors. 
 
Likewise, the size of an auditor firm has been examined in almost 
all disclosure studies. It has often been used as a proxy for brand 
name. Building on DeAngelo‘s (1981b) audit quality theory 
framework, past research such as Owusu-Ansah (1998) and Ali et 
al., (2004), argue that large audit firms (normally proxies by 
Big4/5/6/8) are less likely to depend on a particular client. 
Therefore, larger audit firms are able to, and have greater 
incentive to, maintain independence from clients. However, 
empirical findings are inconsistent54.  
 
One firm characteristic considered to influence the level of 
compliance is the size of a firm. Salomon and Dhaliwal (1980) 
assert that larger firms largely rely on external finance from the 
securities market relative to smaller firms, and it has been well 
                                                     
54 In this study, one further step is taken by extending the brand name of auditing firm 
(usually measured by Big4) to audit specialisation proxied by industry market share. 
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established that cost of capital (cost of equity and cost of debt) 
reduces with increased disclosure (Sengupta, 1998). 
 
Apart from the size of a firm, Inchausti (1997) also argues that 
profitability of a firm does influence the level of compliance. 
Inchausti (1997) asserts that very profitable firms tend to disclose 
more information in order to justify the level of profits. From the 
agency theory perspective, Wallace and Naser (1995) contend that 
management of very profitable firms seek to use information for 
their advantage; hence the managers of very profitable companies 
tend to disclose greater information in order to support the 
continuance of their position and thus increase their compensation. 
 
Last but not least, Owusu-Ansah (1998) argues that the extent of 
compliance with mandatory disclosure may also be influenced by a 
company‘s age (stage of development and growth), whereby older 
(well-established) firms are more likely to disclose a higher degree 
of information than that of younger firms. 
 
Based on these proposed arguments in this section and utilises on 
independent t-Test, this thesis examines whether the mean 
difference between groups are significant. These groups are 
categorised by audit specialisation, audit firm size, client firm size, 
client firm performance, and client firm establishment, in relation 
to the level of compliance with AASB 6 and AASB 136. The results 
are shown in Table 5.655.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
55 For robustness, this thesis also performs the non-parametric Mann-Whitney test and 
the results are qualitatively similar to those presented in Table 5.6. 
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Table 5.6: Independent t-Tests 
 N 
Mean 
DCI 
Mean 
difference 
t--Statistic 
Audit Specialisation 
    Specialist 
    Non-Specialist 
 
26 
182 
81.78% 
75.54% 
6.24% 5.302* 
Audit Firm Size 
    Big4 
    Non-Big4 
 
 
77 
131 
 
79.99% 
74.16% 
5.83% 4.526* 
Client Firm Size 
    Large Firm 
    Small Firm 
 
105 
103 
76.67% 
75.96% 
0.71% 0.543 
Client Firm Performance 
    Making Profit 
    Making Loss 
 
32 
176 
77.89% 
76.03% 
1.87% 1.033 
Client Firm Establishment 
    Well Established 
    Less Established 
 
106 
102 
75.96% 
76.69% 
-0.73% -0.559 
* Significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed) 
 Audit Specialisation: firm is denoted as Specialist should its incumbent auditor gain 20% 
of industry market share; otherwise denoted as Non-Specialist 
Audit Firm Size: firm is denoted as Big4 should its incumbent auditor be either: DT, EY, 
KPMG, or PWC; otherwise denoted as Non-Big-4 
Client Firm Size: firm is denoted as Large should its total asset value be above the 
median value of total sample (AUD $11,394,000); otherwise denoted as Small firm 
Client Firm Performance: firm is denoted as Making Profit should the firm generate a 
positive profit before tax for the financial year ended at 30-june-2006; otherwise denoted 
as Making Loss 
Client Firm Establishment: firm is denoted as Well Established should its number of years 
since listed be above the median number of years since listing of the sample (16.25 
years); otherwise denoted as Less Established. 
 
 
Table 5.6 shows the level of compliance with AASB 6 and AASB 136 
is significantly higher (p<0.01 level) for Australian mineral resource 
firms audited by a specialist in comparison to those who engage 
the audit services of non-specialist. The result of t-Test analysis 
related to audit specialist supports the evidence documented by 
O‘Keefe, King and Gaver (1994). They (O‘Keefe et al., 1994) also 
find that firms audited by an industry specialist result in higher 
level of compliance, hence better quality. 
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In the same way, the results of the t-Test also reveal that the 
disclosure compliance index mean is significantly (p<0.01 level) 
higher for firms engaging the services of Big4 accounting firms 
than their peers who had Non-Big4 auditors. This is consistent with 
the findings of Patton and Zelenka (1997), Owusu-Ansah (1998), 
and Ali et al., (2004) who document evidence that firms audited by 
Big 4 tend to have a higher extent of compliance in mandatory 
disclosure (i.e., a positive relation). 
 
The directional sign of the results presented in Table 5.6 are also in 
line with this thesis expectation of a positive relation between firm 
size, and firm profitability relating to the level of compliance with 
AASB 6 and AASB 136. Table 5.6 shows that larger firms and more 
profitable firms have higher levels of compliance; nonetheless, the 
results are statistically insignificant. Likewise, client firm 
establishment does not influence the level of compliance. In the 
following section, this study examines the correlation among 
variables that are of interest to this research. 
 
5.4 Bivariate Correlation 
Bivariate correlation provides information on whether there is a 
relationship between two variables, and importantly allows the 
assessment of the existence of potential multicollinearity. Table 5.7 
explores such bivariate relationships among the variables. Results 
presented in Table 5.7 are consistent with results obtained from 
the earlier independent t-Tests. There is a significant positive 
correlation (p<0.01) between the disclosure compliance index of 
firms that engage an audit specialist and firms being audited by a 
Big4 auditing firm. Table 5.7 also shows a significant correlation 
(p<0.05) between DCI and Leverage. 
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Table 5.7: Pearson Bivariate Correlation Matrix 
Variables DCI Aud_Idp Specialist FirmSize Leverage Profitability Big4 Age Liquidity Brd_Idp Duality OwnCon 
DCI 1.000 -0.072 0.221* 0.039 0.137** -0.078 0.301* 0.087 -0.076 0.088 0.053 0.078 
Aud_Idp  1.000 0.017 0.348* 0.146** 0.107 0.206* 0.125 -0.134 0.146** -0.055 0.157** 
Specialist   1.000 0.096 0.069 -0.010 0.493* 0.127 -0.156** -0.001 -0.033 0.096 
FirmSize    1.000 0.480* 0.519* 0.431* 0.217* -0.280* 0.145** -0.060 0.396* 
Leverage     1.000 0.016 0.269* 0.176** -0.516* 0.103 -0.020 0.157** 
Profitability      1.000 0.148** 0.062 0.000 0.133 -0.021 0.189* 
Big4       1.000 0.259* -0.249* 0.066 -0.088 0.158** 
Age        1.000 -0.158** 0.002 0.178** 0.162** 
Liquidity         1.000 -0.041 -0.004 -0.062 
Brd_Idp          1.000 -0.199* 0.089 
Duality           1.000 -0.054 
OwnCon            1.000 
* Significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed) 
**Significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed) 
DCI is the level of compliance with AASB 6 and 136, calculated as a ratio of deemed compliance over total applicable mandated disclosure items; 
Aud_Idp is the ratio of non-audit fees to total audit fees; Specialist is a dummy variable, represents firms that are audited by a specialist auditor which 
measured by the top 20% of industry share; FirmSize is measured by the natural log of total assets; Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to equity; 
Profitability is the ratio of the earnings before tax to equity; Big4 is a dummy variable represent being audited by one of the Big4 accounting firms; Age 
is measured by the number of years since listing; Liquidity is current assets divided by current liabilities; Brd_Idp is the ratio of independent director to 
total board of directors; Duality is a dummy variable, coded 1 if the board of directors are chaired by its CEO; OwnCon is the proportion of shares owned 
by the top 20 shareholders. 
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One main objective of a correlation matrix is to determine if there 
is any multicollinearity that would give rise to potential estimation 
issues. With regards to the correlation matrix among the 
independent and control variables, the findings reveal that the 
strongest significant (p<0.01) correlation of 0.519 is between 
FirmSize and Profitability. Table 5.7 also shows some other 
significant (p<0.01) Pearson correlations above 0.4000 such as 
Leverage and Liquidity (-0.516), Specialist and Big4 (0.493), 
FirmSize and Leverage (0.480), FirmSize and Big4 (0.431). Given 
the correlation coefficients are all below the critical limit of 0.800, 
as a rule of thumb only when the correlation coefficient exceeds 
0.800 is multicollinearity a potential statistical issue (Hair, 
Anderson, Tatham and Black, 1995; Cooper and Schindler, 2003; 
Greene, 2003; Gujarati, 2003). Therefore, results shown in Table 
5.7 do not seem to indicate correlation will significantly impair the 
regression results. 
 
For robustness, Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) is also calculated 
for all regressions performed in the following section (5.5 
Multivariate Results) for all independent and control variables. The 
VIF values indicate whether a predictor has a strong linear 
relationship with other predictor(s). Results are consistent with 
Pearson correlations, and confirm no significant multicollinearity 
issues in the model estimations. 
 
5.5 Multivariate Results56 
This section presents the main results for testing the key 
hypotheses derived in Chapter 3. The objective of this section is to 
                                                     
56 All regression results in this thesis are all based on Durbin-Watson statistic and the 
assumption of independent errors is tenable. Conventional diagnostic tests were 
implemented to ensure that fitted model were appropriate. Visual inspection of the 
histograms, normal probability plots and scatter plots indicated that the residual were not 
obviously ill behaved. 
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discuss the results, whereas details of implication of the results will 
be presented in Chapter 7. 
 
Table 5.8, Table 5.9, and Table 5.10 depict the relationship 
between auditor independence and auditor specialisation 
(independent variables) and the level of compliance with AASB 6, 
AASB 136, AASB 6 & 136 (dependent variable) separately. Each 
table has three models of estimation shown in different panels. 
Panel A and Panel B test the association of auditor independence 
(NonAuditRatio) and audit specialisation (Specialist) to the 
dependent variable in isolation. Panel C includes the effects of both 
auditor independence and audit specialisation.  
 
As shown in Table 5.8, Table 5.9, and Table 5.10 the expected 
directional sign of auditor independence and audit specialist is 
negative57 and positive respectively. As per arguments presented in 
Chapter 3, this study proposes that higher levels of auditor 
independence should result in higher level of compliance and 
specialist auditors should also give rise to higher level of 
compliance.  
 
Table 5.8 presents regression DCI-6 results for the disclosure 
compliance index for AASB 6. Across the three panels shown only 
the constant and Big4 (positive direction) are significant (p<0.01). 
The directional sign for the independent variables (auditor 
independence and audit specialist) are opposite to the expected 
direction. However, coefficients for auditor independence and audit 
specialist are not significant. The results show that the three 
                                                     
57 The expected directional sign is presented as negative in tables for auditor 
independence because it is proxied by non-audit ratio, which has an inverse relation 
between auditor independence and non-audit ratio; that means the higher the non-audit 
ratio the less independence of auditor (see Chapter 3 for a full discussion). 
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models in Table 5.8 are not significant overall based on the F-
value. 
 
Table 5.8: Regression Results: Full Sample for DCI - 6 
 Prediction 
PANEL A PANEL B PANEL C 
Beta 
t-
Statistic 
Beta 
t-
Statistic 
Beta 
t-
Statistic 
Constant  0.851 10.026+ 0.848 9.807+ 0.852 9.833+ 
Aud_Idp -   0.003 0.124 0.02 0.093 
Specialist + -0.015 -0.907   -0.015 -0.901 
FirmSize + 0.000 -0.034 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.054 
Leverage +/- 0.005 0.154 0.007 0.209 0.005 0.159 
Profitability + -0.13 -0.956 -0.013 -0.941 -0.013 -0.948 
Big4 + 0.037 3.070* 0.032 2.980* 0.037 3.057* 
Age +/- 0.000 -0.540 0.000 -0.563 0.000 -0.544 
Liquidity +/- 0.000 0.414 0.000 0.472 0.000 0.418 
Brd_Idp + 0.006 0.215 0.006 0.219 0.005 0.212 
Duality - 0.012 0.988 0.013 1.004 0.012 0.990 
OwnCon +/- -0.025 -0.858 -0.027 -0.933 -0.025 -0.859 
Adjusted R2  0.009 0.006 0.005 
F-Statistic  1.247 1.163 1.130 
Prob. (F)  >0.10 >0.10 >0.10 
No. of 
Firms 
 289 289 289 
This table presents the results of regression models that examine the relationship 
between the level of compliance with AASB 6 and independent variables for the full 
sample. 
*   Significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
**  Significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
*** Significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed) 
+  Significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed) 
The dependent variable DCI-6 is the level of compliance with AASB 6, calculated as a ratio 
of deemed compliance over total applicable mandated disclosure items; Aud_Idp is the 
ratio of non-audit fees to total audit fees; Specialist is a dummy variable, represents firms 
that are audited by a specialist auditor which is measured by the top 20% of industry 
share; FirmSize is measured by the natural log of total assets; Leverage is the ratio of 
long-term debt to equity; Profitability is the ratio of the earnings before tax to equity; 
Big4 is a dummy variable represent being audited by one of the Big4 accounting firms; 
Age is measured by the number of years since listing; Liquidity is current assets divided 
by current liabilities; Brd_Idp is the ratio of independent directors to total board of 
directors; Duality is a dummy variable, coded 1 if the board of directors is chaired by its 
CEO; OwnCon is the proportion of shares owned by the top 20 shareholders. 
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Regression models reported in Table 5.9 and Table 5.10 are highly 
significant overall (F-statistic p<0.01). Table 5.9 reports the results 
in the context of AASB 136 in isolation while Table 5.10 shows the 
main model that tests the relation of auditor independence and 
audit specialisation with the level of compliance with both AASB 6 
and AASB 136.  
 
The directional sign of the coefficients on auditor independence in 
Table 5.9 and Table 5.10 are negative in line with the expectation. 
Results related to auditor independence are consistent with the 
argument that as the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees received 
from a client increases the auditor independence may be affected 
(i.e., less independence). This in turn reduces the auditor‘s 
willingness to challenge possible non-compliance of a client‘s 
financial statements, such as non-disclosure of mandatory 
information. The finding lends support to H1 (―There is a positive 
association between the level of auditor independence and the 
firm’s level of compliance with mandatory disclosures of AASB 6 
and AASB 136‖). This result adds further evidence non-audit fees 
are negatively associated with compliance levels. 
  
Likewise, Table 5.9 and Table 5.10 show the positive directional 
sign of audit specialisation and indicates that the better the quality 
an auditor (i.e., a specialist) the higher level of compliance. In 
other words, financial statements audited by a specialist auditor 
will result in a higher level of compliance with accounting 
standards. This is because as an industry specialist auditor is likely 
to be more proactive in challenging corporate management. The 
result is in line with the independent t-Test results. Unlike t-Test, 
however, regressions involve inclusion of compounding factors. 
When these compounding factors are put into the equation, the 
coefficient on audit specialisation insignificantly signifies that the 
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results regarding the association between audit specialisation and 
level of compliance are inconclusive. Therefore the hypothesis H2 
(―There is a positive association between auditor specialisation and 
the firm’s level of compliance with mandatory disclosures of AASB 
6 and AASB 136‖) is not supported. 
 
Table 5.9: Regression Results: Full Sample for DCI - 136 
 Prediction 
PANEL A PANEL B PANEL C 
Beta 
t-
Statistic 
Beta 
t-
Statistic 
Beta 
t-
Statistic 
Constant  0.710 3.736+ 0.773 4.124+ 0.697 3.648+ 
Aud_Idp - -0.096 -1.906**   -0.093 -1.822** 
Specialist +   0.031 0.921 0.025 0.745 
FirmSize + -0.011 -0.923 -0.015 -1.299*** -0.010 -0.848 
Leverage +/- 0.076 1.128 0.090 1.330*** 0.079 1.168 
Profitability + -0.041 -1.343*** -0.036 -1.161 -0.041 -1.329*** 
Big4 + 0.111 4.872* 0.098 3.749* 0.102 3.891* 
Age +/- 0.000 -0.345 -0.001 -0.464 0.000 -0.353 
Liquidity +/- 0.001 0.441 0.001 0.631 0.001 0.514 
Brd_Idp + 0.119 2.030** 0.111 1.887** 0.119 2.035** 
Duality - 0.019 0.677 0.019 0.726 0.018 0.688 
OwnCon +/- 0.075 1.225 0.067 1.076 0.071 1.148 
Adjusted R2  0.112 0.101 0.110 
F-Statistic  3.818 3.495 3.514 
Prob. (F)  <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
No. of 
Firms 
 224 224 224 
This table presents the results of regression models that examine the relationship 
between the level of compliance with AASB 136 and independent variables for the full 
sample. 
*   Significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
**  Significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
*** Significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed) 
+  Significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed) 
The dependent variable DCI-136 is the level of compliance with AASB 136, calculated as a 
ratio of deemed compliance over total applicable mandated disclosure items; Aud_Idp is 
the ratio of non-audit fees to total audit fees; Specialist is a dummy variable, represents 
firms that are audited by a specialist auditor which is measured by the top 20% of 
industry share; FirmSize is measured by the natural log of total assets; Leverage is the 
ratio of long-term debt to equity; Profitability is the ratio of the earnings before tax to 
equity; Big4 is a dummy variable represent being audited by one of the Big4 accounting 
firms; Age is measured by the number of years since listing; Liquidity is current assets 
divided by current liabilities; Brd_Idp is the ratio of independent directors to total board of 
directors; Duality is a dummy variable, coded 1 if the board of directors is chaired by its 
CEO; OwnCon is the proportion of shares owned by the top 20 shareholders. 
    127 
 
Observing the findings from Table 5.9 and Table 5.10, there are 
two control variables, Big4 (firms audited by DT, E&Y, KPMG or 
PWC) and Board Independence (ratio of number of independent 
director to the total board of directors), that are showing significant 
positive coefficients across all models of regression. Coefficients on 
Big4 (p<0.01) and Board Independence (p<0.05) are all positive 
regressions showing in Table 5.9 and Table 5.10 which is in line 
with expectations. The results related to Big4 add support to, and 
are consistent with, past studies, such as Owusu-Ansah (1998) and 
Ali et al., (2004), among others. This indicates that firms that are 
audited by Big4 accounting firms tend to have higher level of 
compliance. The results are consistent with the findings obtained 
from the independent t-Test. 
 
Table 5.10: Regression Results: Full Sample DCI – 6/DCI - 136 
 Prediction 
PANEL A PANEL B PANEL C 
Beta 
t-
Statistic 
Beta 
t-
Statistic 
Beta 
t-
Statistic 
Constant  0.786 6.440+ 0.832 6.969+ 0.777 6.335+ 
Aud_Idp - -0.060 -1.874**   -0.058 -1.808** 
Specialist +   0.022 1.020 0.020 0.902 
FirmSize + -0.008 -0.988 -0.011 -1.407*** -0.007 -0.903 
Leverage +/- 0.052 1.221 0.061 1.431*** 0.055 1.274 
Profitability + -0.022 -1.121 -0.017 -0.893 -0.021 -1.091 
Big4 + 0.069 4.717* 0.059 3.539* 0.062 3.676* 
Age +/- 0.000 -0.081 0.000 -0.172 0.000 -0.087 
Liquidity +/- 0.000 0.385 0.000 0.563 0.000 0.467 
Brd_Idp + 0.062 1.673** 0.055 1.485*** 0.062 1.682** 
Duality - 0.024 1.446*** 0.024 1.469*** 0.024 1.442*** 
OwnCon +/- 0.046 1.156 0.041 1.038 0.042 1.074 
Adjusted R2  0.110 0.099 0.109 
F-Statistic  3.567 3.281 3.314 
Prob. (F)  <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
No. of 
Firms 
 208 208 208 
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This table presents the results of regression models that examine the relationship 
between the level of compliance with AASB 6 & AASB 136 and independent variables for 
the full sample. 
*   Significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
**  Significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
*** Significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed) 
+  Significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed) 
The dependent variable DCI is the level of compliance with AASB 6 and AASB 136, 
calculated as a ratio of deemed compliance over total applicable mandated disclosure 
items; Aud_Idp is the ratio of non-audit fees to total audit fees; Specialist is a dummy 
variable, represents firms that are audited by a specialist auditor which is measured by 
the top 20% of industry share; FirmSize is measured by the natural log of total assets; 
Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to equity; Profitability is the ratio of the earnings 
before tax to equity; Big4 is a dummy variable represent being audited by one of the Big4 
accounting firms; Age is measured by the number of years since listing; Liquidity is 
current assets divided by current liabilities; Brd_Idp is the ratio of independent directors 
to total board of directors; Duality is a dummy variable, coded 1 if the board of directors 
is chaired by its CEO; OwnCon is the proportion of shares owned by the top 20 
shareholders. 
 
Similarly, Table 5.9 and Table 5.10 show coefficient on Board 
Independence is positively associated with the level of compliance 
with AASB 6 and 136. This is in line with expectation and implies 
that firms with relatively more independence directors have a 
higher level of compliance with the accounting standards. The 
findings are consistent with the empirical results of past research 
like Cheng and Courtenay (2005), and Cheung et al., (2006). 
 
With respect to Firm Size and Leverage, both coefficients on these 
variables are moderately significant (p<0.10) in Panel B, but are 
insignificant in Panel A and Panel C, in both Table 5.9 and Table 
5.10. The results are inconclusive which is in line with the 
independent t-Test results. Hence the multiple regression results 
fail to lend support to past findings. Interestingly, it is noted that 
coefficient on Firm Size is negative indicating that the level of 
compliance with AASB 6 and AASB 136 is relatively lower as the 
size of the firms get larger.  
 
Another point to mention is how Duality (dummy variable coded 1 
if board of directors are chaired by its CEO) relates to compliance. 
It is insignificant in Table 5.9 when regressed against AASB 136 in 
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isolation. However, when regressed in the main model against both 
AASB 6 and 136 as shown in Table 5.10, the result is moderately 
significant (p<0.10). The negative relation between the Duality and 
combined level of compliance with AASB 6 and AASB 136 shows 
that a firm‘s board of directors that is chaired by its CEO have 
lower levels of compliance with the accounting standards. This 
result is in line with the past research like Forker (1992) and Gul 
and Leung (2004). 
 
The remaining control variables (i.e., age; liquidity; and ownership 
concentration) are not statistically significant across all panels of 
regressions as shown in Table 5.9 and Table 5.10. These items 
seem to have no influences on accounting compliance. 
 
5.6 Summary 
This thesis finds that on average there is a 76% level of compliance 
with the combined mandatory disclosure requirements of AASB 6 
and AASB136 for Australian listed mineral resource firms. The 
majority 82% of sample firms (170 firms) are in the range of 70% 
to 99% extent of compliance with the combined standards. In 
general, sample firms have higher level of compliance with AASB 6 
in comparison to AASB 136. There are 96% of sample firms reach a 
compliance level of at least 80% with AASB 6, in comparison to 
25% of sample firms that have a similar compliance level with 
AASB 136.  
 
Multiple regression results show a significant positive relationship 
between payment for non-audit services and the level of 
compliance with AASB 6 and AASB 136. The findings imply that 
auditors‘ compromise audit independence relative to the proportion 
of non-audit fees received from clients. Furthermore, the result 
also shows that auditor independence has a significant influence on 
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the level of compliance with the standards for large firms, and has 
a moderate impact on firms that have experienced poor 
performance. However, the association between the auditor 
independence and level of compliance are insignificant for small 
firms, and firms that experience good performance. In stark 
contrast, audit specialisation (proxies by audit industry market 
share) does not have significant influence on the magnitude of 
compliance with AASB 6 and AASB 136.  
 
Overall, the findings contribute to the existing empirical evidence 
from Australian listed mineral resources firms that: (i) auditor 
independence seems to be influenced relative to the proportion of 
non-audit fees income from audit clients, and (ii) the specialisation 
of an auditor appears to have an insignificant influence on the level 
of compliance. 
 
Chapter 6 performs and discusses a variety of sensitivity tests to 
ascertain the credential of results obtained in Chapter 5. 
Specifically, it examines the alternative measures of the main two-
key independent variables (i.e., auditor independence and audit 
specialisation) as per the literature review in Chapter 3. 
Multivariate tests for sub-samples (such as client firm size, firm 
performance, type of auditors, board independence and duality of 
management) are also performed.  
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Chapter 6 ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
 
6.1 Chapter Overview 
The documented findings in the previous chapter lend support to 
the first hypothesis. The result reveals that auditors‘ compromise 
audit independence relative to the proportion of non-audit fees 
received from clients. The evidence, however, fails to support the 
second hypothesis which has the notion of audit specialisation 
(proxies by audit industry market share) results in higher level of 
compliance with AASB 6 Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral 
Resources and AASB 136 Impairment of Assets mandatory 
disclosures.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the robustness of the 
results documented in Chapter 5. As Cooke (1998, p. 209) attests 
that ―no one procedure is the best but that multiple approaches are 
helpful to ensure the results are robust across methods‖. Hence, it 
is important to consider whether the results are varied when other 
measures of independent and control variables are employed as 
this can manifest the strength of the findings. To assure the 
validity and robustness of inferences drawn previously, this chapter 
conducts a range of robustness tests for pooled (AASB 6 and AASB 
136) data set.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Alternative 
measures and discussion for auditor independence is presented in 
Section 6.2. Likewise, robustness test for audit specialisation is 
provided in Section 6.3. Section 6.4 supplements the analysis using 
multivariate tests for sub-samples and control variables that have 
consistent significant results in the main results (see Table 5.10). 
This chapter concludes with a summary in Section 6.5. 
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6.2 Alternative Measures of Auditor Independence 
Recent concerns on auditor independence has focused on the 
provision of non-audit services to firms (Larcker and Richardson, 
2004; Ruddock et al., 2006). As noted in Table 4.3, the ratio of 
non-audit fees to total fees of the incumbent auditors have been 
extensively adopted as a proxy to draw inferences on auditor 
independence in the research literature (e.g., Asbaugh et al., 2003; 
Chung and Kallapur, 2003; Reynolds et al, 2004; Ruddock et al., 
2005). Application of non-audit ratio as a proxy is consistent with 
the SEC‘s Final Rule which mandated firms to disclose audit and 
non-audit fees to financial statement users as a means to assess 
―whether the proportion of fees for audit and nonaudit services 
causes them to question the auditor‘s independence‖ (SEC 2000, 
section III.c.5). 
 
However, the utilisation of non-audit fees to total fees is not free 
from criticism. One of the limitations that has been raised is the 
invariance of such a measure to the absolute scale of fees. Hence, 
it does not capture the relative financial importance of the client to 
the auditor (Frankel et al., 2002; Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Ferguson 
at al., 2004). Furthermore, it is impossible to establish whether 
cross-sectional variation in the ratio is driven by the level of non-
audit as opposed to audit fees (Frankel et al., 2002; Ferguson et 
al., 2004). To overcome the limitation, the natural log of non-audit 
fees is employed to directly capture the level of economic bonding 
resulting from the engagement of non-audit services (Antle et al., 
2002; Brandon et al., 2004; Ferguson et al., 2004). 
 
Ferguson et al., (2004) further assert that both the non-audit fees 
ratio and natural log of non-audit fees may not capture the relative 
economic dependence of individual big clients on an audit firm 
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given all non-audit fees received by the audit firm. Therefore, it 
fails to construct the true economic bonding between the 
incumbent auditors and clients. For example, assume an audit firm 
that has two clients and both firms have the same ratio of non-
audit fees to total fees of 80%. Based on the reported ratio of both 
firms, the incumbent auditor‘s independence appears to be 
affected. However, in absolute terms assume one firm reports total 
fees of $10,000, and the other firm $1,000,000. In this scenario, 
only the latter is economically important to the audit firm. This 
implies that the relative size of fees (ratio of non-audit fees to total 
fees) does not capture the economic dependence of the auditor on 
a client.  
 
Many researchers have posited that total fees (sum of audit and 
non-audit fees) are the better measure of the economic 
dependence of the auditor on a client (Ashbough et al., 2003; 
Geiger and Rama, 2003). Percentile rank has also been utilised by 
many researchers (e.g., Frankel et al., 2002; Reynolds et al., 
2004) as a means to capture such economic importance of 
individual clients to an audit firm given all non-audit fees paid to 
the audit firm. 
 
To assess the robustness of the results reported in the preceding 
chapter, several alternative measures are employed in this thesis 
for auditor independence. First, the natural logarithm 
transformation of audit, non-audit and total fees are utilised to 
capture the relative economic bonding between clients and audit 
firms. This method has been widely used in the past empirical 
research, such as Antle et al., (2002); DeFond et al., (2002); 
Asbaugh et al., (2003); Geiger and Rama (2003); Ragnunandan et 
al., (2003); Brandon et al., (2004); and Ruddock and Taylor 
(2005). Second, percentile rank is used to capture the relative 
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economic dependence of audit firm to individual clients given all 
audit, non-audit, and total fees received by the audit firm. In doing 
so, it allows for a separate test of incentive effects of audit and 
non-audit fees to audit firms as adopted in the studies of Frankel et 
al., (2002), Reynolds et al., 2004, and Ferguson et al., (2004). 
Clients with the highest (lowest) rank are given 1 (0). The results 
of these additional sensitivity tests are presented in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1: Alternative Measures Auditor Independence 
 Prediction 
PANEL A PANEL B PANEL C PANEL D PANEL E PANEL F 
Log Audit Fees Log NonAudit Fees Log Total Fees Rank Audit Fees 
Rank NonAudit 
Fees 
Rank Total Fees 
Beta t-Stats Beta t-Stats Beta t-Stats Beta t-Stats Beta t-Stats Beta t-Stats 
Constant  0.885 7.314+ 0.738 5.958+ 0.865 7.337+ 0.726 5.709+ 0.755 5.979+ 0.698 5.379+ 
Aud_Idp - -0.021 -2.107* -0.003 -2.483** -0.027 -2.826* -0.051 -2.274** -0.034 -1.790** -0.058 -2.469** 
Specialist + 0.026 1.205 0.021 0.975 0.026 1.185 0.024 1.125 0.027 1.247 0.024 1.105 
FirmSize + -0.01 -0.141 -0.004 -0.542 0.004 0.401 -0.003 -0.316 -0.006 -0.700 -0.001 -0.102 
Leverage +/- 0.075 1.743** 0.049 1.147 0.075 1.758** 0.064 1.510*** 0.060 1.405*** 0.060 1.414*** 
Profitability + -0.024 -1.235 -0.026 -1.335** -0.028 -1.427*** -0.029 -1.444*** -0.022 -1.121 -0.030 -1.508*** 
Big4 + 0.068 3.958* 0.061 3.676* 0.071 4.193* 0.046 2.649* 0.056 3.321* 0.045 2.572* 
Age +/- 0.002 -0.089 0.005 -0.087 0.006 -0.009 0.001 0.097 0.001 -0.108 0.001 0.083 
Liquidity +/- 0.000 0.434 0.000 0.365 0.000 0.351 0.000 0.438 0.000 0.502 0.000 0.414 
Brd_Idp + 0.056 1.517*** 0.067 1.819** 0.060 1.653** 0.055 1.492*** 0.063 1.698** 0.057 1.564*** 
Duality - 0.022 1.303*** 0.021 1.291*** 0.021 1.266*** 0.022 1.363*** 0.025 1.496*** 0.022 1.335*** 
OwnCon +/- 0.046 1.163 0.042 1.065 0.048 1.236 0.045 1.150 0.039 0.996 0.048 1.220 
Adjusted R2  0.115 0.122 0.130 0.118 0.109 0.122 
F-Statistic  3.438 3.621 3.814 3.516 3.307 3.613 
Prob. (F)  p<0.000 p<0.000 p<0.000 p<0.000 p<0.000 p<0.000 
No. Firms  208 208 208 208 208 208 
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This table presents the results of regression models that examine the relationship between the level of compliance with AASB 6 & AASB 136 and 
independent variables for the full sample. 
*   Significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
**  Significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
***  Significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed) 
+   Significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed) 
++  Significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed) 
+ ++ Significant at the 0.06 level (two-tailed) 
The dependent variable DCI is the level of compliance with AASB 6 and AASB 136, calculated as a ratio of deemed compliance over total applicable 
mandated disclosure items;  
Aud_Idp (log audit fees) is the natural logarithm of audit fees;  
Aud_Idp (log non-audit fees) is the natural logarithm of non-audit fees;  
Aud_Idp (log total fees) is the natural logarithm of total fees;  
Aud_Idp (rank audit fees) is the percentile rank of audit fees;  
Aud_Idp (rank non-audit fees) is the percentile of non-audit fees;  
Aud_Idp (rank total fees) is the percentile rank of total fees;  
Specialist is a dummy variable, represents firms that are audited by a specialist auditor which measured by the top 20% of industry share;  
FirmSize is measured by the natural log of total assets;  
Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to equity;  
Profitability is the ratio of the earnings before tax to equity;  
Big4 is a dummy variable represents being audited by one of the Big4 accounting firms;  
Age is measured by the number of years since listing;  
Liquidity is current assets divided by current liabilities;  
Brd_Idp is the ratio of independent director to total board of directors;  
Duality is a dummy variable, coded 1 if the board of directors is chaired by its CEO;  
OwnCon is the proportion of shares owned by the top 20 shareholders. 
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Table 6.1 reveals that the F-Value of all models reflected in Panel A 
to F are statistically significant (p<0.001), consistently in line with 
the main results/model documented in Table 5.10. The directional 
sign on the coefficients of Aud_Idp (auditor independence) are 
negative for all panels in Table 6.1. This infers that the higher the 
economic bonding between clients and incumbent auditors, in 
terms of non-audit services employed, result in lower level of 
compliance with AASB 6 and AASB 136. This implies that economic 
bonding by the auditing firms and clients seems to influence the 
incumbent auditor‘s independence. 
 
Table 6.1 shows that the alternative measures employed for the 
variable Aud_Idp (auditor independence) in Panel A with 
LogAuditFees (p<0.01), Panel B with LogNonAuditFees (p<0.05), 
Panel C with LogTotalFees (p<0.01), Panel D with RankAuditFees 
(p<0.05), Panel E with RankNonAuditFees (p<0.05), and Panel F 
with RankTotalFees (p<0.05) all are statistically significant and 
consistent with the main results. This shows that regardless of 
alternative measures utilised or the choice of the proxy for auditor 
independence, it appears to be insensitive to the results. Therefore, 
the conclusion reached in this thesis is that the results obtained are 
not sensitive to type measurements adopted. This infers that audit, 
non-audit or total fees received by incumbent auditors all led to the 
same incentive effects. These findings are not consistent with the 
results obtained by Frankel et al., (2002) who document audit and 
non-audit fees generate different motivation effects. 
 
6.3 Alternative Measures of Audit Specialisation 
Referring to Table 4.4, and related text, the two most common 
proxies utilised to capture audit specialisation in past literature are 
industry portfolio share and industry market share. The former 
approach dominates in the studies reviewed. Industry portfolio 
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share has been criticised that ―the designation of specialist is likely 
to be largely driven by the size of the industry and this may not 
reflect specific efforts made by the audit firm to specialize in that 
industry‖ (Neal and Riley, 2004, p. 170).  
 
In line with past studies this thesis employs industry market share 
to proxy for audit specialisation by using an arbitrary threshold to 
denote market share and industry specialists of an industry 
(Craswell et al., 1995; DeFond et al., 2000; Ferguson and Stokes, 
2002; Zhou and Elder, 2002; Ferguson et al., 2003; Krishnan et 
al., 2003b; Neal and Riley, 2004; Francis et al., 2005). In order to 
rule out that designation of audit specialist is driven by the 
arbitrarily applied cut-off threshold of 20% in the main model, the 
robustness checks include other possible benchmark cut-off 
figures, such as 10% and 15%.  
 
In addition to the mentioned cut-off rates, this thesis also 
considers the recent methodology employed by Ferguson et al., 
(2003), Carcello and Nagy (2004), and Francis et al., (2005), 
among others. That is, where an industry specialist is designated 
when its ranking is the Top one, two, and three based on market 
share. Last but not least, instead of using a dichotomous measure 
to denote an industry specialist, in line with the literature (Balsam 
et al., 2003; Carcello and Nagy, 2004; Dunn and Mayhew, 2004) 
this thesis also employs a continuous ranking of industry market 
share to proxy for audit specialisation. The results of the 
robustness tests are presented in Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2: Alternative Measures Auditor Specialisation 
 Prediction 
PANEL A PANEL B PANEL C PANEL D PANEL E PANEL F 
Market Share > 
10% 
Market Share > 
15% 
Top Rank Auditor Top Two Auditors Top Three Auditors Continuous MS 
Beta t-Stats Beta t-Stats Beta t-Stats Beta t-Stats Beta t-Stats Beta t-Stats 
Constant  0.789 6.433+ 0.785 6.424+ 0.777 6.335+ 0.785 6.424+ 0.789 6.433+ 0.777 6.338+ 
Aud_Idp - -0.059 -1.813** -0.060 -1.885** -0.058 -1.808** -0.060 -1.885** -0.059 -1.813** -0.059 -1.844** 
Specialist + -0.009 -0.334 0.017 0.789 0.020 0.902 0.017 0.789 -0.009 -0.334 0.050 0.924 
FirmSize + -0.008 -1.011 -0.007 -0.962 -0.007 -0.903 -0.007 -0.962 -0.008 -1.011 -0.007 -0.903 
Leverage +/- 0.053 1.236 0.052 1.207 0.055 1.274 0.052 1.207 0.053 1.236 0.054 1.255 
Profitability + -0.022 -1.115 -0.021 -1.079 -0.021 -1.091 -0.021 -1.079 -0.022 -1.115 -0.021 -1.086 
Big4 + 0.077 2.752* 0.057 2.696* 0.062 3.676* 0.057 2.696* 0.077 2.752* 0.056 2.750* 
Age +/- 0.005 -0.076 0.003 -0.073 0.001 -0.087 0.005 -0.073 0.001 -0.076 0.001 -0.087 
Liquidity +/- 0.000 0.375 0.000 0.388 0.000 0.467 0.000 0.388 0.000 0.375 0.000 0.461 
Brd_Idp + 0.063 1.685** 0.061 1.636** 0.062 1.682** 0.061 1.636** 0.063 1.685** 0.062 1.666** 
Duality - 0.023 1.419*** 0.024 1.454*** 0.024 1.442*** 0.024 1.454*** 0.023 1.419*** 0.024 1.450*** 
OwnCon +/- 0.046 1.154 0.044 1.116 0.042 1.074 0.044 1.116 0.046 1.154 0.042 1.073 
Adjusted R2  0.106 0.109 0.109 0.109 0.106 0.110 
F-Statistic  3.238 3.293 3.314 3.293 3.238 3.318 
Prob. (F)  p<0.000 p<0.000 p<0.000 p<0.000 p<0.000 p<0.000 
No. Firms  208 208 208 208 208 208 
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This table presents the results of regression models that examine the relationship between the level of compliance with AASB 6 & AASB 136 and 
independent variables for the full sample. 
*   Significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
**  Significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
***  Significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed) 
+   Significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed) 
++  Significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed) 
+ ++ Significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed) 
The dependent variable DCI is the level of compliance with AASB 6 and AASB 136, calculated as a ratio of deemed compliance over total applicable 
mandated disclosure items;  
Aud_Idp is the ratio of non-audit fees to total audit fees;  
Specialist (>10%) is a dummy variable, represents firms that are audited by a specialist auditor which measured by the top 10% of industry share;  
Specialist (>15%) is a dummy variable, represents firms that are audited by a specialist auditor which measured by the top 15% of industry share;  
Specialist (top rank auditor) is a dummy variable, represents firms that are audited by a specialist auditor which measured by the top 1 auditing firm 
based on market share;  
Specialist (top two auditor) is a dummy variable, represents firms that are audited by a specialist auditor which measured by the top 2 auditing firm 
based on market share;  
Specialist (top three auditor) is a dummy variable, represents firms that are audited by a specialist auditor which measured by the top 3 auditing firm 
based on market share;  
Specialist (continuous MS) is a dummy variable, represents firms that are audited by a specialist auditor which measured by the continuous ranking of 
industry market share;  
FirmSize is measured by the natural log of total assets;  
Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to equity;  
Profitability is the ratio of the earnings before tax to equity;  
Big4 is a dummy variable represents being audited by one of the Big4 accounting firms;  
Age is measured by the number of years since listing;  
Liquidity is current assets divided by current liabilities;  
Brd_Idp is the ratio of independent director to total board of directors;  
Duality is a dummy variable, coded 1 if the board of directors is chaired by its CEO;  
OwnCon is the proportion of shares owned by the top 20 shareholders. 
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Table 6.2 reveals that the F-Value of all models reflected in Panel A 
to F are statistically significant (p<0.001) consistently in line with 
the main results/model documented in Table 5.10. Table 6.2 shows 
there is a negative sign on the coefficients on Specialist (audit 
specialisation) in Panel A (MarketShare>10%) and Panel E 
(TopThreeAuditors). In contrast, Table 6.2 shows that Panel B 
(MarketShare>15%), C (TopRankAuditor), D (TopTwoAuditors), 
and F (ContinuousMarketShare) document a positive association 
between the level of compliance and firms that engaged services of 
specialist auditors. This latter result implies that firms that engaged 
the services of specialist auditors had higher levels of compliance 
with the mandatory disclosures of AASB 6 and AASB 136. However, 
it is important to note that all alternative measures of the variable 
Specialist are statistically not significant. Thus the results remain 
consistent with the reported findings of the primary model 
presented in Table 5.10.  
 
6.4 Multivariate Results for Partitioned Sub-Samples 
Table 5.9 and Table 5.10 show coefficients on firms‘ performance 
are consistently in a negative directional sign which implies that the 
firms with increasing income will have lower levels of compliance. 
Likewise, other control variables such as Big4, Board 
Independence, and Duality consistently show significant results 
reported in Table 5.10 for the pooled sample. It is, therefore, of 
interest to this study to further test the sensitivity of these 
variables by sub-sampling into client firm size, client firm 
performance, Big4 auditors, board independence, and duality. All 
regressions for the sensitivity test by sub-samples are conducted 
based on the main model as reported in Table 5.10 in Chapter 5. 
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6.4.1  Client Firm Size 
To investigate whether a client‘s firm size may have an influence 
on the association between the magnitude of compliance and 
auditor independence, and audit specialisation, this study partitions 
the pooled sample into small and large client‘s firm size. The cut-
off point is based on the median of total assets (AUD 
$11,394,000). Firms with total assets below the median are 
grouped as SmallFirms and those above LargeFirms. 
 
Table 6.3 shows the coefficient on Aud_Idp is negative for both 
Panel A (SmallFirms) and Panel B (LargeFirms). The findings are 
consistent with pooled samples‘ results. It is noted that only the 
coefficient on Aud_Idp in Table 6.3 Panel B (Large Firms) is 
statistically significant (p<0.05). In contrast, the coefficient on 
Aud_Idp is insignificant in Table 6.3 Panel A (Small Firms). This 
implies that a large client in terms of firm size influences the 
relationship between auditor independence and the level of 
compliance with the accounting standards. The findings indicate 
that auditors affect their independence due to client bargaining 
power when supplying non-audit services to large clients. It is, 
however, not the case with the small clients as documented in 
Table 6.3 Panel A.  
 
Moreover, the coefficient on Specialist in both Panel A and B in 
Table 6.3 is positive and statistically insignificant. The results are in 
line with the main results of the pooled sample. This indicates that 
irrespective of firm size, engaging specialist auditor‘s services 
appears not to affect the magnitude of compliance with the 
accounting standards. 
 
With respect to control variables, both Panel A and B in Table 6.3 
reveal that Big4 is consistent with the main pooled sample‘s result. 
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That is positively related with the level of compliance with the 
accounting standards. Big4 is significant at p<0.10 and p<0.01 for 
Panel A Small Firms and Panel B Large Firms respectively. Results 
infer that a firm that is audited by one of the Big4 accounting firms 
will have a higher level of compliance with AASB 6 and AASB 136 
regardless of the size (bargaining power) of the client firm. The 
results are consistent with the findings of the independent t-Test 
reported in Table 5.6. That is, Table 5.6 shows that firms audited 
by Big4 accounting firms have higher degree of compliance than 
peers engaging non-Big4 firms. 
 
Table 6.3 Panel A shows that small firms with higher leverage 
(p<0.10) have higher levels of compliance. Interestingly, it is also 
noted that the significant negative association between the level of 
compliance and Duality (p<0.05) for small firms in Panel A in Table 
6.3 indicate that the board of directors of small firms chaired by 
the CEO have higher levels of compliance. In contrast, Table 6.3 
Panel B documents a significant positive coefficient on Brd_Idp 
(p<0.05). This demonstrates the level of compliance is higher for 
large firms with more independent directors on the board.  
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Table 6.3: Partitioning by Client Firm Size 
 Prediction 
Client Firm Size 
PANEL A 
Small Firms 
PANEL B 
 Large Firms 
Beta t-Statistic Beta t-Statistic 
Constant  0.620 2.068++ 0.874 4.105+ 
Aud_Idp - -0.031 -0.563 -0.083 -1.922** 
Specialist + 0.033 0.820 0.005 0.170 
FirmSize + 0.004 0.222 -0.014 -1.052 
Leverage +/- 0.125 1.623*** 0.022 0.387 
Profitability + -0.022 -0.966 0.005 0.107 
Big4 + 0.046 1.520*** 0.071 3.150* 
Age +/- 0.000 -0.382 0.000 -0.241 
Liquidity +/- 0.000 0.434 0.001 0.410 
Brd_Idp + 0.016 0.330 0.119 1.937** 
Duality - 0.048 2.204** -0.002 -0.092 
OwnCon +/- 0.043 0.734 0.053 0.890 
Adjusted R2  0.127 0.177 
F-Statistic  2.347 1.820 
Prob. (F)  P<0.010 P<0.050 
No. Firms  103 105 
This table presents the results of regression models that examine the relationship 
between the level of compliance with AASB 6 & AASB 136 and independent variables for 
the full sample. 
*   Significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
**  Significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
*** Significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed) 
+   Significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed) 
++  Significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed) 
+++ Significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed) 
The dependent variable DCI is the level of compliance with AASB 6 and AASB 136, 
calculated as a ratio of deemed compliance over total applicable mandated disclosure 
items; Aud_Idp is the ratio of non-audit fees to total audit fees; Specialist is a dummy 
variable, represents firms that are audited by a specialist auditor which measured by the 
top 20% of industry share; FirmSize is measured by the natural log of total assets; 
Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to equity; Profitability is the ratio of the earnings 
before tax to equity; Big4 is a dummy variable represents being audited by one of the 
Big4 accounting firms; Age is measured by the number of years since listing; Liquidity is 
current assets divided by current liabilities; Brd_Idp is the ratio of independent director to 
total board of directors; Duality is a dummy variable, coded 1 if the board of directors is 
chaired by its CEO; OwnCon is the proportion of shares owned by the top 20 
shareholders. 
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6.4.2  Client Firm Performance 
This section examines whether a client‘s financial performance, 
being in a state of financial difficulty or prosperity, may influence 
the level of compliance with AASB 6 and AASB 136.  
 
As shown in Table 6.4, the pooled sample is segregated into two 
sub-samples. The firms are grouped into Poor Performing Firms in 
Panel A should the firms report a loss during the financial year. 
Likewise, should the firms‘ report a profit, then these firms are 
sub-sampled into Panel B Good Performing Firms.  
 
Table 6.4 reveals that the overall model fit is significant for Panel A 
Poor Performing Firms (F statistic of p<0.01) but not Good 
Performing Firms (see Panel B). With regards to the sign on the 
coefficients for Aud_Idp (auditor independence) and Specialist 
(audit specialisation), Table 6.4 shows both Panel A and Panel B‘s 
results are consistent with the main findings in Table 5.10. The 
significant negative coefficient on Aud_Idp (p<0.10) in Table 6.4 
Panel A infers that the higher the ratio of non-audit fees to total 
fees of poor performing firms results in less compliance with the 
AASB 6 and AASB 136. However, such impairment to auditor 
independence is inconclusive for the good performing firms as 
exhibited in Panel B.  
 
In relation to audit specialisation, Table 6.4 Panel A and Panel B 
results indicate neither good nor poor performing firms are 
influenced differently as a result of the association between audit 
specialisation (Specialist) and the extent of compliance. This 
suggests that specialist auditors do not have impact on, neither 
good nor poor performing firms, the levels of compliance with the 
mandatory disclosures of AASB 6 and AASB 136. 
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With reference to control variables, Table 6.4 Panel A shows 
variable Big4 (Poor Performing Firms) has consistent results with 
the main results documented in Table 5.10. The statistically 
significant result (p<0.01) of Big4 in Table 6.4 Panel A shows a 
positive coefficient implying that poor performing firms that engage 
Big4 services have higher levels of compliance than the peers that 
are audited by the Non-Big4. It is, however, inconclusive in the 
case of Good Performing Firms (statistically insignificant) as shown 
Table 6.4 Panel B.  
 
Other control variables, such as Brd_Idp (p<0.05), Duality 
(p<0.05), OwnCon (p<0.10) all have positive coefficients and are 
statistically significant for the Poor Performing Firms (as shown in 
Table 6.4 Panel A). These variables, however, are not significant in 
Table 6.4 Panel B for the sub-sample of Good Performing Firms. 
This infers that for the Poor Performing Firms with more 
independent directors, non-CEO as a chairperson to board, and 
higher proportion of shares owned by the top twenty shareholders, 
have a higher level of compliance with AASB 6 and AASB 136. For 
the Good Performing Firms the aforementioned variables do not 
seem to influence compliance levels. 
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Table 6.4: Partitioning Client Firm Performance 
 Prediction 
Client Firm Performance 
PANEL A 
Poor Performing Firms 
PANEL B 
Good Performing Firms 
Beta t-Statistic Beta t-Statistic 
Constant  0.796 5.889+ 0.571 1.384+++ 
Aud_Idp - -0.051 -1.401*** -0.044 -0.504 
Specialist + 0.025 1.022 -0.010 -0.166 
FirmSize + -0.010 -1.121 0.011 0.416 
Leverage +/- 0.024 0.510 0.105 0.734 
Profitability + -0.027 -1.269 0.055 0.211 
Big4 + 0.063 3.511* 0.061 1.078 
Age +/- 0.000 -0.461 0.001 0.256 
Liquidity +/- 0.000 -0.506 0.005 1.650*** 
Brd_Idp + 0.088 2.193** -0.112 -0.828 
Duality - 0.030 1.776** -0.019 -0.236 
OwnCon +/- 0.070 1.608*** -0.028 -0.208 
Adjusted R2  0.140 0.166 
F-Statistic  3.595 0.600 
Prob. (F)  P<0.000 P<0.800 
No. Firms  176 32 
This table presents the results of regression models that examine the relationship 
between the level of compliance with AASB 6 & AASB 136 and independent variables for 
the full sample. 
*   Significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
**  Significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
*** Significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed) 
+   Significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed) 
++  Significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed) 
+++ Significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed) 
The dependent variable DCI is the level of compliance with AASB 6 and AASB 136, 
calculated as a ratio of deemed compliance over total applicable mandated disclosure 
items; Aud_Idp is the ratio of non-audit fees to total audit fees; Specialist is a dummy 
variable, represents firms that are audited by a specialist auditor which measured by the 
top 20% of industry share; FirmSize is measured by the natural log of total assets; 
Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to equity; Profitability is the ratio of the earnings 
before tax to equity; Big4 is a dummy variable represents being audited by one of the 
Big4 accounting firms; Age is measured by the number of years since listing; Liquidity is 
current assets divided by current liabilities; Brd_Idp is the ratio of independent director to 
total board of directors; Duality is a dummy variable, coded 1 if the board of directors is 
chaired by its CEO; OwnCon is the proportion of shares owned by the top 20 
shareholders. 
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6.4.3  Type of Auditor 
This section examines the influence of firms audited by Big4 and 
Non-Big4 on the association between audit quality (auditor 
independence and audit specialisation) and the extent of 
compliance with AASB 6 and AASB 136. The pooled sample is 
segregated into firms that are audited by Big4 in Panel A and Non-
Big4 in Panel B in Table 6.5.  
 
Table 6.5 shows the coefficient on Aud_Idp in both Panel A and 
Panel B is negative, which is in line with the main pooled results 
and as predicted. Interestingly, the sub-sample of firms audited by 
Big4 (Panel A) shows an insignificant result for the coefficient on 
Aud_Idp. This implies Big4 auditing firms‘ independence is not 
influenced regardless of non-audit services provided to their clients 
and it, accordingly, does not affect the level of compliance with 
AASB 6 and AASB136. In contrast, for firms audited by Non-Big4 
auditing firms (Panel B) it appears that when an economic bonding 
is formed between the Non-Big4 auditor and the clients by 
providing non-audit services, it has an impact on the level of 
compliance with AASB 6 and AASB 136. This infers impairment on 
Non-Big4 auditor independence when an economic bonding is 
developed by supplying non-audit services to their clients. 
 
In respect to audit specialisation, the evidence documented in 
Table 6.5 Panel A shows that firms audited by Big4 auditing firms, 
and in particular those designated as an industry specialist, there 
are higher levels of compliance with AASB 6 and AASB 136.  
 
Table 6.5 Panel A also reveals that control variables of sub-sample 
firms that are audited by Big4 auditing firms have a significant 
coefficient on Leverage (p<0.10), Profitability (p<0.10), Liquidity 
(p<0.10), and Duality (p<0.05). This suggests that firms audited 
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by Big4 auditing firms that are more liquid, higher in leverage, less 
profitability, and the chairman of the board is not led by its CEO, 
gives rise to higher level of compliance with AASB 6 and AASB 136. 
However, this is not the case for firms that are audited by Non-
Big4 auditing firms as tabulated in Table 6.5 Panel B. 
 
Table 6.5: Partitioning by Type of Auditor 
 Prediction 
Type of Auditor 
PANEL A 
Audited by Big4 
PANEL B 
Audited by NonBig4 
Beta t-Statistic Beta t-Statistic 
Constant  0.699 3.807+ 0.877 4.970+ 
Aud_Idp - -0.029 -0.683 -0.081 -1.731** 
Specialist + 0.026 1.391***   
FirmSize + 0.001 0.044 -0.012 -1.088 
Leverage +/- 0.074 1.329*** 0.029 0.441 
Profitability + -0.040 -1.349*** -0.011 -0.429 
Age +/- 0.000 0.166 0.000 -0.139 
Liquidity +/- 0.002 1.306*** 0.000 -0.368 
Brd_Idp + 0.062 1.178 0.051 1.009 
Duality - 0.047 1.876** 0.012 0.532 
OwnCon +/- 0.008 0.149 0.052 0.942 
Adjusted R2  0.062 -0.011 
F-Statistic  1.499 0.848 
Prob. (F)  P<0.160 P<0.574 
No. Firms  77 131 
Table presents results of regression models examining the relationship between the level 
of compliance with AASB 6 & AASB 136 and independent variables for the full sample. 
*   Significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
**  Significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
*** Significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed) 
+   Significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed) 
++  Significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed) 
+++ Significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed) 
Dependent variable DCI is the level of compliance with AASB 6 and AASB 136, calculated 
as ratio of deemed compliance over total applicable mandated disclosure items; Aud_Idp 
is the ratio of non-audit fees to total audit fees; Specialist is a dummy variable, 
represents firms that are audited by a specialist auditor which measured by the top 20% 
of industry share; FirmSize is measured by the natural log of total assets; Leverage is the 
ratio of long-term debt to equity; Profitability is the ratio of the earnings before tax to 
equity; Big4 is a dummy variable represents being audited by one of the Big4 accounting 
firms; Age is measured by the number of years since listing; Liquidity is current assets 
divided by current liabilities; Brd_Idp is the ratio of independent director to total board of 
directors; Duality is a dummy variable, coded 1 if the board of directors is chaired by its 
CEO; OwnCon is the proportion of shares owned by the top 20 shareholders. 
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6.4.4  Level of Board Independence 
This section examines whether numbers of independent directors 
on board would have an impact on the relationship between auditor 
independence and audit specialisation and level of compliance with 
AASB 6 and AASB 136. The pooled sample is divided into a sub-
sample of firms that have more than 50%58 of the board 
comprising independent directors (Panel B) and a sub-sample with 
less than 50% of board comprising independent directors (Panel 
A). 
 
Table 6.6 Panel A shows an insignificant positive coefficient on 
Aud_Idp. This reveals that economic bonding between the firms 
that have less board independence and the incumbent auditing 
firms seem not to have an impact on the level of compliance with 
AASB 6 and AASB 136. In comparison, results show a significant 
negative coefficient on Aud_Idp for firms that have more 
independent directors on the board, (see Table 6.6 Panel B). This 
signals that the higher the economic dependence of the incumbent 
auditors on their clients tends to lead to lower magnitudes of 
compliance with the accounting standards. This infers an 
impairment of auditor independence may be due to supplying non-
audit services.  
 
On a different note, in Panel A and Panel B of Table 6.6 the 
coefficients on Specialist are positive and insignificant. It seems, 
therefore, that specialist auditors do not have an impact on the 
magnitude of compliance with AASB 6 and AASB 136 regardless of 
the level of independent directors on the board. 
 
                                                     
58 It is noted that a better grouping method is to segregate the board of directors into 
100% independent when the ratio of independent directors to total directors on board is 
1. However, due to data constraints, this study sub-samples the data into firms that have 
more or less number of independent directors. 
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In regards to control variables, Table 6.6 Panel A shows coefficients 
with negative on FirmSize (p<0.10), positive on Big4 (p<0.05) and 
positive on Duality (p<0.10). It implies that firms that have less 
independent directors which are smaller in size, audited by Big4 
auditing firms, and whose chairman of the board of directors is led 
by its CEO, produces a higher level of compliance with the 
accounting standards. Furthermore, Table 6.6 Panel B indicates 
that firms with more independent directors and with higher levels 
of leverage (p<0.05), and are audited by Big4 auditing firms 
(p<0.01) have higher levels of compliance with the mandatory 
disclosures in AASB 6 and AASB 136. 
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Table 6.6: Partitioning by Level of Board Independence 
 Prediction 
Level of Board Independence 
PANEL B 
Less Board Independence 
PANEL A 
More Board Independence 
Beta t-Statistic Beta t-Statistic 
Constant  1.093 4.060+ 0.745 5.447+ 
Aud_Idp - 0.006 0.079 -0.092 -2.615* 
Specialist + 0.027 0.598 0.006 0.227 
FirmSize + -0.027 -1.575*** -0.001 -0.165 
Leverage +/- -0.062 -0.643 0.088 1.878** 
Profitability + 0.015 0.380 -0.019 -0.838 
Big4 + 0.077 2.230** 0.058 3.060* 
Age +/- 0.002 0.940 -0.001 -0.910 
Liquidity +/- -0.001 -0.419 0.000 0.400 
Duality - 0.049 1.503*** 0.019 0.982 
OwnCon +/- 0.110 1.362*** 0.042 0.934 
Adjusted R2  0.073 0.129 
F-Statistic  1.533 3.043 
Prob. (F)  P<0.150 P<0.003 
No. of 
Firms 
 69 139 
This table presents the results of regression models that examine the relationship 
between the level of compliance with AASB 6 & AASB 136 and independent variables for 
the full sample. 
*   Significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
**  Significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
*** Significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed) 
+   Significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed) 
++  Significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed) 
+++ Significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed) 
The dependent variable DCI is the level of compliance with AASB 6 and AASB 136, 
calculated as a ratio of deemed compliance over total applicable mandated disclosure 
items; Aud_Idp is the ratio of non-audit fees to total audit fees; Specialist is a dummy 
variable, represents firms that are audited by a specialist auditor which measured by the 
top 20% of industry share; FirmSize is measured by the natural log of total assets; 
Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to equity; Profitability is the ratio of the earnings 
before tax to equity; Big4 is a dummy variable represents being audited by one of the 
Big4 accounting firms; Age is measured by the number of years since listing; Liquidity is 
current assets divided by current liabilities; Brd_Idp is the ratio of independent director to 
total board of directors; Duality is a dummy variable, coded 1 if the board of directors is 
chaired by its CEO; OwnCon is the proportion of shares owned by the top 20 
shareholders. 
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6.4.5  Duality of Management 
This last section of the sub-sample test is to investigate if a 
chairman of board of directors led by the CEO impacts on the 
association between auditor independence and audit specialisation 
and magnitude of compliance with AASB 6 and AASB 136. The 
pooled-sample is sub-grouped by firms that have a CEO (Panel A) 
and a non-CEO (Panel B) as the chairman of the board of directors.  
 
Table 6.7 indicates that regression models for the both Panel A and 
Panel B have significant F-value (p<0.01). Both Panel A (p<0.05) 
and Panel B (p<0.10) document the coefficient on Aud_Idp is 
significant and positive. The result shows that regardless of 
whether the firm‘s board of directors is chaired by the CEO (Panel 
A: Duality) or not (Panel B: NonDuality), the higher the level of 
economic bonding between auditor firms with the clients (proxies 
by non-audit ratio) generates lower levels of compliance with AASB 
6 and AASB 136. This demonstrates that such economic bonding 
gives rise to the detriment of auditor independence.  
 
In contrast, Panel A and Panel B in Table 6.7 show the coefficient 
on Specialist is insignificant. This implies disregarding to firms that 
are audited by an industry specialist or not, it seems not having an 
influence on the magnitudes of compliance with the AASB 6 and 
AASB 136. 
 
Examining the control variables, Table 6.7 Panel A shows Duality 
firms that are smaller in size (p<0.05), less profitable (p<0.05), 
audited by Big4 (p<0.01), more liquid (p<0.10), and have a higher 
proportion of company shares owned by top 20 shareholders, have 
a higher level of compliance with the mandatory disclosures of 
AASB 6 and AASB 136. In contrast, for NonDuality firms‘ results 
shown in Table 6.7 Panel B, suggest those audited by Big4 auditing 
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firms (p<0.01) and have more independent directors on the board 
(p<0.05) have higher magnitudes of compliance with AASB 6 and 
AASB 136. 
 
Table 6.7: Partitioning by Duality 
 Prediction 
Duality 
PANEL A 
Duality Firms 
PANEL B 
NonDuality Firms 
Beta t-Statistic Beta t-Statistic 
Constant  1.027 4.242+ 0.764 5.360+ 
Aud_Idp - -0.099 -1.863** -0.055 -1.472*** 
Specialist + -0.060 -1.270 0.028 1.164 
FirmSize + -0.027 -1.882** -0.004 -0.469 
Leverage +/- 0.082 0.992 0.053 1.102 
Profitability + -0.118 -2.692* -0.006 -0.282 
Big4 + 0.122 3.890* 0.049 2.580* 
Age +/- 0.002 1.429*** -0.001 -0.790 
Liquidity +/- 0.002 1.602*** 0.000 -0.165 
Brd_Idp + -0.037 -0.536 0.072 1.663** 
OwnCon +/- 0.174 2.478* 0.011 0.243 
Adjusted R2  0.514 0.070 
F-Statistic  5.013 2.258 
Prob. (F)  P<0.000 P<0.017 
No. of 
Firms 
 39 169 
This table presents the results of regression models that examine the relationship 
between the level of compliance with AASB 6 & AASB 136 and independent variables for 
the full sample. 
*   Significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed) 
**  Significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
*** Significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed) 
+   Significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed) 
++  Significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed) 
+++ Significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed) 
The dependent variable DCI is the level of compliance with AASB 6 and AASB 136, 
calculated as a ratio of deemed compliance over total applicable mandated disclosure 
items; Aud_Idp is the ratio of non-audit fees to total audit fees; Specialist is a dummy 
variable, represents firms that are audited by a specialist auditor which measured by the 
top 20% of industry share; FirmSize is measured by the natural log of total assets; 
Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to equity; Profitability is the ratio of the earnings 
before tax to equity; Big4 is a dummy variable represents being audited by one of the 
Big4 accounting firms; Age is measured by the number of years since listing; Liquidity is 
current assets divided by current liabilities; Brd_Idp is the ratio of independent director to 
total board of directors; Duality is a dummy variable, coded 1 if the board of directors is 
chaired by its CEO; OwnCon is the proportion of shares owned by the top 20 
shareholders. 
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6.5 Further Robustness/Sensitivity Tests Conducted 
The primary purpose of this chapter has been to describe and detail 
the main robustness and sensitivity tests conducted to determine 
the validity of the main results reported in Chapter 5. The results 
detailed in this chapter should not be perceived as an exhaustive 
list of all robustness and sensitivity tests conducted. Rather, the 
results tests provided a snapshot of all robustness and sensitivity 
tests undertaken. Results presented in detail are deemed the most 
relevant, justifiable and complete amongst all robustness and 
sensitivity tests performed. 
 
Whilst prior disclosure research infers a multitude of factors 
(including those associated with firm characteristics and corporate 
governance) can influence disclosure practices and patterns, it is 
impractical to consider all within the context of this study. 
Independent and control variables included in this study were 
selected based on deemed relevance, prior theoretical and 
empirical support, and availability of data. Nonetheless, additional 
robustness and sensitivity tests (above those detailed in Chapter 6) 
involving the inclusion of extra omitted variable were conducted. 
For example, studies in the past decade have increasingly used 
growth as a determinant (or control variable) associated with 
various financial accounting issues (e.g., earnings management, 
disclosure). Data necessary for calculating a proxy for growth was 
collected in addition to information for the study‘s main variables. 
Regression analysis detailed in Chapter 5 was performed again. 
The additional tests yield findings highly similar to the main results. 
Further examination also indicates a high correlation between 
growth and firm size as measured using total assets. The high 
correlation suggests growth may also be used as a proxy for size (a 
results supported by additional (untabulated) tests). As additional 
tests using growth do not yield any significant differences to the 
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main findings (hence, does not yield any further insights above 
that presented) and the correlation with firm size, discussion on 
results related to the inclusion of growth is not formally presented. 
This similarly applies to other omitted variables (e.g., risk, 
complexity, number of subsidiaries) that were included in 
regressions performed again. 
 
Whilst a lack of any differences is one explanation for not 
tabulating and discussing tests performed using various omitted 
variables, another reason is the lack of data. For instance, prior 
research implies corporate governance features (other than those 
examined in this study) may influence disclosure practices. This 
includes audit committees. At the time this study is undertaken, 
only the largest (i.e., Top 300 by market capitalization) were 
required to have a formal audit committee. Consequently, a 
sizeable proportion of firms included in this analysis did not have a 
formal audit committee (or were only in the preliminary stages of 
establishing an audit committee). This presented a major hurdle in 
collecting sufficient and consistent data to perform any valid 
empirical analysis on the potential cross-sectional influences of 
audit committee features such as size, diligence, expertise and 
independence. As tests could only be performed using significantly 
reduced samples, analysis performed to consider the influence of 
audit committee features (and other corporate governance features 
(such as remuneration or nomination committee)) are not formally 
presented due to difficulties in drawing any meaningful 
comparisons with main results. 
 
Finally, in some prior disclosure research utilising an index, 
analysis has been presented using a subset(s) of the full index 
(see, for example, corporate social reporting or intellectual capital 
disclosure research). For the purposes of this study, the results 
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presented (both for the main, and robustness and sensitivity 
analysis) has been based solely on the full index (i.e., the DCI) 
spanning AASB – 6 and AASB – 136. Attempts were made in this 
study to decompose the DCI into relevant subsets for purposes of 
performing additional analysis. However, after a serious review of 
full DCI and the associated standards, it was decided 
decomposition could not be clearly performed and supported. 
Several reasons justify this decision. First, there is no theoretical 
rationale to clearly and combine elements of the disclosure 
requirements of the two standards covered in this study into clear 
and independent subsets. Second, unlike prior research in such 
areas as corporate social responsibility and intellectual capital, 
there is no prior empirical research providing guidance or a clear 
track record of subsets pertinent to this study. Third, there is a lack 
of justification to infer specific disclosure requirements in the AASB 
– 6 and AASB – 136 are more or less important than another. 
Hence, dividing the disclosures in subsets in an arbitrary manner 
may exclude requirements perceived by users and/or preparers to 
be of higher significance than those included in the subset leading 
to potentially misleading findings. Finally, given the disclosure 
pattern of each firm across the various disclosure items, it is felt 
that decomposition into subsets using an arbitrary approach would 
likely produce results difficult to interpret and compare relative to 
the main findings.59   
 
                                                     
59
 Though it is stated that analysis of a decomposed DCI is not formally presented for various reasons, 
exploratory analysis was performed using subsets of the main measurement index. Whilst the 
subsequent analysis did provide findings worthy of consideration, the lack of theoretical and empirical 
background underpinning decomposition of items into the subset made interpretation of the results 
meaningless and any implications highly questionable. As the presentation of such findings is likely to 
provide confusing results with an untenable basis for interpretation relative to the main results, it is 
decided to exclude these from the thesis so as not to distract from the study’s primary focus and 
objectives.  
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6.6 Chapter Summary 
To test the validity of the findings of the primary model 
documented in Table 5.10, this study tests several alternative 
proxies for the independent variables, namely auditor 
independence and audit specialisation. The main alternative proxies 
for audit independence are log audit fees, log non-audit fees, and 
log total fees. In addition, the percentile rank of audit fees and 
non-audit fees, and total fees are employed as alternate proxies for 
auditor independence. The results of tests using alternative 
measures confirm the results of the primary model. The results 
show that the findings are robust and insensitive to definitions 
employed. This supports the argument that the economic bonding 
between clients and auditors as a result of non-audit services 
provided, gives rise to lower level of compliance with AASB 6 and 
AASB 136. Hence, the results further imply that such economic 
dependence does influence auditor independence. 
 
Similarly, six alternatives measures are utilised to proxy for audit 
specialisation. These include employing different arbitrary threshold 
cut-off rates of industry market share. Furthermore, a ranking 
system of top one, two, three are adopted. Finally, a continuous 
ranking is utilised as an alternative proxy for audit specialisation. 
Results of tests using the alternative proxies also confirm the main 
findings presented in Table 5.10. The additional robustness tests 
again fail to lend support to the argument that firms audited by an 
industry specialist have a higher level of compliance with AASB 6 
and AASB 136.  
  
Further robustness tests are performed by partitioning the pooled 
sample into few sub-samples based on firm size, client firm 
performance, Big4 auditors, board independence and duality. 
Results show the auditor type influence independence when 
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supplying non-audit services to large clients (in term of size), poor 
performing firms, firms with more independent directors on board, 
and firms regardless of whether board of directors is led by the 
CEO. This implies the economic bonding between auditor and client 
has an influence on the levels of compliance with mandatory 
disclosures in AASB 6 and AASB 136. In contrast, results show 
coefficients on Specialist (audit specialisation) in different 
partitioned sub-samples are insignificant.  
 
Overall, the findings in the above sensitivity tests confirm the key 
findings of Chapter 5. The findings documented from the main 
model are robust and the results are not driven by different 
measures. 
 
In the final chapter, results, implications, and limitations are 
discussed. Future research possibilities and how this study could be 
extended are set out in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 7 CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 Summary of the Study 
Agency theory suggests that it is in the interest of management to 
engage an external audit to express an independent opinion on the 
company financial statement, as well as to provide monitoring and 
verification of the management‘s actions (Firth, 1997a). In doing 
so, it reduces agency costs. The lack of a credible external ―audit 
will likely increase the cost of capital, restrict access to capital, and 
impose severe restrictions on management‘s actions‖ (Firth, 
1997a, p. 7). This statement implies that auditing adds value to 
the quality of financial statements and derives value from its role in 
reducing agency costs and information asymmetries between 
corporate management and owners. It is achieved by providing 
external verification of the reliability of the firm‘s financial 
statements (Leftwich, 1980; Ferguson et al., 2003; Almer, 
Gramling and Kaplan, 2008) and the effectiveness of the external 
monitoring by the audit firm, which in turn, depends on its audit 
quality (DeAngelo, 1981a, 1981b). 
 
As articulated in Chapter 1, the main objective of this thesis is two-
fold: (1) to investigate the magnitude of compliance with AASB 6 
Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources and AASB 136 
Impairment of Assets; and (2) to examine the influence of audit 
quality on this level of compliance. Audit quality, as discussed 
throughout this thesis, is a function of auditor independence and 
technical competence (audit specialisation) (Maines, 2001; 
Houghton and Jubb, 2002). Utilising the tenets of agency theory, 
the following two key hypotheses are tested: 
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H1: There is a positive association between the level of 
auditor independence and the firm’s level of 
compliance with mandatory disclosures of AASB 6 
and AASB 136. 
 
H2: There is a positive association between auditor 
specialisation and the firm’s level of compliance 
with mandatory disclosures of AASB 6 and AASB 
136. 
 
Using virtually the whole population of 305 Australian mineral 
resource firms listed on the ASX the level of compliance is assessed 
against a 62-item disclosure compliance index. Firth (2002) 
contends that independence in fact (actual independence) is 
generally unobservable; therefore, independence in appearance 
assumes prime importance (Beattie and Fearnley, 2002). 
Furthermore, appearance is perceived as representative of actual 
independence (Olazabal and Almer, 2001; Joshi et al., 2007). 
Maines (2001) claims that auditors‘ competence is linked to task-
specific knowledge of the auditors‘ expertise. Past research has 
mostly used auditors‘ industry specialisation (such as: Craswell et 
al., 1995, Solomon et al., 1999; Zhou and Elder, 2002; Balsam et 
al., 2003; Krishnan, 2003a) as a proxy for auditors‘ technical 
competence. Hence, this thesis defines auditor independence as 
independence in appearance and audit specialisation as auditor 
industry specialisation (see Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion). 
 
This chapter summary is organised as follow. Section 7.2 discusses 
the findings and the implications are presented in Section 7.3. 
Future research possibilities are set out in Section 7.4. Last but not 
least, concluding remarks are presented in Section 7.5. 
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7.2 Discussion and Analysis of Results 
This section summarises the results documented in testing of the 
two key hypotheses stated in the preceding section and discusses 
its implication. This thesis examines the relationship between two 
auditor quality characteristics, namely auditor independence and 
audit specialisation, and the magnitude of compliance with the 
mandatory disclosures AASB 6 Exploration for and Evaluation of 
Mineral Resources and 136 Impairment of Assets.  
 
7.2.1  Magnitude of Compliance 
A Disclosure Compliance Index (DCI) is constructed to measure for 
corporate compliance with mandatory disclosures in AASB 6 and 
AASB 136. The DCI checklist consists of 62 information items that 
are required to be disclosed by AASBs 6 and 136. In this study, 
each item of the required disclosure of AASBs 6 and 136 is equally 
weighted (see Chapter 4 for more detail and defence of the 
construction of the dependent variable).  
 
As shown in Table 5.2, on average there is 76% compliance rate 
with AASB 6 and AASB 136 by Australian mineral resources listed 
firms. Stated differently, there is a non-compliance rate of 24%. 
This could be seen as surprisingly high, given that all 62 items are 
mandatory. Furthermore, no company fully complies with all 
compulsory disclosures of AASB 6 and AASB 136.  
 
The frequency of mandatory compliance varies across items. The 
most complied items are in AASB 6. The top five items that are 
nearly 100% complied with are: (1) disclosure of information that 
identifies and explains the amounts recognised in the financial 
report arising from the exploration for and evaluation of mineral 
resources; (2) disclosure of firm accounting policies for exploration 
and evaluation expenditures; (3) the recognition of exploration and 
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evaluation assets; (4) the amounts arising from the exploration for 
and evaluation of mineral resources; and (5) disclosure of the 
recoverability of the carrying amount of the exploration and 
evaluation assets is dependent on (i) successful development and 
commercial exploitation or (ii) sale of the respective areas of 
interest. The possible explanation for those items to have such high 
compliance may be due to being easily identified and based on 
non-controversial reliable historical cost.  
 
In contrast, the item with the highest level of non-compliance 
related to AASB 136 is item 20 of the DCI (see Table 4.2 for a 
complete list of the items). Item 20 requires firms to disclose the 
amount of reversals of impairment losses recognised in the profit 
or loss, and directly in equity during the period.  
  
A possible explanation for the most compliance items of AASB 6 is 
that the required disclosures are simpler in comparison to AASB 
136 which requires firms to provide more proprietary information 
and more complicated disclosures. For example, (i) disclosure on 
the basis used to determine fair value less costs to sell (such as 
whether fair value was determined by reference to an active 
market), and (2) if the recoverable amount is based on value in 
use, firms are required to disclose the discount rates used in the 
current estimate and previous estimate of value in use. Such 
information requires justification and is controversial on 
benchmarks adopted. 
 
7.2.2  Compliance and Auditor Independence 
The statistical results of the association between auditor 
independence and the extent of compliance with mandatory 
disclosures are consistent and statistically significant in both the 
core model (see Table 5.10) and robustness tests (see Table 6.1). 
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The findings of the core model show a significant (p<0.05) 
association between the magnitude of compliance with mandatory 
disclosures and NonAuditRatio (non-audit fees to total fees). The 
negative coefficient on NonAuditRatio (Auditor Independence) 
reveals that the higher the non-audit ratio (i.e., the higher non-
audit fees to total revenue) the lower the level of compliance 
achieved by clients/companies. This suggests that in the Australian 
mineral resources sector context, non-audit services rendered to 
clients seems to cause detriment to auditor independence. In turn, 
this influences the levels of compliance with the mandatory 
disclosures in AASB 6 and AASB 136. The significant negative 
association is even stronger when auditor independence is 
alternatively proxies by LogAuditFees and LogTotalFees (p<0.01). 
The findings have been consistent in a series of robustness test 
(see Table 6.1) for auditor independence (LogNonAuditFees, 
RankAuditFees, RankNonAuditFees, and RankTotalFees), the 
documented evidence shows a statistically significant negative 
association (p < 0.05). Furthermore, when the regression is run in 
isolation of the relationship between level of compliance with 
mandatory disclosures and auditor independence (see Table 5.10, 
Panel A), the coefficient on NonAuditRatio has consistently shown a 
significant negative relationship (p < 0.05) between the level of 
compliance and auditor independence. 
 
Consistent with this dissertation‘s H1 hypothesis the findings 
provide strong and consistent evidence. The overall evidence 
documented in the main tests and subsequent robustness tests 
consistently show that the presence of non-audit services rendered 
by an incumbent auditor to its clients in the form of paying large 
non-audit fees, seems to hamper the auditor independence. 
Therefore auditors play a significant role in conducting an effective 
audit which, thereby, increases the level of compliance with 
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mandated disclosures of AASB 6 and AASB 136. Given the above 
findings, H1 is fully supported. 
 
The perception of auditor independence being affected with the 
increasing of non-audit fees is in line with past studies reported in 
the U.S. evidence by Frankel et al., (2002), U.K. findings of 
Ferguson et al., (2004) and Denmark studies by Quick and 
Warming-Rasmussen (2005)60.  
 
The feasible explanation for the significant relationship between the 
level of compliance with mandatory disclosures (AASB and AASB 
136) and auditor independence may be because of the competitive 
environment of the audit market (Chaney, Jeter, and Shaw, 2003). 
Given increasing competitiveness in the market for audit services, 
it is more likely for the auditors to jeopardise their independence in 
order to retain particularly large or profitable audit clients (Chaney 
et al., 2003). Consequently, it potentially causes detriment to the 
audit quality by allowing non-disclosure of mandatory requirements 
by audit clients. 
 
Another plausible reason for auditors to compromise their 
independence is that incumbent auditors are operating in a low 
litigation environment such as Australia (Lee et al., 2003), thereby, 
the incumbent auditors are willing to accommodate to clients‘ non-
compliance with the mandatory disclosures as to retain and 
maintain their client base. The weaker enforcement environment in 
Australia compared to other developed countries such as the U.S. 
                                                     
60 One point to note is that even though this thesis results are aligned with past studies, 
Frankel el al. (2002) among others, one point to note is the characteristics of non-audit 
fees in the Australian capital market is fundamentally different from those in the U.S. 
capital market (i.e., data employed in Frankel et al., (2002)). For instance, the provision 
of non-audit fees is 26% of Australian audit firm‘s total fee and only 46% of the sample 
firms that engage non-audit services from their incumbent auditors. In contrast to the 
U.S. counterparts that have 95% of the sample firms that engage non-audit services from 
their incumbent auditors. 
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(Francis et al., 2005) appears to contribute a conductive 
environment for aggressive non-disclosures of mandatory 
requirements of AASB 6 and AASB 136. 
 
7.2.3  Compliance and Audit Specialisation 
The statistical results of the association between audit 
specialisation and the extent of compliance with mandatory 
disclosures are consistent and insignificant in both the core model 
(see Table 5.10) and robustness tests61 (see Table 6.2). This 
implies that in the context of Australian mineral resources sector, 
firms that engage a specialist auditor do not necessarily achieve a 
result of a higher quality of financial statements which in this case 
is higher magnitudes of compliance with mandatory disclosures of 
AASB 6 and AASB 136. 
 
The absence of a statistically significant relationship between audit 
specialisation and the level of compliance suggests that there is 
insufficient evidence to support the proposed hypothesis that firms 
which engage specialist auditor services result in a higher level of 
compliance. Thereby, H2 is not supported. 
 
This finding is in line with evidence reported in Chen et al., (2005) 
who fail to support the notion that industry specialist auditors fetch 
higher audit quality. There are many possible explanations why 
industry specialisation is not an important element in audit quality 
in the Australian context. One possible reason is that the Australian 
audit market is comparatively smaller than the U.S. The relatively 
small proportion 12% (37 out of 305 firms) of Australian mineral 
resources firms audited by industry specialist auditors is in stark 
contrast to other country audit environments. For instance, 86% in 
                                                     
61 With the exception of robustness test when Audit Specialisation is proxied by 
MarketShare>1% and TopThreeAuditors that results in a negative association. Consistent 
with the main test analysis, the association has a statistically insignificant coefficient. 
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Singapore (Rusmin, 2006) and approximately 85% in the U.S. 
(Mayhew and Wilkins, 2003; Francis et al., 2005). 
 
Another possible reason for the non-significant finding is the size 
composition of Australian mineral resource firms with a high 
percentage of smaller firms, (see Table 5.4, average of AUD 
$325,274) with a few extremely large firms (AUS 
$65,311,449,000). Smaller firms may require more personalised 
relationships; hence prefer to be audited by relatively small 
accounting firms which have a small client base (Mayhew and 
Wilkins, 2003). Furthermore, industry specialist auditors command 
higher audit fees than non-specialist auditors (Ferguson et al., 
2003; Francis et al., 2005). Large firms are more economically 
important to the incumbent auditors, thereby, they may well have 
greater influence/bargaining power over the auditing firms. 
Consequently, auditors have an increased capacity to detect non-
compliance with mandatory disclosures reported by small firms 
than those of large ones. This notion has been put forward by 
Carcello and Nagy (2004) who find a negative relationship between 
clients‘ financial fraud and industry specialist auditors, but such 
association is much weaker for larger clients. 
 
Last but not least, another plausible possible reason is that 
industry specialisation is not well recognised as an important 
element of audit quality relevant to Australian mineral resource 
firms. The reasoning is that the enforcement and litigation of 
auditors is less likely to take place in Australia in contrast to other 
developed countries such as the U.S. (Lee et al., 2003; Francis et 
al., 2005). Hence, the demand for an industry specialist auditor for 
quality differentiated auditing is lower in the Australian capital 
market with more unwillingness to pay the higher audit fees 
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commanded by the specialists (Ferguson and Stokes, 2002; Francis 
et al., 2005). 
 
7.3 Implications of the Study 
Findings of this study have important implications for accounting 
bodies, regulators, investors, enforcement bodies, and other 
interested parties. This thesis focuses on mandatory disclosures 
and calculates only a 76% compliance rate. Taken at face value, 
the 24% non-compliance rate suggests the inadequacy of the 
mechanism in monitoring compliance by enforcement bodies. One 
plausible reason for such inadequacy could be due to a lack of 
professional training and insufficient/non-competitive wages to 
attract highly qualified accountants. Furthermore, there may be a 
lack of commitment from government at a policy level to 
enforcement. Another possible explanation to the 24% non-
compliance rate is that this study utilises first year data after the 
AASB fully adopted the IFRS. Thus, there may be some time lag 
effects before companies and/or accounting firms become better 
acquaintance with the standards and result in a better 
compliance62. However, accounting rules in Australia were 
mandatory long before this time period. 
 
Insights drawn from this study may be of assistance to Australian 
regulators and other policymakers as they consider the costs and 
benefits associated in imposing any regulations on mandatory 
disclosures. Regarding the 24% non-compliance rate, this thesis 
suggests that regulators could pursue one or more of the following 
four courses of actions. 
 
                                                     
62 In order to determine the impact on level of compliance should AASB move to complete 
adoption of the IFRS, a longitudinal study is required to take into consideration of the 
learning curve and time lag that is needed by companies and auditing firms to become 
fully conversance with the new IFRS. 
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First, regulators could conduct further research on the importance 
of each individual item that has non-compliance. Based on such 
findings, regulators could evaluate each disclosure requirement 
carefully from a cost/benefit analysis point of review and possibly 
reduce the current number of mandatory items that have mostly 
not been complied with by most firms and to make those items as 
optional/voluntary. If the non-disclosures of those items seem to 
be not an issue to investors and other key stakeholders, such 
imposed disclosures might be jettisoned as an inappropriate 
additional burden/cost to firms.  
 
Second, the regulators could ‗do nothing‘. That is, regulators may 
determine it is beyond their reach to enforce compliance with the 
disclosure requirements of AASB – 6 and AASB – 136. Regulators, 
therefore, may allow enforcement to work on a quasic lassez-faire 
manner with regulators only being responsible for adjusting the 
meaning, interpretation and items required to be disclosed. This 
implies free markets are the best policy for enforcement and 
determination of required disclosure levels. Such an approach, 
however, would be contrary to the tenets and values espoused by 
regulation theory. In principle, regulation theory charges that 
regulators are a social good with a moral requirement to provide a 
level playing field for all interested actors within the capital market. 
If a regulator fails to act when conditions within the market appear 
to be imbalance (such as when there are low levels of compliance) 
then this could disadvantage certain interested actors. Failure to 
act in such conditions would contradict a regulator‘s moral 
obligation. So whilst the option to ‗do nothing‘ is available to 
regulators, regulation theory that provides some underpinnings for 
this thesis is unlikely to be a valid option.  
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Third, to ensure greater compliance, regulators could enforce the 
investigation and penalisation of any non-compliance with the 
mandatory disclosures via tougher regulations. Under this scenario, 
stronger, vibrant and more actively pursued enforcement is 
necessary to maximise compliance.  
 
Finally, as shown in the findings of this thesis, regulators could 
instead directly intervene in the enforcing of compliance with 
mandatory disclosures. That is, regulators could indirectly improve 
the level of compliance by means of auditor independence. The 
results from this thesis show the level of compliance is significantly 
associated with the extent of compliance. Hence, regulators could 
more closely regulate the non-audit services component to boost 
the magnitude of compliance. 
 
The dissertation‘s results show an insignificant association between 
audit specialisation and the extent of compliance. It could thus be 
suggested that no additional encouragement be made for greater 
engagement of specialist auditors in the mineral resources sector. 
As such engagement may only increase audit fees, hence operating 
costs, to the mineral resources firms with no positive impact on the 
magnitude of compliance with the mandatory disclosures with 
AASB 6 and AASB 136. Conversely, the findings also show there is 
no apparent need for regulation of auditor specialization issues in 
the Australian context. 
 
7.4 Limitations of the Study 
This thesis provides useful insights into the behaviour of mineral 
resource firms with regards to the association between mandatory 
compliance with AASB 6 and AASB 136 and audit quality. However, 
like all other empirical research this study is not without its 
caveats. The following limitations should be noted. 
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First, the sample frame of this research is restricted to firms in the 
mineral resources sector that is listed on the ASX. Findings, 
therefore, should not be aggressively interpreted to be reflective of 
all practices and influences that would be observed with other 
Australian industries, and mineral resource firms operating in other 
domestic/international settings. Second, given the analysis only 
focuses on two AASB standards, caution should be applied if 
extrapolating results to other accounting standards. Third, another 
noted limitation is that this study‘s findings are based on data from 
firms with fiscal year-ends between the periods of 1 July 2005 to 
30 June 2006. Hence, there is a possibility that conclusions drawn 
from this thesis may only be a partial temporal picture. The chosen 
study period is a post study of CLERP 9 enactment. Therefore, 
results cannot retrospectively apply to past findings. Fourth, the 
implications drawn from this research only address the objectivity 
and impartiality of auditor independence in appearance. Therefore, 
issues dealing with auditor independence in fact are beyond the 
scope of this study. Fifth, in testing the hypotheses this thesis 
attempted to include variables that are justified theoretically and 
empirically. In addition, a series of robustness tests are made to 
incorporate the most available and appropriate proxies. However, 
several tested models result in low explanatory power. This lack of 
explanatory power implies that other significant variables may have 
been omitted from the statistical analysis and may still be of 
influence.  
 
Despite these limitations, this thesis makes several important 
contributions. While previous disclosure research primarily focuses 
on voluntary compliance with IAS/IFRS and its association with 
firm level characteristics, this study seems be the first study that 
provides insights on external institutional factor (i.e., auditor 
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independence and audit specialisation) that may influence the 
extent of compliance with mandatory disclosures, in particular in 
the mineral resources sector. Furthermore, most prior research 
applies only limited content analysis on required disclosures Cairn 
(2002) argues that such practices restrict severely on the value of 
the implications drawn. This study documents the methodological 
strengths by including all disclosures by AASB 6 and AASB 136. 
Last but not least, this is the first comprehensive analysis of the 
extent of compliance with AASB 6 and AASB 136 since the 
enactment of CLERP 9 from 1 July 2004 and convergence with IAS 
from 1 January 2005.  
 
7.5 Future Research 
The thesis findings may warrant extension to other settings. For 
instance, the Big-4 and middle tier (e.g., Grant Thornton, BDO) 
accounting firms have decentralised their organisations and now 
are more likely to operate through a network of semi-autonomous 
local practice offices (Narayanan, 1995). These local offices 
contract with clients, administer audit engagements, and issue 
audit reports signed on letterhead of the local office of the 
accounting firm (Francis, 1999; Reynolds and Francis, 2001). This 
implies that each individual accounting firm is unique and drives its 
income at the firm level (hereafter office level). This thesis employs 
a country-level perspective in measuring auditor independence 
(proxies by NAS) which considers an accounting firm‘s practice in 
aggregate (hereafter national level). Therefore, research on the 
impact on gaining or losing a client may be more significant at the 
office level in comparison to the national level (DeFond and Francis, 
2005). Future research could extend this study by breaking down 
NAS earned by accounting firms at the office level. 
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In the aspect of audit specialisation, this thesis adopts industry 
market share at a national level due to the limitation on the 
number of firms within the mineral resources firms. Francis et al., 
(2005) and Ferguson et al., (2006) argue that the quality industry 
specialist auditors are driven by office level clients. Hence, future 
research could extend this study by investigating audit 
specialisation‘s influences on the extent of compliance with 
mandatory disclosures at the office level. 
 
Future research could also address some of the limitations of this 
study. For instance: (1) to extend the study to cross-sectional 
industries; (2) to increase the time frame of study to multi-years; 
(3) to cover more standards; so as to be able to better generalise 
the findings. Finally, future research could explore other proxies for 
auditor independence in fact, such as using the attributes of real 
accounting data. 
 
7.6 Concluding Remarks 
This thesis provides further and more recent evidence on 
mandatory disclosure. It adds to a growing body of research on 
mandatory disclosure, auditor independence and audit 
specialisation. The findings reveal that the level of mandatory 
compliance with AASB 6 and AASB 136, on average, is at the rate 
of 76%. Firms that engage non-audit services from their incumbent 
auditors appear to have their independence affected whereas 
specialist auditors appear not to influence the extent of the 
compliance. 
 
This study focuses on post-Enron data where corporate governance 
and the regulatory environment have gone through considerable 
reforms. This time frame is considered to be a challenging period 
for both auditor and the auditing profession in Australia. This 
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research is conducted based on a relatively new epoch when 
corporate governance and regulation were significantly refined; it 
also utilises on the first year data post-adoption of the IFRS by 
AASB. It provides valuable input for the regulators in evaluating 
the present governance, policies, and new adoption of IFRS with 
respect to auditor independence and audit specialisation.  
 
Finally, given that there is no known prior study on the association 
between the compliance with mandatory disclosures and external 
institutional factor (auditor independence and audit specialization) 
in Australia, this thesis provides a good starting point for future 
research. 
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Appendix A: Key Terms and Concepts 
It is important to have a basic understanding of key terms and 
fundamental concepts that are adopted in this study. This will 
confine the boundaries of this research and will in turn assist the 
readers in their interpretation of the research. 
 
Area of interest: ―an individual geological area which is considered 
to constitute a favourable environment for the presence of a 
mineral deposit or an oil or natural gas field, or has been proved to 
contain such a deposit or field‖ (AASB 6, 2004, p. 20). 
 
Carrying amount: ―the amount at which an asset is recognised 
after deducting any accumulated depreciation (amortisation) and 
accumulated impairment losses thereon‖ (AASB 136, 2004, p. 15). 
 
Cash-Generating Unit (CGU): ―the smallest identifiable group of 
assets that generates cash inflows that are largely independent of 
the cash inflows from other assets or groups of assets‖ (AASB 136, 
2004, p. 15). 
 
Economically recoverable reserves: ―the estimated quantity of 
product in an area of interest that can be expected to be profitably 
extracted, processed and sold under current and foreseeable 
economic conditions‖ (AASB 6, 2004, p. 20). 
 
Exploration for and evaluation expenditures: ―expenditures 
incurred by an entity in connection with the exploration for and 
evaluation of mineral resources before the technical feasibility and 
commercial viability of extracting a mineral resource are 
demonstrable‖ (AASB 6, 2004, p. 20). 
 
Exploration for and evaluation of mineral resources: ―the search for 
mineral resources, including minerals, oil, natural gas and similar 
non-regenerative resources after the entity has obtained legal 
rights to explore in a specific area, as well as the determination of 
the technical feasibility and commercial viability of extracting the 
mineral resources‖ (AASB 6, 2004, p. 20). 
 
Fair value less costs to sell: ―the amount obtainable from the sale 
of an asset or cash-generating unit in an arm‘s length transaction 
between knowledgeable, willing parties, less the costs of disposal‖ 
(AASB 136, 2004, p. 15). 
 
Impairment loss: ―the amount by which the carrying amount of an 
asset or a cash-generating unit exceeds its recoverable amount‖ 
(AASB 136, 2004, p. 15). 
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Recoverable amount of an asset or a CGU: ―the higher of its fair 
value less costs to sell and its value in use‖ (AASB 136, 2004, p. 
15). 
 
Useful life is either: ―the period of time over which an asset is 
expected to be used by the entity‖ or ―the number of production or 
similar units expected to be obtained from the asset by the entity‖ 
(AASB 136, 2004, p. 15). 
 
Value in use: ―the present value of the future cash flows expected 
to be derived from an asset or cash-generating unit‖ (AASB 136, 
2004, p. 16). 
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Appendix B: Partial Extraction from Corporations Act 2001 
Section 300 
Annual directors' report—specific information 
(1) The directors' report for a financial year 
must include details of: (ca) the name of each 
person who: 
(i) is an officer of the company, registered scheme or 
disclosing entity at any time during the year; and 
(ii) was a partner in an audit firm, or a director of an audit 
company, that is an auditor of the company, disclosing 
entity or registered scheme for the year; and 
(iii) was such a partner or director at a time when the audit 
firm or the audit company undertook an audit of the 
company, disclosing entity or registered scheme; and 
Special rules for listed companies 
(11) The report for a listed company must also include the 
following details for each director: 
(a) their relevant interests in shares of the company or a related 
body corporate; 
(b) their relevant interests in debentures of, or interests in 
a registered scheme made available by, the company 
or a related body corporate; 
(c) their rights or options over shares in, debentures of or 
interests in a registered scheme made available by, the 
company or a related body corporate; 
(d) contracts: 
(i) to which the director is a party or under which the 
director is entitled to a benefit; and 
(ii) that confer a right to cal] for or deliver shares in, or 
debentures of or interests in a " registered scheme 
made available by the company or a related body 
corporate; 
(e) all directorships of other listed companies held by the 
director at any time in the 3 years immediately before the end 
of the financial year and the period for which each directorship 
has been held. 
 
Note: Directors must also disclose interests of these kinds to a 
relevant market operator under section 205G as they are 
acquired. 
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(11A) If a registered company auditor plays a significant role 
in the audit of a listed company for the financial year in 
reliance on a declaration made under section 342A, the report 
for the company must also include details of the declaration. 
Listed companies—non-audit services and auditor independence 
(11B) The report for a listed company must also include the 
following in relation to each auditor: 
(a) details of the amounts paid or payable to the auditor for 
non-audit services provided, during the year, by the 
auditor (or by another person or firm on the auditor's 
behalf); 
(b) a statement whether the directors are satisfied that the 
provision of non-audit services, during the year, by the 
auditor (or by another person or firm on the auditor's 
behalf) is compatible with the general standard of 
independence for auditors imposed by this Act; 
(c) a statement of the directors' reasons for being satisfied 
that the provision of those non- audit services, during the 
year, by the auditor (or by another person or firm on the 
auditor's behalf) did not compromise the auditor 
independence requirements of this Act 
These details and statements must be included in the 
directors‘ report under the heading "Non-audit services". If 
consolidated financial statements are required, the details and 
statements must relate to amounts paid or payable to the 
auditor by, and non-audit services provided to, any entity 
(including the company, registered scheme or disclosing 
entity) that is part of the consolidated entity. 
(11C) For the purposes of paragraph (I 1B)(a), the details of 
amounts paid or payable to an auditor for non-audit services 
provided, during the year, by the auditor (or by another 
person or firm on the auditor's behalf) are: 
(a) the name of the auditor; and 
(b) the dollar amount that: 
(i) the listed company; or 
(ii) if consolidated financial statements are required—any 
entity that is part of the consolidated entity; paid, or is 
liable to pay, for each of those non-audit services. 
(11D) The statements under paragraphs (11B)(b) and (c) must be 
made in accordance with: 
(a) advice provided by the listed company's audit committee if 
    206 
the company has an audit committee; or 
(b) a resolution of the directors of the listed company if 
paragraph (a) does not apply. 
(11E) For the purposes of subsection (11D), a statement is 
taken to be made in accordance with advice provided by the 
company's audit committee only if: 
(a) the statement is consistent with that advice and does not 
contain any material omission of material included in that 
advice; and 
(b) the advice is endorsed by a resolution passed by the 
members of the audit committee; and 
(c) the advice is written advice signed by a member of the 
audit committee on behalf of the audit committee and 
given to the directors. 
 
Section 307C 
Auditor's independence declaration  
Contravention by individual auditor  
(1) If an individual auditor conducts: 
(a) an audit of the financial report for a financial year; or 
(b) an audit or review of the financial report for a half-year; 
the individual auditor must give the directors of the company, 
registered scheme or disclosing entity: 
(c) a written declaration that, to the best of the individual 
auditor's knowledge and belief, there have been: 
(i) no contraventions of the auditor independence 
requirements of this Act in relation to the audit or 
review; and 
(ii) no contraventions of any applicable code of professional 
conduct in relation to the audit or review; or 
(d) a written declaration that, to the best of the individual 
auditor's knowledge and belief, the only contraventions of: 
(i) the auditor independence requirements of this Act in 
relation to the audit or review; or 
(ii) any applicable code of professional conduct in relation 
to the audit review; are those contraventions details 
of which are set out in the declaration 
 
(2) An offence based on subsection (I) is an offence of strict liability.  
Note: For strict liability see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code. 
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Contravention by lead auditor 
(3) If an audit firm or audit company conducts: 
(a) an audit of the financial report for a financial year; or 
(b) an audit or review of the financial report for a half-year; 
the lead auditor for the audit must give the directors of the 
company, registered scheme or disclosing entity: 
(c) a written declaration that, to the best of the lead 
auditor's knowledge and belief, there have been: 
(i) no contraventions of the auditor independence 
requirements of this Act in relation to the audit or review; 
and 
(ii) no contraventions of any applicable code of professional 
conduct in relation to the audit or review; or 
(d) a written declaration that, to the best of the lead auditor's 
knowledge and belief, the only contraventions of: 
(i) the auditor independence requirements of this Act in 
relation to the audit or review; or 
(ii) any applicable code of professional conduct in relation to 
the audit or review;  
 are those contraventions details of which are set out in the 
declaration. 
 
Section 308 
Auditor's report on annual financial report 
(1) An auditor who audits the financial report for a financial year 
must report to members on 
whether the auditor is of the opinion that the financial report is 
in accordance with this Act, including: 
(a) section 296 (compliance with accounting standards); and 
(b) section 297 (true and fair view). 
 
Section 324CA 
General requirement for auditor independence—auditors 
Contravention by individual auditor or audit company 
(1) An individual auditor or audit company contravenes this 
subsection if: 
(a) the individual auditor or audit company engages in audit 
activity in relation to an audited body at a particular time; 
and 
    208 
(b) a conflict of interest situation exists in relation to the audited 
body at that time; and 
(c) at that time: 
(i) in the case of an individual auditor—the individual 
auditor is aware that the conflict of interest situation 
exists; or 
(ii) in the case of an audit company—the audit company is 
aware that the conflict of interest situation exists; and 
(d) the individual auditor or audit company does not, as soon as 
possible after the individual auditor or the audit company 
becomes aware that the conflict of interest situation exists, 
take all reasonable steps to ensure that the conflict of 
interest situation ceases to exist. 
Note: For conflict of interest situation, see section 324CD 
Individual auditor or audit company to notify ASIC 
(1A) An individual auditor or audit company contravenes this 
subsection if: 
(a) the individual auditor or audit company is the auditor of an 
audited body; and 
(b) a conflict of interest situation exists in relation to the 
audited body while the individual auditor or audit company 
is the auditor of the audited body; and 
(c) on a particular day (the start day): 
(i) in the case of an individual auditor—the individual 
auditor becomes aware that the conflict of interest 
situation exists; or 
(ii) in the case of an audit company—the audit company 
becomes aware that the conflict of interest situation 
exists; and 
(d) at the end of the period of 7 days from the start day: 
(i) the conflict of interest situation remains in existence; 
and 
(ii) the individual auditor or audit company has not 
informed ASIC in writing that the conflict of interest 
situation exists. 
Note: For conflict of interest situation, see section 324CD. 
(2) An individual auditor or audit company contravenes this 
subsection if: 
(a) the individual auditor or audit company engages in audit 
activity in relation to an audited body at a particular time; 
and 
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(b) a conflict of interest situation exists in relation to the audited 
body at the time; and 
(c) at that time: 
(i) in the case of an individual auditor—the individual 
auditor is not aware that the conflict of interest 
situation exists; or 
(ii) in the case of an audit company—the audit company is 
not aware that the conflict of interest situation exists; 
and 
(d) the individual auditor or the audit company would have 
been aware of the existence of the conflict of interest 
situation at that time if the individual auditor or audit 
company had had in place a quality control system 
reasonably capable of making the individual auditor or audit 
company aware of the existence of such a conflict of interest 
situation. 
Note: For conflict of interest situation, see section 324CD. 
Section 324CB 
General requirement for auditor 
independence—member of audit firm 
Contravention by member of audit firm 
(1) A person (the defendant) contravenes this subsection if 
(a) an audit firm engages in audit activity in relation to an 
audited body at a particular time; and 
(b) a conflict of interest situation exists in relation to the audited 
body at that time; and 
(c) the defendant is a member of the audit firm at that time; 
and 
(d) the defendant is or becomes aware of the circumstances 
referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b); and 
(e) the defendant does not, as soon as possible after the 
defendant becomes aware of those circumstances, take 
reasonable steps to ensure that the conflict of interest 
situation ceases to exist. 
Note: For conflict of interest situation, see section 324CD.  
Member of audit firm to notify ASIC 
(1A) A person (the defendant) contravenes this subsection if 
(a) an audit firm is the auditor of an audited body; and 
(b) a conflict of interest situation exists in relation to the 
audited body while the audit firm is the auditor of the 
audited body; and 
(c) the defendant is a member of the audit firm at a time 
when the conflict of interest situation exists; and 
(d) on a particular day (the start day), the defendant becomes 
aware of the circumstances referred to in paragraphs (a) 
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and (b); and 
(e) at the end of the period of 7 days from the start day: 
(i) the conflict of interest situation remains in existence; and 
(ii) ASIC has not been informed in writing by the defendant, 
by another member of the audit firm or by someone else 
on behalf of the audit firm that the conflict of interest 
situation exists. 
Note: For conflict of interest situation, see section 324CD.  
Conflict of interest situation of which members are not aware 
 (4) A person contravenes this subsection if: 
(a) an audit firm engages in audit activity in relation to an 
audited body at a particular time; and 
(b) a conflict of interest situation exists in relation to the audited 
body at the time; and 
(c) the person is a member of the audit firm at that time; and 
(d) at that time none of the members of the audit firm is aware 
that the conflict of interest situation exists; and 
(e) a member of the audit firm would have been aware of the 
existence of the conflict of interest situation if the audit firm 
had in place a quality control system reasonably capable of 
making the audit firm aware of the existence of such a 
conflict of interest situation. 
Note: For conflict of interest situation, see section 324CD. 
 
Section 324CC 
General requirement for auditor independence—
director of audit company Contravention by director 
of audit company 
(1) A person (the defendant) contravenes this subsection if: 
(a) an audit company engages in audit activity in relation to an 
audited body at a particular time; and 
(b) a conflict of interest situation exists in relation to the audited 
body at that time; and 
(c) the defendant is a director of the audit company at that time; 
and 
(d) the defendant is or becomes aware of the circumstances 
referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b); and 
(e) the defendant does not, as soon as possible after the defendant 
becomes aware of those circumstances, take reasonable steps 
to ensure that the conflict of interest situation ceases to exist. 
Note: For conflict of interest situation, see section 324CD.  
Director of audit company to notify ASIC 
(1A) A person (the defendant) contravenes this subsection if: 
(a) an audit company is the auditor of an audited body; and 
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(b) a conflict of interest situation exists in relation to the audited 
body while the audit company is the auditor of the audited 
body; and 
(c) the defendant is a director of the audit company at a time 
when the conflict of interest situation exists; and 
(d) on a particular day (the start day), the defendant becomes 
aware of the circumstances referred to in paragraphs (a) and 
(b); and 
(e) at the end of the period of 7 days from the start day: 
(i) the conflict of interest situation remains in existence; 
and 
(ii) ASIC has not been informed in writing by the defendant, 
by another director of the audit company or by the 
audit company that the conflict of interest situation 
exists. 
Note: For conflict of interest situation, see section 324CD. 
(1B) A person is not excused from informing ASIC under 
subsection (1A) that a conflict of interest situation exists on 
the ground that the information might tend to incriminate 
the person or expose the person to a penalty. 
(1C) However, if the person is a natural person: 
(a) the information; and 
(b) the giving of the information; 
are not admissible in evidence against the person in a 
criminal proceeding, or any other proceeding for the recovery 
of a penalty, other than proceedings for an offence based on 
the information given being false or misleading. 
(1D) If ASIC is given a notice under paragraph (1A)(e), ASIC 
must, as soon as practicable after the notice is received, give a 
copy of the notice to the audited body. 
Conflict of interest situation of which another director of audit 
company aware 
(2) A person contravenes this subsection if: 
(a) an audit company engages in audit activity in relation to 
an audited body at a particular time; and 
(b) a conflict of interest situation exists in relation to the 
audited body at the time; and 
(c) the person is a director of the audit company at that 
time; and 
(d) at that time, another director of the audit company is 
aware that the conflict of interest situation exists; and 
(e) the audit company does not, as soon as possible after 
the director referred to in paragraph (d) becomes 
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aware that the conflict of interest situation exists, take 
all reasonable steps to ensure that the conflict of 
interest situation ceases to exist. 
Note: For conflict of interest situation, see section 324CD. 
(3) For the purposes of an offence based on subsection (2), strict 
liability applies to the physical elements of the offence 
specified in paragraphs (2)(a), (b), (d) and (e). 
Note 1: For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code. 
Note 2: Subsection (6) provides a defence. 
Conflict of interest situation of which directors of audit company not 
aware 
(4) A person contravenes this subsection it 
(a) an audit company engages in audit activity in relation to an 
audited body at a particular time; and 
(b) a conflict of interest situation exists in relation to the 
audited body at the time; and 
(c) the person is a director of the audit company at that time; 
and 
(d) at that time none of the directors of the audit company is 
aware that the conflict of interest situation exists; and 
(e) a director of the audit company would have been aware of 
the existence of the conflict of interest situation if the audit 
company had in place a quality control system reasonably 
capable of making the audit company aware of the 
existence of such a conflict of interest situation. 
Note: For conflict of interest situation, see section 324CD. 
 
Section 324 CD 
Conflict of interest situation 
(1) For the purposes of sections 324CA, 324CB and 324CC, a conflict 
of interest situation exists in relation to an audited body at a particular 
time if, because of circumstances that exist at that time: 
(a) the auditor, or a professional member of the audit team, is not 
capable of exercising objective and impartial judgment in 
relation to the conduct of the audit of the audited body; or 
(b) a reasonable person, with full knowledge of all relevant facts and 
circumstances, would conclude that the auditor, or a professional 
member of the audit team, is not capable of exercising objective 
and impartial judgment in relation to the conduct of the audit of 
the audited body. 
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), have regard to circumstances 
arising from any relationship that exists, has existed, or is likely to 
exist, between: 
(a) the individual auditor; or 
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(b) the audit firm or any current or former member of the firm; or 
(c) the audit company, any current or former director of the audit 
company or any person currently or formerly involved in the 
management of the audit company; 
 
 
Section 324 CE 
Auditor independence—specific requirements for individual 
auditor  
Specific independence requirements for individual auditor 
(1) An individual auditor contravenes this subsection if: 
(a) the individual auditor engages in audit activity at a particular 
time; and 
(b) a relevant item of the table in subsection 324CH(1) applies at 
that time to a person or entity covered by subsection (5) of 
this section; and 
(c) the individual auditor is or becomes aware of the 
circumstances referred to in paragraph (b); and 
(d) the individual auditor does not, as soon as possible after the 
individual auditor becomes aware of those circumstances, take 
all reasonable steps to ensure that the individual auditor does 
not continue to engage in audit activity in those circumstances. 
Individual auditor to not 05) ARC 
(IA) An individual auditor contravenes this subsection if: 
(a) the individual auditor is the auditor of an audited body; and 
(b) a relevant item of the table in subsection 324CH(1) applies to a 
person or entity covered by subsection (5) of this section while 
the individual auditor is the auditor of the audited body; and 
(c) on a particular day (the start day), the individual auditor 
becomes aware of the circumstances referred to in 
paragraph (b); and 
(d) at the end of the period of 7 days from the start day: 
(i) those circumstances remain in existence; and 
(ii) the individual auditor has not informed ASIC in writing of 
those circumstances 
 
Section 324CF 
Auditor independence—specific requirements for audit firm  
Contraventions by members of audit firm 
(1) A person (the defendant) contravenes this subsection if: 
(a) an audit firm engages in audit activity at a particular time; and 
(b) a relevant item of the table in subsection 324CH(1) applies 
at that time to a person or entity covered by subsection (5) 
of this section; and 
(c) the defendant is a member of the audit firm at that time; and 
(d) the defendant is or becomes aware of the circumstances 
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referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b); and 
(e) the defendant does not, as soon as possible after the defendant 
becomes aware of those circumstances, take all reasonable 
steps to ensure that the audit firm does not continue to 
engage in audit activity in those circumstances 
 
Member of audit firm to notify ASIC 
(1A) A person (the defendant) contravenes this subsection if: 
(a) an audit firm is the auditor of an audited body; and 
(b) a relevant item of the table in subsection 324CH(1) applies to a 
person or entity covered by subsection (5) of this section while 
the audit firm is the auditor of the audited body; and 
(c) the defendant is a member of the audit firm at a time when the 
circumstances referred to in paragraph (b) exist; and 
(d) on a particular day (the start day), the defendant becomes 
aware of the circumstances referred to in paragraphs (a) and 
(b); and 
(e) at the end of the period of 7 days from the start day: 
(i) the circumstances referred to in paragraph (b) remain in 
existence; and 
(ii) ASIC has not been informed in writing of those circumstances 
by the defendant, by another member of the audit firm or by 
someone else on behalf of the audit firm 
 
Section 324CG 
Auditor independence—specific requirements for audit 
company  
Specific independence requirements for audit company 
(1) An audit company contravenes this subsection if: 
(a) the audit company engages in audit activity at a particular 
time; and 
(b) a relevant item of the table in subsection 324CH(1) applies at 
that time to a person or entity covered by subsection (9) of 
this section; and 
(c) the audit company is or becomes aware of the circumstances 
referred to in paragraph (b); and 
(d) the audit company does not, as soon as possible after the audit 
company becomes aware of those circumstances, take all 
reasonable steps to ensure that the audit company does not 
continue to engage in audit activity in those circumstances. 
Audit company to notify ASIC 
(IA) An audit company contravenes this subsection if: 
(a) the audit company is the auditor of an audited body; and 
(b) a relevant item of the table in subsection 324CH(1) applies to 
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a person or entity covered by subsection (9) of this section 
while the audit company is the auditor of the audited body ; 
and  
(c) on a particular day (the start day), the audit company 
becomes aware of the circumstances referred to in 
paragraph (b); and 
(d) at the end of the period of 7 days from the start day: 
(i) those circumstances remain in existence; and 
(ii) the audit company has not informed ASIC in writing of those 
circumstances. 
Note: If the audited body is a public company or a registered scheme 
and the notice under this subsection is not followed up by a notice 
under subsection 327B(2C) (public company) or 331AAA(2C) 
(registered scheme) within the period of 21 days from the day the 
notice under this subsection is given, the audit appointment will be 
terminated at the end of that period. 
 
(1B) If the audit company gives ASIC a notice under paragraph (1A)(d), 
ASIC must, as soon as practicable after the notice has been received, 
give a copy of the notice to the audited body 
 
Strict liability contravention of specific independence requirements by 
audit company 
(2) An audit company contravenes this subsection if: 
(a) the audit company engages in audit activity at a particular time; 
and 
(b) a relevant item of the table in subsection 324CH(1) applies 
at that time to a person or entity covered by subsection (9) 
of this section. 
(3) For the purposes of an offence based on subsection (2), strict 
liability applies to the physical elements of the offence specified 
in paragraph (2)(b). 
Note: For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code 
 
Section 324CH 
Relevant relationships 
(1) The following table lists the relationships between: 
(a) a person or a firm; and 
(b) the audited body for an audit; 
 
Section 324CI 
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Special rule for retiring partners of audit firms and retiring 
directors of authorised audit companies 
A person contravenes this section if: 
(a) the person ceases to be: 
(i) a member of an audit firm; or 
(ii) a director of an audit company; 
at a particular time (the departure time); and 
(b) at any time before the departure time, the audit firm or audit 
company has engaged in an audit of an audited body; and 
(c) the person was a professional member of the audit team for the 
audit; and 
(d) within the period of 2 years starting at the departure time, the 
person becomes, or continues to be, an officer of the audited 
body; and 
(e) the audited body is not a small proprietary company for the 
most recently ended financial year. 
If the audited body is a listed entity (other than a registered scheme), 
apply paragraph (d) as if references in that paragraph to the audited 
body included references to a related body corporate of the audited 
body. 
 
Section 324CJ 
Special rule for retiring professional member of audit 
company  
A person contravenes this section if: 
(a) the person who is not a director of an audit company ceases 
to be a professional employee of the audit company at a 
particular time (the departure time); and 
(b) at any time before the departure time, the audit company has 
engaged in an audit of an audited body; and 
(c) the person was a lead auditor or review auditor for the audit; 
and 
(d) within the period of 2 years starting at the departure time, the 
person becomes, or continues to be, an officer of the audited 
body; and 
(e) the audited body is not a small proprietary company for the 
most recently ended financial year . 
If the audited body is a listed entity (other than a registered 
scheme), apply paragraph (d) as if references in that paragraph 
to the audited body included references to a related body 
corporate of the audited body 
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Section 324CK 
Multiple former audit firm partners or audit company 
directors 
A person contravenes this section if 
(a) an audit firm, or audit company, is an auditor of an audited body 
for a financial year; and 
(b) the person has at any time been a member of the audit firm or 
a director of the audit company; and 
(c) the person becomes an officer of the audited body; and 
(d) at the time when paragraph (c) is satisfied another person who 
is or who also has at any time been a member of the audit firm, 
or a director of the audit company, at a time when the audit 
firm, or audit company, undertook an audit of the audited body 
is also an officer of the audited body; and 
(e) the audited body is not a small proprietary company for the 
most recently ended financial year. 
If the audited body is a listed entity (other than a registered 
scheme), apply paragraphs (c) and (d) as if references in those 
paragraphs to the audited body included references to a related 
body corporate of the audited body. 
 
Section 324DA 
Limited term for eligibility to play significant role in audit 
of a listed company or listed registered scheme 
(1) If an individual plays a significant role in the audit of a listed 
company or listed registered scheme for 5 successive financial 
years (the extended audit involvement period), the individual is 
not eligible to play a significant role in the audit of the company or 
the scheme for a later financial year (the subsequent financial 
year) unless: 
(a) the individual has not played a significant role in the audit 
of the company or the scheme for at least 2 successive 
financial years (the intervening financial years); and 
(b) the intervening financial years: 
(i) commence after the end of the extended audit involvement 
period; and 
(ii) end before the beginning of the subsequent financial year. 
Note: Play a significant role in an audit is 
defined in section 9 
(2) An individual is not eligible to play a significant role in the audit of a 
listed company or listed registered scheme for a financial year if, 
were the individual to do so, the individual would play a significant 
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role in the audit of the company or scheme for more than 5 out of 7 
successive financial years. 
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), disregard an individual's 
playing of a significant role in the audit of a company or scheme 
for a financial year if: 
(a) ASIC makes a declaration under paragraph 342A(1)(a) in 
relation to the individual; and 
(b) because of the declaration, subsection (1) of this section does 
not operate to make the individual not eligible to play a 
significant role in the audit of the company or scheme for 
that financial year. 
 
Section 324DB 
Individual's rotation obligation 
An individual contravenes this section if the individual: 
(a) plays a significant role in the audit of a listed company or 
listed registered scheme for a financial year; and 
(b) is not eligible to play that role 
 
Section 324DC 
Audit firm's rotation obligation 
Contraventions by members of audit firm 
(1) A person (the defendant) contravenes this subsection if: 
(a) an audit firm consents to act as a listed company's or listed 
registered scheme's auditor for a financial year; and 
(b) an individual acts, on behalf of the firm, as a lead or review 
auditor in relation to the audit of the company's or scheme's 
financial report for that financial year; and 
(c) the individual is not eligible to play a significant role in the 
audit of the company or scheme for that financial year; 
and 
(d) the defendant is a member of the firm; and 
(e) the defendant is not the individual and is or becomes 
aware that the individual is not eligible to play that role; 
and 
(f) the defendant fails to take the necessary steps, as soon as 
possible after the defendant becomes aware that the 
individual is not eligible to play that role, either: 
(i) to ensure that the audit firm resigns as auditor of the 
company or scheme; or 
(ii) to ensure that the individual ceases to act, on behalf of 
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the audit firm, as a lead or review auditor in relation to 
the audit of the company or scheme for that financial 
year. 
(2) A person (the defendant) contravenes this subsection if 
(a) an audit firm consents to act as a listed company's or listed 
registered scheme's auditor for a financial year; and 
(b) an individual acts, on behalf of the firm, as a Lead or review 
auditor in relation to the audit of the company's or scheme's 
financial report for that financial year; and 
(c) the individual is not eligible to play a significant role in the 
audit of the company or scheme for that financial year; 
and 
(d) the defendant is a member of the firm 
 
Section 324DD 
Audit company's rotation obligation 
Contravention by audit company 
(1) An audit company contravenes this subsection if: 
(a) the audit company consents to act as a listed company's 
or listed registered scheme's auditor for a financial year; 
and 
(b) an individual acts, on behalf of the audit company, as a lead 
or review auditor in relation to the audit of the company's 
or scheme's financial report for that financial year; and 
(c) the individual is not eligible to play a significant role in the 
audit of the company or scheme for that financial year; 
and 
(d) a director of the audit company (other than the individual) 
is aware that the individual is not eligible to play that role; 
and 
(e) the audit company fails to take the necessary steps, as soon 
as possible after the director becomes aware that the 
individual is not eligible to play that role, either: 
(1) to resign as auditor of the company or scheme; or 
(ii) to ensure that the individual ceases to act, on behalf of 
the audit company, as a lead or review auditor in relation 
to the audit of the company or scheme for that financial 
year. 
Contraventions by directors of audit company 
(2) A person (the defendant) contravenes this subsection if: 
(a) an audit company consents to act as a listed company's or 
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listed registered scheme's auditor for a financial year; and 
(b) an individual acts, on behalf of the audit company, as a lead 
or review auditor in relation to the audit of the company's or 
scheme's financial report for that financial year; and 
(c) the individual is not eligible to play a significant role in the 
audit of the company or scheme for that financial year; 
and 
(d) the defendant is a director of the audit company; and 
(e) the defendant is not the individual and is or becomes 
aware that the individual is not eligible to play that role; 
and 
(f) the defendant fails to take the necessary steps, as 
soon as possible after the defendant becomes aware 
that the individual is not eligible to play that role, 
either: 
(i) to ensure that the audit company resigns as auditor of the 
company or scheme; or 
(ii) to ensure that the individual ceases to act, on behalf of the 
audit company, as a lead or review auditor in relation to 
the audit of the company or scheme for that financial year. 
(3) A person (the defendant) contravenes this subsection if 
(a) an audit company consents to act as a listed company's or 
listed registered scheme's auditor for a financial year; 
and 
(b) an individual acts, on behalf of the audit company, as a lead 
or review auditor in relation to the audit of the company's 
or scheme's financial report for that financial year; and 
(c) the individual is not eligible to play a significant role in the 
audit of the company or scheme for that financial year; and 
(d) the defendant is a director of the audit company. 
 
Source: Adopted from Rusmin (2006) and Scaleplus (2004) 
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Appendix C: CLERP 9 – Audit Reform63 
II. Directors‘ report disclosures: 
 Disclosure of officers who are former auditors (applies to directors‘ 
report for the current financial year) 
 Non-audit services (applies to an auditor of a financial report for a 
financial year if the financial year begins on or after 1 July 2004) 
 Auditor‘s independence declaration (applies to an auditor of a financial 
report for a financial year if the financial year begins on or after 1 July 
2004) 
 
The director‘s report for disclosing entities must include: 
 Former auditors: the name of each officer of the disclosing entity during 
financial year who: 
 Was formerly a partner or director of an audit firm or audit 
company that is currently the disclosing entity‘s auditor; and 
 Was a partner or director a t a time when the audit firm or audit 
company conducted an audit of the disclosing entity (section 
300(1)(ca)). This information is required for current financial 
years, as there is no transitional provision 
 
 Non-audit services: for listed companies, disclosure of non-audit 
services in a section of the directors‘ report headed ‗Non-audit 
Services‘. Both the board and the audit committee have a role to play in 
preparing the non-audit disclosure. The Non-Audit Services section of 
the directors‘ report must include: 
 Details of the amount paid or payable to the auditor for non-audit 
services provided by, or on behalf of, the auditor during the year 
(including the names of the auditor and the dollar amount that the 
listed company paid, or must pay, for each of the non-audit 
services (section 300(11B)(a) and (11C); 
 A statement whether the directors are satisfied that the provision 
of non-audit services by the auditor during the year is compatible 
with the general standard of independence of auditors imposed by 
the Corporations Act (section 300(11B)(b)); and  
 A statement of the directors‘ reasons for being satisfied that the 
auditor‘s independence was not compromised (section 
300(11B)(c)) 
 
The boards section 300(11B) states that non-audit services must be 
consistent with the advice of the audit committee and must not 
contain any material omission of material included in that advice. In 
addition, the audit committee‘s advice must: 
 Be endorsed by a resolution passed by the members of the audit 
committee; and  
 Be written advice and signed by a member of the audit committee 
on behalf of the audit committee and given to the directors 
(section 300(11E)) 
 
 Auditor‘s independence declaration: for all disclosing entities, a copy of 
the auditor‘s independence declaration under new section 307C. 
If auditor conducts an audit for a financial year, or half-year, the auditor 
must give the directors of the company, registered scheme or disclosing 
entity a written declaration in the form of one of the following: 
                                                     
63 Source: Adopted from Blake Dawson Waldron (2004) and Rusmin (2006). 
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 To the best of the auditor‘s knowledge and belief, there have been 
no contraventions of: 
 The auditor independence requirements of the Corporations Act 
in relation to the audit; and  
 Any applicable code of professional conduct in relation to the 
audit review; or  
 To the best of the individual auditor‘s knowledge and belief, the 
only contraventions of the two points above are those 
contraventions which have been set out in the declaration (section 
307C) 
 
III. General requirements for auditor independence: 
 Applies to an audit of a financial report for a financial year, or an audit 
or review of the financial report for a half-year in a financial year, if the 
financial year begins on or after 1 July 2004 
 Applies to all relationships that exist between an auditor and an audited 
body on or after 1 July 2004 (including a relationship that exists 
because of circumstances that come into existence before 1 July 2004) 
 
Some of the provisions promoting general auditor independence: 
 Individual auditor or auditing company aware of a conflict of interest 
situation. It is a contravention of section 324CA if an individual auditor 
or audit company engages in audit activity of an audited body and at 
that time: 
 A conflict of interest situation exists in relation to the audited 
body; 
 The auditor or audit company is aware of the conflict of interest 
situation; and 
 The auditor or audit company does not take reasonable steps to 
ensure that the conflict of interest situation ceases to exist as soon 
as possible after they become aware of the situation (section 
324CA(1)) 
 Requirement to notify ASIC if conflict of interest situation continues. If 
an individual auditor or audit company becomes aware of a conflict of 
interest situation still exists, ASIC must be notified (section 324CA(1A)) 
 Individual auditor or auditing company not aware of a conflict of 
interest situation. 
An individual auditor or auditing company will contravene section 324 
CA (2) if a conflict of interest situation exists and the individual auditor 
or the auditing company is not aware of that situation, but would have 
been aware if they had in place a quality control system reasonably 
capable of making the auditor aware of the conflict of interest situation.  
Section 324 CA (4) provides a defence if the individual auditor or 
auditing company has reasonable grounds to believe that a quality 
control system used by the auditor provided reasonable assurance that 
the individual auditor, or auditing company (or their employees) 
complied with the auditor independence requirements. 
Likewise to section 324CA describe above, section 324CB and 324CC 
impose similar obligations on members of an auditing firm and directors 
of auditing companies to avoid conflict of interest situations and to 
notify ASIC where a conflict of interest situation continues to exist. 
Note: For conflict of interest situation, see section 324 CD. 
 
 
IV. Specific requirements for auditor independence: 
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Applies to all relationships that exist between an auditor and an audited body 
on or after 1 July 2004 (including a relationship that exists because of 
circumstances that come into existence before 1 July 2004. 
 Individual auditor or audit company aware of section 324 CH(1) 
relationship. Individual auditor (under section 324CE), audit firms 
(under section 324CF), audit company (under section 324CG) 
contravene the specific independence requirements if: 
 The auditor is engaged in audit activity, (while reference is made 
only to an auditor in this context auditor refers to individual 
auditors, and auditing firms) 
 At that time, a section 324 CH (1) relationship exists (describe 
below); 
 The auditor becomes aware of the section 324CH(1) relationship; 
and  
 The auditor does not take all reasonable steps to ensure that the 
individual auditor to act in the audit 
 
 Requirement to notify ASIC if a section 324CH(1) relationship 
continues. 
Under section 324CE, 324CF, or 324CG, auditors must also notify ASIC 
if they become aware of a section 324CH(1) relationship and after 7 
days that relationship continues to exist. A notice is also required under 
section 327B(2A) or section 331AAA(2A) within 21 days from the date 
the section 324CE, 324CF, or 324CG notice is given. A failure to do so 
will result in a termination of the auditor appointment. 
 
 
   Individual auditor or audit company not aware of a section 324CH(1) 
relationship. 
It is also a contravention if the auditor is engaged in an audit and a 
section 324CH(1) relationship exists, regardless of the auditor‘s 
knowledge. It is a defence to this strict liability provision if the auditor 
had in place a quality control system that provided reasonable 
assurance that the auditor and its employees complied with the specific 
auditor independence requirements. 
 
Relevance relationships under section 324CH(1) vary slightly between 
individual auditors, auditing firms. However, some of the more common 
relationship are: 
 officer or audit-critical employee – the individual auditor, or a 
professional member of the audit team, being related to the 
audited body by being an officer or audit-critical employee of the 
audited body; 
 former officer of audit-critical employee – the individual auditor, or 
professional member of the audit team, being related to the 
audited body by being an officer or audit-critical employee of the 
audited body within the last 12 months before the financial year 
being audited; 
 former professional employee of the auditor who fail the 
independence test - a former professional employee of the auditor 
related to the audited body by being an officer or audit-critical 
employee who can influence the policies of the auditor, 
participates in business or professional activities of the auditor‘s 
practice, or receives a commission from the auditor for generating 
business; and  
 non-audit services provider who exceeds the maximum hour test – 
if a non-audit service provider has provided more than 10 hours of 
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non-audit services during the period being audited, or the 12 
months immediately before the audited period, and that non-audit 
service provider has certain investments in the audited body 
If these or other relationships in section 324CH(1) are present, the 
specific audit independence requirements will e contravened unless 
the auditor takes all reasonable steps to ensure that the auditor 
ceases to act on the audit. 
 
V. Restrictions on auditors being employed by audit clients 
 Section 324CI and 324CJ apply only if the relevant departure time for 
the purposes of the sections occur on or after 1 July 2004 
 Section 324CK applies to a person only if the person is on 1 July 2004, 
or becomes after 1 July 2004 a member of the audit firm concerned, 
and becomes an officer of the audited body concerned on or after 1 July 
2004. 
In addition to the general and specific auditor independence requirements 
described above, there are specific restrictions on former auditors taking up 
positions with former audit client. 
 2 year cooling off period 
 a member of an audit firm, or director of an audit company who 
was a professional member of an audit team, cannot become an 
officer (director, company secretary or senior manager) of an 
audit client until 2 years from the date of ceasing to be with the 
audit firm or audit company (section 324 CI) 
 section 324CJ applies similar rules for lead or review auditors 
 Multiple former audit firm partners or audit company directors 
There is now a limit on the number of former audit firm partners or 
audit company directors who can become an officer of an audit client. A 
person will contravene section 324CK if: 
 An audit firm or audit company is an auditor of an audited body for 
a financial year; 
 The person has at any time been a member of the audit firm or a 
director of the audit company; 
 The person becomes an officer of the audited body; and 
 At the time when the person becomes an officer of the audited 
body, another person who is or who has at any time been a 
member of the audit firm or a director of the audit company, at a 
time when the audit firm or audit company undertook an audit of 
the audited body is also an officer of the audited body 
 
 
VI. Auditor rotation for listed companies 
Applies to an audit of the financial report for a financial year or an audit or 
review of the financial year report for a half-year in a financial year, if the 
financial year begins on or after 1 July 2006 
 Rotation after significant role in an audit in 5 out of 7 years 
Section 324DA requires rotation of a person who plays a significant role 
in an audit in 2 situations: 
 If an individual has played a significant role in the audit for 5 
successive financial years, the individual must not play a 
significant role in the audit for at least 2 successive financial year 
(section 324DA(1)); and 
 If an individual has played role in the audit for 5 out of 7 
successive financial years, the individual must not play a 
significant role in the audit (section 324DA(2)) 
A person plays a significant role in the audit generally, if the person is a 
lead or review auditor for the audit (section 9). 
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Appendix D: Studies Voluntary & Aggregate 
Table D1, and D2 summarise past studies, and group them into 
Voluntary Disclosures Studies and Aggregate Disclosures Studies64 
respectively. 
 
All the studies shown in Table D.1 and Table D.2 cover only one 
year per firm with the exception of Ahmed (1996), Inchausti 
(1997) and Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh (2005) who investigates the 
extent of disclosures in two, three and four years respectively. 
None of the studies is industry-specific, with the exception of 
Craswell and Taylor (1992) and Malone, Fries and Jones (1993) 
who examine the oil and gas industry. The number of firms of each 
study has varied from 20 in Bahrain (Al-Bastaki, 1977) to 577 in 
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh (Ali, Ahmed and Henry, 2004).  
 
Relationship between corporate attributes and disclosures in 
corporate annual reports has been investigated since 1961 (Ahmed 
and Courtis, 1999). The firm attributes that have been examined 
as possible determinants of level of disclosure have ranged from 
two (Stanga, 1976) to thirteen (Naser, Al-Khatib and Karbhari, 
2002). Firm size, proxied by assets, sales and market 
capitalisation, is the most favoured in the all studies; followed by 
leverage, profitability and size of audit firm. Most of these studies 
adopt disclosure index as dependent variable. The disclosure items 
that form the disclosure index have varied from a minimum of 11 
(Tai et al., 1990) to a maximum of 530 (Craig and Diga, 1998). 
Some studies assign different weight to the items (e.g., Belkaoui 
and Kahl, 1978; Firth, 1979; McNally, Lee and Hasseldine, 1982; 
Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; and Malone et al., 1993), while 
                                                     
64 Aggregate disclosure consists of both mandatory and voluntary disclosure (see Cooke 
(1992)). 
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some others apply equal weight to all items65. Based on literature 
reviewed, past accounting compliance studies predominantly 
examine level of compliance with accounting standards in two 
major streams: (i) level of compliance of measurement, 
presentation and disclosure; and (ii) determinants of level of 
compliance. 
 
The (then) President of the IFAC criticised auditors for attesting 
that corporate financial statements comply with IASs while the 
accounting policies and footnotes show otherwise (Cairns, 1997). 
The revision of IAS 1 requires firms who claim to comply with IASs 
to fully comply with all IASs without exception.  
 
Street, Grey and Bryant (1999) conduct an empirical research of 
the accounting policies and disclosures of firms who claiming to 
comply with IASs in 1996. The key research objective of the study 
is to investigate at what extent the firms really comply with IASs in 
practice. Their tests for compliance focus on both measurement 
and disclosure issues for the IASs 2, 8, 9, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22, and 
2366 revised during the Comparability Project. They sampled 221 
companies from 12 countries, of which claiming to comply with 
IASs. The list of companies is obtained from the IASC. Only firms, 
with 1995 sales of at least US $1 billion, of non-regulated and non-
financial industry, and represented in either WorldScope or the 
Financial Times database, are included in the sample. The final 
sample consists of 49 companies67. 
                                                     
65 Refer to Chapter 4 for methodology discussion. 
66 The IASs examined are IASs 2 (Inventories), 8 (Net Profit/Loss for the Period), 9 
(Research and Development Costs), 16 (Property, Plant and Equipment), 18 (Revenue), 
19 (Retirement Benefit Costs), 21 (The Effects of Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates), 22 
(Business Combination), 23 (Borrowing Costs) 
67 The sample is geographically widespread. The sample consists of firms from Canada 
(2), Finland (3), France (10), Germany (3), Hong Kong (1), Italy (3), Japan (3), Malaysia 
(1), Norway (1), South Africa (2), Sweden (8), and Switzerland (12). 
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Table D.1: Summary of Studies on Voluntary Disclosure 
Study Country Size Leverage Liquidity Profitability Auditor Internationality Industry Ownership 
Diffusion 
Age 
Firth (1979) UK *TS 
*BVE 
   British Big 
Eight / 
Other 
    
McNally, Eng 
& Hasseldine 
(1982) 
New 
Zealand 
*TA   NP/TA *Big Eight 
/ Other 
 11 
Groups 
  
Chow & 
Wong-Boren 
(1987) 
Mexico *MVE+BVD 
*Log 
MVE+BVD 
BVD / 
(BVD+MVE) 
       
Cooke (1989) Sweden *TS 
*TA 
*NSH 
    *Domestic / 
Overseas 
Listing 
*4 
Groups 
  
Cooke (1991) Japan *TA 
*TS 
*NSH 
    *Unlisted / 
Domestic / 
Overseas 
Listing 
*4 
Groups 
  
Craswell & 
Taylor (1992) 
Australia Log TA BVD / MVE   *Big Eight 
/ 
Otherwise 
  Proportion 
shares 
owned by 
top 20 
shareholders 
 
Hossain, Tan 
& Adams 
(1994) 
Malaysia *Log MVE LTD / BVE   Big Six / 
Other 
*Domestic / 
Overseas 
Listing 
 *Proportion 
shares 
owned by 
the top 10 
shareholders 
 
Meek, Roberts 
& Gray (1995) 
US, UK, 
France, 
Germany, 
and the 
Netherlands 
*TS *LTD / BVE  Profit After 
Tax & 
Interest / 
TS 
 *Foreign Sales 
/ TS 
*Domestic / 
Overseas 
Listing 
*4 
Groups 
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Table D.1: Summary of Studies on Voluntary Disclosure (continued) 
 
Study Country Size Leverage Liquidity Profitability Auditor Internationality Industr
y 
Ownership Diffusion Age 
Hossain, 
Perera & 
Rahman 
(1995) 
New 
Zealand 
*Log TA *LTD / BVE   Big Six / 
Other 
*Domestic / 
Overseas Listing 
*Export / TS 
2 
Groups 
  
Raffournier 
(1995) 
Switzerla
nd 
*Log TA 
*Log TS 
BVD / TA  NP / NW Big Six / 
Other 
*Export / TS 2 
Groups 
Proportion shares 
not owned by known 
shareholders 
 
Chau & Gray 
(2002) 
Hong 
Kong & 
Singapor
e 
*Log NS LTD / BVE  PTEE / NS Big Five / 
Other 
Foreign sales by 
subsidiaries / TS 
4 
Groups 
*Proportion shares 
owned by outsiders 
 
Ferguson, Lam 
& Lee (2002) 
Hong 
Kong 
*Log TA *LTD/BVE    Domestic / 
Overseas Listing 
2 
Groups 
  
Haniffa & 
Cooke (2002) 
Malaysia Log TA  BVD / TA  *NP / BVE Big Six / 
Other 
Domestic / 
Overseas Listing 
Foreign 
Activities/Otherwis
e 
*4 
Groups 
*Proportion shares 
owned by foreigners 
Proportion shares 
owned by 
institutional 
investors 
No of 
years 
passe
d 
since 
listing 
Makhija & 
Patton (2004) 
Czech 
Republic 
Log TA   TEBT / BVE *Big Six 
/ Other 
 2 
Groups 
Proportion shares 
owned by 
government 
Proportion shares 
owned by foreigners 
*Proportion shares 
owned by the fund 
with the largest 
shares 
 
*=Significant. TA=Total assets. TS=Total sales. MVE=Market value of equity. BE=Book value of equity. TL=Total liabilities. NS=Net sales. NW=Net 
worth. TR=Total revenue. CA=Current assets. CL=Current liabilities. TEBT=Total earnings before tax. BVD=Book value of total debt. LTD=Long term 
debt. TTA=Total tangible assets. NP=Net profit. NSH=Number of shareholders. NEM=Number of employees. NS=Net sales. PTEE=Profit after tax, 
exceptional items, and extraordinary items. NOP=Net operating profit. Adapted from Al-Shammari (2005). 
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Table D.2: Summary of Studies on Aggregate Disclosure 
 
Study Country Size Leverage Liquidity Profitability Auditor Internationality Industry Ownership 
Diffusion 
Age 
Cerf (1961) US *TA 
*NSH 
  *NP / NW      
Singhvi (1968) India *TA   *TEBT / NW 
*TEBT / NS 
Large / 
Small 
    
Singhvi & 
Desai (1971) 
US TA   NP / NW 
NP / NS 
Large / 
Small 
  NSH  
Buzby (1975) US *TA         
Belkaoui & 
Kahl (1978) 
Canada *TA 
*NS 
 *CA / CL *NP / TA   *14 
Groups 
  
Malone, Fries 
& Jones 
(1993) 
US TA *BVD / BVE  NP / BVE 
NP/NS 
Big Eight 
/ Other 
Foreign 
operation / 
Other 
2 
Groups 
*NSH  
Solas (1994) Jordan TA 
NSH 
  TEBT / NS 
TEBT / BVE 
     
Zarzeski 
(1996)  
France, 
Germany, 
Hong Kong, 
Japan, 
Norway, UK 
& US 
*Log TA *BVD / TA    *Foreign Sales 
/ TS 
   
Ahmed (1996) Bangladesh Log TA 
Log TS 
Log BVD   Large / 
Small 
*Multinational 
subsidiary / 
Otherwise 
   
Al-Bastaki 
(1997) 
Bahrain *TA TL / TA  NP / BVE      
Inchausti 
(1997) 
Spain *TA 
*Log TA 
Log TS 
TL / TA 
TL / BVE 
 NP / BVE 
NOP / BVE 
*Big Six / 
Other 
*Domestic / 
Overseas 
Listing 
3 
Groups 
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Table D.2: Summary of Studies on Aggregate Disclosure 
 
Study Country Size Lever
age 
Liquidity Profitability Auditor Internationality Industr
y 
Ownership Diffusion Age 
Al-Bastaki 
(1997) 
Bahrain *TA TL / 
TA 
 NP / BVE      
Inchausti 
(1997) 
Spain *TA 
*Log TA 
Log TS 
TL / 
TA 
TL / 
BVE 
 NP / BVE 
NOP / BVE 
*Big 
Six / 
Other 
*Domestic / 
Overseas Listing 
3 
Groups 
  
Naser 
(1998) 
Jordan *TA 
*MVE 
TS 
*LTD 
/ 
BVE 
CA / CL TEBT / NS 
*TEBT / BVE 
Large / 
Small 
 *2 
Groups 
Proportion shares 
owned by 
government 
 
Craig and 
Diga (1998) 
Singapore, 
Malaysia, 
Indonesia, 
Philippines 
& Thailand 
*Log TR *BVD 
/ 
BVE 
   Foreign 
subsidiary / 
Otherwise 
*Locally owned / 
foreign owned or 
controlled 
   
Naser, Al-
Khatib & 
Karbhari 
(2002) 
Jordan *TS 
*MVE 
TA 
NEM 
*BVD 
/ 
BVE 
*CA / CL TEBT / NS 
TEBT / BVE 
*Local 
/ 
Interna
tional 
 2 
Groups 
Proportion shares 
owned by 
government 
Proportion shares 
owned by foreigners 
NSH 
 
Al-Shayeb 
(2003) 
United 
Arab 
Emirates 
*Log TA 
Log NS 
  NP / BVE  Multinational 
subsidiary / 
Otherwise 
*3 
Groups 
 No of 
years 
passe
d 
since 
found
ation 
*=Significant. TA=Total assets. TS=Total sales. MVE=Market value of equity. BE=Book value of equity. TL=Total liabilities. NS=Net sales. NW=Net 
worth. TR=Total revenue. CA=Current assets. CL=Current liabilities. TEBT=Total earnings before tax. BVD=Book value of total debt. LTD=Long term 
debt. TTA=Total tangible assets. NP=Net profit. NSH=Number of shareholders. NEM=Number of employees. NS=Net sales. PTEE=Profit after tax, 
exceptional items, and extraordinary items. NOP=Net operating profit. Adapted from Al-Shammari (2005) 
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They document evidence of significant non-compliance with IASs 2 
(Inventory), 8 (Net profit or Loss for the Period), 9 (Research and 
Development Costs), 16 (Property, Plant and Equipment), 18 
(Revenue), and 19 (Retirement Benefit Costs). In particular the 
non-compliance includes: use of inventory valuation that not 
endorsed by the IAS; violation of the strict definition of 
extraordinary items; failure to capitalise certain development 
costs; failure to disclose information pertaining to revaluation on 
property, plant and equipment and charging goodwill to reserves or 
amortising goodwill over a period in excess of the 20 year limit. 
Their findings reveal that only 41% (20 out of 49 companies) state 
compliance with all IASs. However, regardless indications on 
accounting policy footnote and/or audit opinion that company 
comply with all/most IASs, their evidence shows that there is a 
significant extent of non-compliance with the individual IAS on 
measurement and disclosure, especially with the disclosure 
requirements. They conclude that the extent of compliance by 
firms claiming to comply with IASs is very mixed and somewhat 
selective. Their study neither seeks to explain compliance/non-
compliance nor investigates whether there is any association 
between the non-compliance with its firms‘ characteristics. 
 
Tower, Hancock and Taplin (1999) empirically examine the degree 
of compliance with IASs (voluntary disclosure and measurement) of 
six Asia Pacific countries (Australia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, 
Philippines and Hong Kong). The sample consists of 10 listed firms 
from each of the six countries in 1997. There are 512 compliance 
items drawn from twenty six standards (IASs 1, 2, 5, 7-11, 13, 14, 
16-25, 27, 28, 30-33) applicable to 1997 fiscal year ends, which 
range from 2 items (IAS 1) to 74 items (IAS 5)68. Two compliance 
indices are constructed. Ratio 1 compliance assumes that non-
                                                     
68 The average number of compliance items of 22.77 per standard. 
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disclosure of an item is a non-applicable item. A stricter Ratio 2 
regards non-disclosure as violation to standard, hence is in effect 
non-compliance. They also look into the association of firm‘s 
characteristics (country, firm size, leverage, profitability, industry 
and days taken to issue annual report) with the level of 
compliance. Their results show that Ratio 1 has a mean of 90.68% 
of level of compliance, with the minimum of 81% and the 
maximum of 100%. On different note, the stricter Ratio 2 shows, 
that on average, a significant decrease level of compliance to 
42.2%, and the level of compliance range is 20% to 73%. Both 
Ratio 1 and 2 indicate that Australia has the highest level of 
compliance (94% and 54% respectively) and Philippines has the 
lowest (88% and 28% respectively). The findings have greatly 
conflicted with that of Street, Grey and Bryant (1999), who find 
significant of non-compliance. The multivariate statistics show that 
country is the only firm‘s attribute that is highly significant in 
relation to the level of compliance; while days taken to issue 
annual report is moderately significant. Other attributes are not 
significant. 
 
Motivated by the studies of Cairns (1999), Street et al., (1999) and 
Street and Bryant (2000) who support IFAC‘s view that non-
compliance is problematic, a research monograph69 by Street and 
Gray (2001) examine extent of compliance and most importantly to 
document key determinants of non-compliance of a worldwide 
sample companies referring to the use of IAS. A final sample of 
27970 companies‘ 1998/99 financial reports and footnotes are 
                                                     
69 The research monograph was sponsored by the Association of Chartered Certified 
Accountants (ACCA). 
70 An initial sample of 831 companies obtained from the IASC‘s (1999) list of ‗Companies 
Referring to their Use of IAS‘. Companies in the sectors of finance, oil and gas, not for 
profit organisations, merged companies and annual reports that are not in English, are 
eliminated. The sample of annual reports obtained are as follows: 63(China), 62 
(Switzerland), 47 (Germany), 19 (France), 9 (each from Hong Kong and Zimbabwe), 7 ( 
each from Austria, Denmark and South Africa),  6 (each from Canada and Hungary), 5 
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examined in respect of compliance with IAS-required disclosures 
and measurement/presentation practices. Building on the findings 
of United Nation‘s Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) (1998), Cairns (1999), Street et al., (1999) and Street 
and Bryant (2000), a checklist of 14 IASs (2, 4, 8, 12, 14, 16, 17, 
19, 21, 22, 22, 23, 29, 32 and 33) for IAS‘s required disclosures 
and measurement/presentation are constructed. There are four 
compliance indices are developed; two for disclosures and two for 
measurement/presentation71. The first disclosure index provides 
equal weighting to each IAS reviewed and is obtained by dividing 
the total number of disclosures by the number of applicable 
disclosure for each IAS under review. The compliance index for 
each company (i.e., dependent variable) is calculated by averaging 
the disclosure indices for each of the IASs applicable to the 
company. The second disclosure compliance index is calculated as 
follows. The total number of disclosures is divided by the number of 
applicable disclosures for each company for all the IASs under 
review, which give rise to equal weighting to each disclosure item. 
Their results show that overall disclosure compliance index DC1 
and DC2 have 72% and 74% level of compliance with IAS-required 
disclosures. When the sample is grouped into non-regional listings, 
USA filings, USA listings, no listings (i.e., government owned or 
privately held or domestic only listings) and local regional listings, 
the former three groups exhibit the highest level of compliance 
with (87% DC1 and 85% DC2), (78% DC1 and 80% DC2) and 
(83% DC1 and 85% DC2) respectively; whereas the lowest group 
is exhibited by non-listed firms (57% DC1 and 59% DC2). Street 
and Grey (2001) also reveal that the highest level of compliance 
                                                                                                                                                      
(Finland), 4 (Sweden), 3 (each from Italy, Luxembourg and Poland), 2 (each from 
Barbados, Czech Republic and Netherlands) and 1 (each from Australia, Bahrain, 
Botswana, Croatia, Grand Cayman Island, Guyana, Japan, Jordan, Malta, Mexico, Papua 
New Guinea, Russia and Turkey). 
71 Since this thesis focuses on disclosures, therefore measurement/presentation 
compliance is not discussed. Henceforth, the terms ―compliance‖ and ―compliance with 
IAS-required disclosures‖ are used interchangeably. 
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with IAS-required disclosures is firms domiciled in China (80% DC1 
and 82% DC2) in contrast to the lowest is of France (60% DC1 and 
62% DC2). They provide evidence that the highest level of 
compliance is exhibited by firms indicating that IAS is the exclusive 
basis of the financial reports (76% DC1 and 78% DC2) and the 
lowest one is found for firms indicating the reports are in 
compliance with both National GAAP and IAS (60% DC1 and 63% 
DC2). The findings indicate that the highest levels of compliance 
are found when: firms are audited by Big 5+2 (includes BDO and 
Grant Thornton) accounting firms (74% DC1 and 76% DC2), the 
audit opinion states the reports are prepared according to IAS 
(75% DC1 and 77% DC2) and the audit opinion states the audit 
was conducted in accordance with ISA and/or US GAAP (75% DC1 
and 77% DC2). 
 
In assessing the determinants of the non-compliance, Street and 
Grey (2001) document a significant positive relationship between 
the compliance with IAS-required disclosures (DC1) and: 
 an US listing/filing and/or non-regional listing; 
 being in commerce and transportation industry; 
 referring exclusively to the use of IAS (with no exceptions 
noted or reference to other accounting standards); 
 being audited by a Big 5+2 accounting firm; 
 being domiciled in China; 
 being domiciled in Switzerland. 
 
In particular, firms in the industry of commerce and transportation 
supply more IAS-required disclosures (80%) than that of other 
industries (70%). Firms audited by Big 5+2 accounting firms 
provide more IAS-required disclosures (74%) than do the firms 
audited by other types of accounting firms (57%). The findings 
suggest that size of the domestic capital market has significantly 
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negatively related to the level of compliance with IAS-required 
disclosures; which is inconsistent with expectations and in 
contradiction with previous findings. They argue that none of the 
sample firms are domiciled in the US or the UK which are the 
world‘s largest capital markets and are well-known for their 
extensive disclosure requirements, and only one firm from Japan 
the third largest stock market in the world. 
 
Likewise, the level of compliance with IAS-required disclosures as 
measured in DC2 is found to be significantly positively associated 
with: 
 being audited by a Big 5+2 accounting firm; 
 referring exclusively to the use of IAS (with no exceptions 
noted or reference to other accounting standards); 
 having an US listing/filing and/or non-regional listing. 
 
Particularly, firms audited by Big 5+2 accounting firms release 
more IAS-required disclosures (76%) than that of other types of 
accounting firms (59%). The results also unveil a significant 
negative relationship between compliance with IAS-required 
disclosures and being domiciled in Germany, France or other 
Western Europe. 
 
Thus far, most studies on compliance are cross sectional. Craswell 
and Taylor (1992) investigate factors that motivate Australian 
managers of oil and gas companies to voluntary disclose reserves. 
Noting the analysis of Verrecchia (1983), Craswell and Taylor 
(1992) identify two potential confounding factors that are likely to 
be influential, namely the proprietary costs of disclosure and higher 
agency costs of non-disclosure. In order to control for the 
confounding effect on voluntary disclosure decision, they conduct 
the studies focusing on a specific industry (i.e., oil and gas). In 
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determining factors that associated with manager‘ decision in 
voluntary disclosure of the oil and gas reserves, they propose the 
following variables: degree of leverage, cash flow risk, separation 
of ownership and control, firm size and auditor quality. The sample 
of this study is drawn from the Sydney Stock Exchange with the 
three-digit industry codes 031 Oil and Gas Producers and 033 Oil 
and Gas Explorers. The final sample consists of 98 listed companies 
at the end of 1984. The results unveil that there is a significant 
positive relationship between auditor quality and level of reserves 
disclosures. The authors proclaim that firms have tendency to 
engage then the Big 8 auditors to signal high quality of disclosure, 
which is consistent with evidence of reducing agency costs. They 
further assert that high quality auditors bring pressure on client to 
disclosure comprehensively of the oil and gas reserves. 
 
In a related study, Malone et al., (1993) undertake an empirical 
investigation of the extent and determinants of corporate financial 
disclosure in the oil and gas industry (Enterprise Standard 
Industrial Classification [ESIC] Code 1311 Crude Petroleum and 
Natural Gas. The 10-K form and financial reports of the final 
sample of 125 oil and gas firms are examined. Degree of voluntary 
disclosure is determined by using weighted index of disclosure 
items. A survey questionnaire made up by 129 disclosure items 
from the 10-K form and annual reports are sent to 722 oil and gas 
financial analysts listed on membership directory of the Financial 
Analysts Foundation72. The analysts are asked to weight each item 
in its importance in the investment decision. A stepwise regression 
is adopted to test the relationship between the ten variables (listing 
status, firm size, audit firm size, leverage, rate of return on net 
worth, industry diversification, earnings margin, proportion of 
outside directors, multinational and number of shareholders) and 
                                                     
72 Only 115 usable responses are received. 
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the extent of disclosure. Of the ten factors, listing status, leverage 
and number of shareholders are found statistically positively 
significant. Malone et al., (1993) conclude by acknowledging the 
existence of systematic differences between firms that disclose 
different level of information. They (Malone et al., 1993) claim that 
―regulators, on requiring uniformity of disclosure, may, in some 
instances, be putting some firms at a relative economic 
disadvantage. This would be the case if firms have reached an 
optimal point in the market for financial information‖ (p. 267). 
 
As can be seen in Table D.1 and Table D.2, most research 
conducted in relation to compliance studies are corporate voluntary 
disclosure. Wallace and Naser (1995) investigate the extent and 
firm-specific determinants of comprehensiveness of mandatory 
disclosures in the financial statements of firms listed on the stock 
exchange of Hong Kong. The final sample of this study is drawn 
from 80 corporate financial statements for 1991. There are eleven 
firm attributes examined. The first one is the registered office of 
the firm (the official domicile of a firm). The rest are categorised 
into three non-mutually exclusive groups, as per Land and 
Lundholm (1993) and Wallace, Naser and Mora (1994), namely 
structure-related, performance-related and market-related73. The 
structure-related firm attributes includes debt-equity ratio, firm 
size (using two proxies by market capitalisation and proportion of 
equity shares held by outsiders, excluding nominees and family 
groups in Hong Kong. Consistent with Wallace et al., (1994), the 
performance-related firm characteristics consist of profit margin, 
earnings return and liquidity. Finally, the market-related firm 
                                                     
73 Structural variables ―measure firm characteristics that are widely known and likely to 
remain relatively stable over time‖ (Land and Lundhom, 1993, p. 248).  Performance 
variables ―are time-period specific, representing information to which management may 
have preferential access and which is likely to be subject to disclosure within the period‖ 
Land and Lundholm, 1993, p. 248). Market variables ―are either time-period specific 
and/or relatively stable over time‖ (Wallace et al., 1994, p. 47). 
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attributes incorporate market capitalisation of firm‘s equity, scope 
of business operations and auditor size.  
 
The ranked OLS and unranked OLS regression are employed to 
investigate the incremental explanatory power of the variables. The 
studies find that the level of comprehensiveness of compliance with 
mandatory disclosures has ranged from 55.32% to 87.23%, with 
an average of 72.54%. The findings show that the level of 
comprehensiveness of compliance with the mandatory disclosure is 
significantly positively related to asset size and the scope of 
business operations but negatively associated with profits and size 
of auditor. The result documented of a negative relationship 
between the level of compliance and the size of auditor contradict 
with evidence found by prior research on Bangladesh (Ahmed and 
Nicholls, 1994), New Zealand (McNally et al., 1982), and the US 
(Singhvi and Desai, 1971) but supports the findings of Tai et al., 
1990) and the UK (Firth, 1979). Wallace and Naser (1995) argue 
that low profit margins tend to achieve higher degree of compliance 
as Hong Kong firms regard lower profit margin as bad news; hence 
provide more details as to attract investors. They further postulate 
that higher profit firms may assume that investors are satisfied 
with the firm‘s performance, therefore additional information is not 
required. 
 
In a similar study, Glaum and Street (2003) assess the extent of 
compliance with mandatory disclosures by companies listed on 
Germany‘s New Market (Neuer Markt). Emulating the example of 
NASDAQ, the New Market is set up in 1997 as a division of 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange to entice young and innovative growth 
companies. Firm listed on the New Market are required to prepare 
their financial statements in accordance with either IAS or US 
GAAP. The sample used in this study is drawn from each 100 firms 
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that apply IAS and US GAAP in the year-2000 financial reports 
(excluding Financial Services and Media & Entertainment industry). 
Firm size has ranged from €15 million to €17.7 billion. On average, 
US GAAP firms are larger than IAS‘s. Of the 200 sample firms, 116 
are audited by Big 5 accounting firms74. Utilised on the 
methodology of Cooke (1989, 1991, 1992), Street and Bryant 
(2000) and Street and Gray (2001), two checklists are constructed 
based on Ernst & Young‘s (2000) IAS/US GAAP Comparison. The 
final checklist for IAS and US GAAP consist of 153 and 144 items 
respectively. The findings show the extent of compliance with 
mandatory disclosures of IAS varies from 41.6% to 100%, with an 
average of 83.7%; and of US GAAP ranges from 52.4% to 98.8%, 
with an average of 86.6%. This implies that compliance level is 
lower for firms that apply IAS on preparing their financial 
statements. In line with prior research of Street and Bryant (2000) 
and Street and Gray (2001), the results reveal that IAS firms are 
particularly problematic in regard to certain disclosure relation to 
pension, leasing, financial instruments, business combination and 
capitalisation of interest costs. Glaum and Street (2003) also 
document the evidence that the level of compliance with IAS and 
US GAAP mandatory disclosures has a significant positive 
association with firm being audited by Big 5 accounting firms and 
to cross-listing on US exchanges.  
 
Reviewing the past literature indicates that there is no specific 
study on compliance with mandatory disclosure in mineral 
resources sector. To explain variation in companies‘ compliance 
level, several studies have addressed the association between 
compliance with IASs disclosures and firm‘s characteristics. These 
characteristics include, magnitude of a firms foreign operations, 
                                                     
74 Andersen taps the biggest share of 19%, followed by KPMG (12%), Ernst & Young 
(12%), PwC (11.5%) and Deloitte & Touche (3.5%). 
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financing policy, multiple listings, US listing/filing, type of auditor, 
industry, country domiciled, size, type of economy, leverage, 
profitability, ownership concentration and culture. Predominantly, 
these studies find that level of disclosure is significantly related 
with size and listing status. However, findings regarding the 
association between level of disclosure and other corporate 
variables yield mixed results. 
 
This suggests the findings on compliance with IASs are mixed. A 
limitation of previous compliance studies that could explain the 
mixed results is they have subjectively selected certain items 
covering a limited set of IASs when developing a checklist for the 
compliance analysis. To develop more comprehensive findings a 
checklist dealing with all the disclosure, measurement and 
presentation practices in each IAS should be constructed (Cairns, 
2002). A common finding across all the studies, however, is a lack 
of complete compliance.  
 
Auditor quality/size has been included in the studies under review 
as one of the determinants of the extent of compliance. The 
findings are mixed. This will be further investigated in this 
research. This thesis will segregate auditor quality into audit 
independence and audit specialisation, and look into their 
association with mandatory disclosure as required by AASBs 6 and 
136. Chapter 3 discusses on past literature on audit quality and 
hypotheses developments. 
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Appendix E: Australian Sample Companies 
ABM Resources NL Cullen Resources Limited 
Acclaim Exploration NL D'Aguilar Gold Limited 
Adamus Resources Limited De Grey Mining Limited 
Adelaide Resources Limited Diamond Rose NL 
Admiralty Resources NL Discovery Nickel Limited 
Agincourt Resources Limited Dominion Mining Limited 
Aim Resources Limited  Dragon Mining NL 
Alcaston Mining NL  Drake Resources Limited 
Allied Gold Limited Dwyka Diamonds Limited 
Alto Energy International Limited  East Coast Minerals NL 
Anglo Australian Resources NL Elkedra Diamonds NL 
Arafura Resources NL  Ellendale Resources NL 
Argonaut Resources NL  Emperor Mines Limited 
Ashburton Minerals Limited Equigold NL 
Astro Diamond Mines NL  Eurogold Limited 
Astron Limited Exco Resources NL 
Atlas Iron Limited  Extract Resources Ltd 
Audax Resources Limited Ferraus Limited 
Aurora Minerals Limited  Fox Resources Limited 
Aurox Resources Limited Frontier Resources Limited 
Ausquest Limited  Gindalbie Metals Ltd 
Australia Oriental Minerals NL Giralia Resources NL 
Australian Zircon NL Gleneagle Gold Limited 
Avoca Resources Limited Glengarry Resources Limited 
AXG Mining Limited GME Resources Limited 
Aztec Resources Limited Gold Aura Limited 
Bannerman Resources Limited Golden Cross Resources Limited 
Bass Metals Ltd Golden Deeps Limited 
Bendigo Mining Limited Golden State Resources Limited 
Berkeley Resources Limited Golden West Resources Limited 
BHP Billiton Limited Goldsearch Limited 
Breakaway Resources Limited Grange Resources Limited 
Cape Lambert Iron Ore Limited Gravity Diamonds Limited 
Carnegie Corporation Ltd Graynic Metals Limited 
Cazaly Resources Limited Great Australian Resources Limited 
CBH Resources Limited Great Gold Mines NL 
Central Asia Gold Limited Greater Pacific Gold Limited 
Chrome Corporation Limited Gunson Resources Limited 
Climax Mining Limited Haddington Resources Limited 
Comet Resources Limited Hampton Hill Mining NL 
Conquest Mining Limited Helix Resources Limited 
Consolidated Minerals Limited Herald Resources Limited 
Continental Goldfields Limited Heron Resources Limited 
Copper Strike Ltd Imperial Corporation Limited 
Copperco Limited Indo Mines Limited 
Cougar Metals NL Intermin Resources Limited 
Crescent Gold Limited Intrepid Mines Limited 
Crusader Holdings NL Jabiru Metals Limited 
CuDeco Limited Jackson Gold Limited 
 
Australian Sample Companies (continued) 
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Jervois Mining Limited Peninsula Minerals Limited 
Jindalee Resources Limited Perilya Limited 
Jubilee Mines NL Perseus Mining Limited 
Jupiter Energy Limited Perseverance Corporation Limited 
Jupiter Mines Limited Petra Diamonds Limited 
Kalgoorlie-Boulder Resources Limited Pioneer Nickel Limited 
King Island Scheelilte Limited Platinum Australia Limited 
Kingsgate Consolidated Limited Platsearch NL 
Lake Resources NL Polaris Metals NL 
Latin Gold Limited Ramelius Resources Limited 
Leyshon Resources Limited Rand Mining NL 
Liberty Gold NL Range Resources Limited 
Macarthur Coal Limited Range River Gold Limited 
Macmin Silver Ltd Red 5 Limited 
Magnesium International Limited Red Metal Limited 
Malachite Resources NL Redbank Mines Limited 
Marathon Resources Limited Redport Limited 
Matrix Metals Limited Reed Resources Ltd 
Mawson West Limited Reefton Mining NL 
Medusa Mining Ltd Regal Resources Limited 
Metallica Minerals Limited Regis Resources NL 
Metals Australia Ltd Republic Gold Limited 
Michelago Limited Resolute Mining Limited 
Midas Resources Limited Resource Mining Corporation Limited 
Mincor Resources NL Rimfire Pacific Mining NL 
Mindax Limited Rusina Mining NL 
Minotaur Exploration Limited Sabre Resources Limited 
Mithril Resources Limited Sally Malay Mining Limited 
Moly Mines Limited Saracen Mineral Holdings Limited 
Monarch Gold Mining Company 
Limited Scimitar Resources Limited 
Mount Burgess Mining NL SMC Gold Limited 
Mount Gibson Iron Limited Southern Gold Limited 
Namakwa Diamond Company NL Sphere Investments Limited 
New Holland Mining Limited Stellar Resources Limited 
Newcrest Mining Limited Sub-Sahara Resources NL 
NGM Resources Limited Sundance Resources Limited 
Nkwe Platinum Limited Sylvania Resources Limited 
North Australian Diamonds Ltd Synergy Metals Ltd 
Northern Star Resources Ltd Takoradi Limited 
Norton Gold Fields Limited Tanami Gold NL 
Nullarbor Holdings Limited Tasman Resources NL 
Olympia Resources Limited Tectonic Resources NL 
OneSteel Limited Tennant Creek Gold Limited 
Ord River Resources Limited Territory Iron Limited 
Oropa Limited The Ark Fund Limited  
Pacmag Metals Limited Tianshan Goldfields Limited 
Pan Palladium Limited Titan Resources Limited 
Paradigm Gold Limited Tribune Resources NL 
Paramount Mining Corporation 
Limited Troy Resources NL 
Pelican Resources Limited Union Resources Limited 
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Australian Sample Companies (continued) 
Uranium Equities Limited 
View Resources Ltd 
Vulcan Resources Limited 
West Australian Metals Limited 
Western Areas N.L. 
Westgold Resources NL 
Westonia Mines Limited 
Yilgarn Gold Limited 
Yilgarn Mining Limited 
Zinifex Limited 
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Appendix F: List of Non-Big4 Accounting Firms 
Auditor 
Alcock Davis Danieli CAs K Westaway & Assoc. 
Barnes Dowell James Leydin Freyer & Assoc. 
BDO Maxim Audit 
BDO Kendalls Moore Stephens 
BDO Stoy Hayward Nexia ASR 
Bentley MRI Nexia Court & Co 
Bill Li & Co Ord Partners 
Brentnalls Assurance Pitcher Partners 
Butler Settineri PKF 
DFK Richard Hill Priestly & Morris 
Draper Dillon Rix Levy Fowler 
DTT Victoria Robertsons CA 
G. Cole & Assoc. Rothsay CAs 
Gould Ralph & Co RSM Bird Cameron 
Graham Abbott Assoc. Some & Cooke 
Grant Thornton Stantons International 
HLB Mann Judd Stantons Partners 
Horwarth Audit Stirling SCI 
Horwath Webb Callaway Paton 
Horwath Sydney Partnership William Buck CA 
Ian D. Riley Wong & Mayes 
 
 
